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Abstract 
 
 
How and what can we discern through the aesthetic production of hazy phenomena? 
Although historically secreted from architectural formats and protocols, scenography 
deviated from them by advancing visual attenuations, the evanescence of spatial 
borders, and the malleability of imperceptibility, up to making black box theatre spaces.  
Intersecting practices and theories from various spatial arts, the thesis inquires 
into the precedents and legacy of this scenographic gloom to advance an understanding 
of its sensory and cognitive difficulties. In particular, the work explores how the 
blurring of bodily and spatial substances pertains to a phenomenal domain of 
transformative and interactive spatio-corporeality or bodily space. In this fluctuating 
field, the crisis of visual legibility exerts pressures on perception, representation and 
language bringing them down to a speculative threshold. 
By further interrogating this threshold practically and philosophically, the thesis 
unfolds a reconsideration of experiential and authorial subjectivity in embodied terms 
that constitute a vertiginous detournement of ontological and epistemological traditions. 
Resulting from such discursive disorientations, scenography is reposited as an 
architectural mise en abyme that is a mise en abyss where the gloom sheds light upon an 
ethical praxis of reciprocal and affective relations and beings. 
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Have you ever been in love and had the feeling that 
the street before you suddenly expands, that houses 
grow, sing, lose themselves, and it seems to you that 
the street darkens drastically, levitates, and becomes 
transformed into a cloud? (Craig in Baugh 2005: 126) 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          1 Edward Gordon Craig, woodcut print for King Lear, 1920 
 
 
 
 
 
[A] form is a form only if its inhumanity touches our 
humanity (Castellucci 2001: 183; present author’s 
translation). 
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Introduction 
 
 
Sceno-graphy, as its etymology suggests, may be said to draw from a historical and 
graphic tradition of linking imagery and text, vision and meaning. This is well 
exemplified by illuminations or illuminated manuscripts wherein the visual is 
cognitively coded under the assumption that light (limnen) is a function of discursive 
intelligibility. In scenography, this graphic condition is constituted on the basis of the 
visual translation of text in space. Scenographic visuality would then be founded on a 
discursive clarity that also comes to be known as representation. Yet, from haze-
machines and scrims, through to Magic Lanterns, the history of scenography is 
punctuated by devices producing visual disturbances inasmuch as vision is attenuated 
and representation less than certain. The creation of visual uncertainty in scenography 
culminates in the twentieth century with new developments in electric lighting that 
propelled even more radical visual discrepancies such as the cyclorama and the larger 
revision of the interior architecture of theatre-houses that is the black box. Through 
developing an understanding of the scenographic as a growing desire to advance 
imperceptibility, thereby disentangling vision from representation – up to turning the 
visual against the discursive – the thesis seeks to delineate the experiential and 
conceptual implications of such endeavour. This will include the exploration of 
questions such as: What are the perceptual complications inferred by visual attenuation? 
How does the demise of representational stability alter the production of meaning? 
The thesis will argue that the sensory domain of imperceptibility offers 
experiential and cognitive problems relating to the positionality of both the observer and 
that which is observed. Perceptual and discursive disorientations embed the body 
differently in the materiality of its surrounding. As relations between body and 
environment shift, the traditional frameworks of human cognition and subjectivity are 
dispelled, allowing for epistemological and ontological reconsiderations which have 
also been found in some twentieth-century theories and philosophies. As these offer 
constructive ways of thinking the human subject in the tumult of a discursively 
undefinable material world of actions, scenography here serves as a particularly relevant 
platform of intersection and investigation of the practical and theoretical potentials of a 
praxis of imperceptibility which I am calling here ‘gloom’.  
14
 
 
 
What follows traces the historical lineage of the gloom. That tracing is 
accompanied by an analysis of the concepts and philosophies that may be said to pertain 
to gloom. Taken together the historical lineage and its conceptual elaboration suggest 
the context through and upon which contemporary practices may be understood and 
from which they may be further developed.  
Part 1 traces a genealogy of historical developments in which visual clarity is 
incrementally eroded up to the conception of the black box. Because the graphic in 
general is part of an aesthetic tradition governed by representational systems, including 
visual creations such as painting, sculpture and architecture, scenography will be 
analysed within a cross-disciplinary perspective. The argument of the thesis will 
therefore deliberately place scenography alongside other visual forms, from which it 
draws and to which it offers a challenge. This method of contextualization and contrast 
should enable a deeper insight into scenographic development. 
The first part of the thesis posits the developments of scenographic 
imperceptibility against an increasingly prevalent tradition of visual clarity. With a 
focus on practices from the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, this first 
section argues that the reinforcement of traditional aesthetic strategies and their 
underlying ideologies is paired with their subversion by ways of elaborating tactics of 
visual incompletion and unrest. The more the stage was visually framed the more 
practitioners sought to unframe it and ‘return perception to the fullness of its encounter 
with its environment’ (Garner 1994: 1). This perceptual domain will be defined within 
the disorienting terms of a multisensory and multiperspectival construction of spatio-
corporeality, or what Stanton Garner calls ‘bodied spatiality [: a] phenomenal space, 
governed by the body and its spatial concerns, a non-Cartesian field of habitation which 
undermines the stance of objectivity and in which the categories of subject and object 
give way to a relationship of mutual implication’ (Garner 1994: 4).  
Garner’s formulation of bodied spatiality leads us into one of the key concepts 
of the thesis. The production of bodied spatiality may be said to infer that it is not 
possible to posit or position the body distinctively in and from space. From here we can 
say that, since the instantiation of the body as of space cannot be granted by any 
ideological assumption, we are at a juncture. I call this a speculative threshold. The 
speculative threshold of spatio-corporeality is one in which the realization of both 
spatial and bodily forms may be drawn from the most unrealizable conceptions.  
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In summary, Part 1 of the thesis argues that the history of the discrepant gloom 
developed through an incremental cultivation of bodied spatiality and the challenges it 
brings forth to ‘perception and the constitution of meaning, objects and their 
appearances, subjectivity and otherness, presence and absence, body and world’ (Garner 
1994: 3). From here Part 2 of the thesis will argue that, although this history was 
initiated from the subversion of the dominant tradition of visuality in spatial art forms, 
the emergence of the black box both circumvents and yet propelled further 
developments that can be seen as radical departures from the tradition. Unfolding the 
body from such a speculative threshold makes it possible to reconsider its cognitive and 
subjective relation to the world by means of a multipositional entanglement in space. By 
observing late twentieth-century and contemporary developments, the second part of the 
thesis initiates and consolidates an understanding of the epistemological and ontological 
vertigo bestowed by the speculative threshold. Indeed, how are we to comprehend 
cognition and subjectivity when ‘the image is a thorn in the eye and bodies write a text 
that defies publication, the prison of meaning’ (Müller in Cody 1998: 291)? And, from 
here, how are we to understand the human condition when the images created do not 
attempt to frame such a condition in discourse? 
 
Methodology: 
The research undertaken and the structure of the thesis are informed by various 
methodological features. These concern the tripartite combination of historical, 
theoretical and practical inquiries, the role of practice as a reflective, historically 
derived, process of speculation, the positioning of the author and his subjective stance, 
and the functional articulation of various key concepts.  
The research employs three modes of inquiry into the subject of scenographic 
imperceptibility: theoretical, historical and practical. These are correlated within the 
terms of an approach that seeks to produce a praxis of the gloom. As the thesis will 
demonstrate, such a praxis implicates a change in sensory perception and the disruption 
of an individuated conception of subjectivity, a subjectivity positioned in singularity. 
The profitability of such disruption is analyzed conceptually in the text through the 
elaboration of notions such as bodily space, speculative threshold and polyphonic 
subjectivity. However, these serve as constructs – ‘ideas consciously and systematically 
thought up […] for specific purposes of explanation’ (Murray and Lawrence 2000: 135) 
– rather than concepts ‘generalizing idea[s] or term[s], useful for classifying 
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phenomena’, and thus do not seek to formulate a ‘taxonomic definition [–] a device for 
restricted comparison’ – but a ‘componential definition [:] a device for elaborated 
comparison’ (Murray and Lawrence 2000: 93).  
Accordingly, the subjective position of the present author is progressively 
intersected with other authors in a polyphonic way whereby no authorial classification 
and hierarchization is orchestrated. In other words, neither the author nor any other 
author referenced in the text effectively predominates over the others. In order to carry 
out this project, no individual is biographically depicted nor are their ideas presented 
within a complete rendering of their intellectual approach. This leads, for example, to a 
deliberate and incremental erasure of the normal scholarly apparatus whereby 
quotations from sources are introduced with the names of their authors (as in the 
quotations above). This organizational method is intended to reflect and sustain key 
conceptual and ethical components discussed in the work, but at the same time it  serves 
the purpose of constructing a genealogical network of a legacy of which the relevance is 
not found in anecdotal historicism but rather in its appropriation as a continuing 
determination to unfold and expand. In other words, all instances of past practices and 
ideas are here dissected with a view to informing and activating contemporary practice 
and thinking. To this end, the citational structure of the thesis seeks to disrobe the 
singularity of the individual voices that are called upon, thereby allowing for the 
imbrication of the author’s voice within a dialogic perspective that dispels all individual 
subjectivities and strives to nurture an intersubjective domain of reflection and 
experience. As such, this genealogy of the gloom does not claim nor seek to be 
exhaustive.  
Similarly, the personal practice undertaken as part of this research is derived 
from appropriating past practices within a proto-processual exploration of the gloom’s 
contemporary potential for further growth. As such, the practical aspect of the work 
does not attempt to formulate a privileged model of a praxis of the gloom but rather lies 
in a desire to develop a practical process of creation solely focused on the production of 
phenomena of imperceptibility. This is done in order, firstly, to comprehend further the 
processual issues at play creatively as well as, secondly, to experience first-hand and 
test the limits of the effects of the gloom on the body and the self. As a result, the work 
could be accused of ‘systematic bias […] where the enquiry is known and planned to 
lead in a particular direction’ (Murray and Lawrence 2000: 127). Although ‘bias, the 
skewing of an enquiry in a particular direction, will always occur in some form’ 
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(Murray and Lawrence 2000: 127), I have sought to minimize its breadth and effects by 
maintaining an ‘attention to detail in checking and rechecking the enquiry process as it 
proceeds […] as help to contain bias’ (Murray and Lawrence 2000: 128). To do so, I 
have followed Schon’s reflective practitioner (1983) in consistently balancing, within 
each phase of the practice, iterations of tacit praxis (non-discursive and intuitively 
evaluated progression through sensation) with ad hoc or first-hand discursive 
reflections on practice, further punctuated with second-hand, post hoc, evaluations 
(detached from the contextual conditions of the practical phase under scrutiny). To this 
extent, the practice is particularly predicated upon a process of ‘tacit transmission’ 
(Rust 2007: 73) or translation of past images into present and new images of which the 
ownership cannot therefore be located in one singular being but, rather, within a legacy 
that helps formulate a critical and cogent mode of co-authorship. 
 Indeed, the authorly dimension of this study lies in how it manages to conduct a 
personal journey that is, at the same time, not individual; that testifies to the productive 
potential of the gloom as a deindividuating factor of creative authorship and experience. 
Co-authorship lies at the heart of any praxis of the gloom whereby the process of 
authoring is engaged from the start with the material world, the outside or the other, as 
an undefined and as yet unformed landscape of possibilities. Engaging with one’s lack 
of autonomy as an enactive and creative interdependency with others (whose autonomy 
must also be suspended) is in this thesis embodied in terms of the author disaggregating 
his subjective position as a function of his process of creation and reflection. 
 In the chapters which follow, then, there will be both an analytical account of 
the historical evolution of scenography within a larger visual and philosophical context 
and, at the same time, the gradual dissolution of the authorial presence which controls 
this journey and its analysis. The account of the gloom has, in some sense, to be itself a 
praxis of gloom.  
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1 Void 
 
 
 
Once upon a time, stage scenery was architecture. A little later it became 
imitation architecture; still later it became imitation artificial architecture. 
Then it lost its head, went quite mad, and has been in a lunatic asylum 
ever since (Craig in Baugh et al. 1999: 1). 
 
 
In the absence of walls that once seemed secure, nothing remains separate 
or isolated; everything becomes permeable screens (Taylor 2003: 231).  
 
 
If architecture is a huge three-dimensional sculpture in an outdoor 
situation, so then scenography […] is a sort of reversed sculpture inside 
(and sometimes outside) any concrete space (Malina in Howard 2002: 
xiv). 
 
 
[U]nfolding the body as if pulling black velvet curtains to expose a stage 
(Schneider 1997: 2). 
 
 
 
Within the field of theatre, scenography is often conceptually framed under the umbrella 
of an interdisciplinarity predominantly seen as a ‘seamless synthesis’ (Howard 2002: 
xx) of body, space, light and sound. In this conception, the hinge or node of these 
constituents is the actual and visible presence of the actor (States 1987; Fischer-Lichte 
1997; McAuley 2000; Howard 2002; Baugh 2005). This ‘centrality of the actors’ 
(McAuley 2000: 282) conceives of them as ‘dynamic agent[s] responsible for 
energizing the performance space […] endowing it with meaning and drawing meaning 
from it’ (McAuley 2000: 282). The production of meaning, though reliant upon space, 
is attributed first to the actor, and as such the actor embodies the discursive clarity, 
legibility and intelligibility of text: ‘it is through the actor’s corporeal presence under 
the spectator’s gaze that the dramatic text actualizes itself in the field of performance’ 
(Garner 1994: 1). Thus, the scenographic would be ‘the measured space of […] a 
meeting point between actors and a potential audience’ (Howard 2002: 1) thereby 
participating in the alleged ‘specificity of theatre [that] consists essentially of the 
interaction between performers and spectators in a given space’ (McAuley 2000: 5).  
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In this section we shall begin to look at attitudes to this given space. This will 
lead us to some preliminary formulations about the body presumed by such a space and 
its problematics.  
In the conceptual model of scenography described here, its relational function as 
a ‘meeting point’, a hinge for ‘interaction’, would then be predicated upon cognitive 
clarity and discursive understanding that start with a space that is ‘measured’ and 
‘given’ on a par with, yet secondary to, the presence of actors: thus when devoid of 
bodies, the scenographic space would be ‘silent, empty and inert’ (Howard 2002: 1).  
To understand scenography in this way implies that its spatiality adheres to 
architectural and everyday spaces inasmuch as these orchestrate and regulate human 
encounters: it would then participate in ‘describ[ing] the experience of reality according 
to a model provided by theatre’ by merely emulating the so-called ‘theatricalization’ of 
‘everyday life [where] town planning, architecture, and design shape our environment 
as a kind of theatrical backdrop, against which individuals and groups display 
themselves and their lifestyles’ (Fischer-Lichte 1997: 218). Yet, everyday spaces like 
the stage can be seen to pre-order human relations even before they are inhabited and 
experienced accordingly. As such, they cannot be deemed silent or neutral when empty 
and, as a result, the aforementioned model of the scenographic should imply a set of 
socio-political assumptions and ideologies about human interaction.  
Such perspective is consistent with the historical tradition of stage design as it 
was often undertaken by architects pursuing everyday architecture and its grounding 
conception of body-space relations in the theatre. Although, from Ancient Greek theatre 
onwards, stage design can be seen to utilize and destabilize architectural norms by 
adding to them uncertain visual phenomena based on flying machineries (mechane) and 
smoke-making devices, ideological subtexts drawn from larger societal concerns can be 
seen to be reinforced in theatre by way of further defining it visually as ‘an 
architecturally closed form in the Renaissance, in which the ideal city was represented 
on stage’ (Stemmrich in Douglas & Eamon 2009: 94). This predominant strategy can be 
seen to culminate with Richard Wagner’s conception of a scenographic 
interdisciplinarity grounded practically in the reenforcement of the opera house’s 
proscenium arch and conceptually in the increasing ideology of Nationalism in 
nineteenth-century Europe.  
This historical tradition of connivance between scenography and architecture 
suggests that the ideological dimension of the centrality of the actor in the scenographic 
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phenomenon is implicitly related to the everyday positionality of the human subject. 
Thus the empirical and live conditions in which the visual phenomenon unfolds would 
not consider the materiality of the body at its origins but its societal inscription. Yet 
such bodily materiality, which can be called corporeality, remains experientially and 
phenomenologically determinant inasmuch as it remains the cognitive agent of the 
performative event. As such, it cannot be altogether erased but only disguised and 
disregarded. Critiques of such an ideological masquerade can be found currently within 
the field of architecture:   
bodies are absent in architecture, but they remain architecture’s unspoken 
condition […] the body is there in an incontrovertible way. The point is to 
affirm that it’s there and to find the right kind of terms and values by 
which to make it profitable for architecture to think its own investments in 
corporeality (Grosz 2001: 14). 
 
However, similar injunctions that sought to expose a corporeal dimension untainted by 
ideological subtexts were made by scenographers such as Edward Gordon Craig and 
Adolphe Appia over a century ago. Thus, Appia’s wish to explore the potential for 
scenography to be ‘inspired by the human body’ (Beacham 1993: 110) not only denotes 
a schism between scenography and architecture but also refers to a threshold from 
which the human subject can be reconsidered and a whole ‘new social practice’ (Appia 
in Beacham 1993: 109) imagined. By conceiving of a scenographic interdisciplinarity 
that hinges on a critical corporeality, Appia, like Craig, brought attention to a kind of 
spatiality that could no longer simply be a backdrop on a par with the architectural 
frame and tradition. In subverting constructions of a spatiality based on a socialized and 
politicized body, they proposed to reconsider the material dimension of spatio-
corporeality away from societal orders, thereby exposing how the body  
functions almost like as a ‘black box’: it is acted upon, inscribed, peered 
into; information is extracted from it, and disciplinary regimes are 
imposed on it; yet its materiality also entails a resilience and thus also 
(potential) modes of resistance to power’s capillary alignments. It is a kind 
of passivity capable of being mobilized according to the interests of power 
or in the forms of subversion (Grosz 1994: 146).  
 
In doing so, Appia and Craig elaborated through scenography possibilities for a 
dissident domain of bodily life whose material perceptions and actions required new 
types of spaces and phenomena such as the black box. Though these have now become 
rather ubiquitous, their historical contextualization within a scenographic subversion of 
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the architectural framework and their currency as such have received very little analysis. 
The present section undertakes such an analysis by way of tracing points of 
convergence and divergence between scenography and other spatial arts with a view to 
clarifying the conceptual and practical qualities of a scenographic domain conceived as 
a spatio-corporeal mode of resistance to (inter)disciplinary regimes and ideologies of 
the body and being. I shall start firstly with analyzing how scenographic 
interdisciplinarity shifted from an ideologically coded domain to its inversion that is 
based on a speculative threshold which informs a historical schism between 
scenography and other spatial conceptions. 
 
 
1.1 The aesthetic ideology of visual representation 
Interdisciplinarity in performance and its scenography found one of its most blatant 
affirmations and theorizations in the nineteenth-century artist Richard Wagner. His 
fusion of music, space, light and the body followed his concern with advancing a kind 
of performance grounded in a higher aesthetic consensus: a Gesamtkunstwerk or ‘total 
work of art’ (Bonnier in Crary 2001: 253). Wagner hoped to create performances that 
did not fall into any one genre but conflated them all into a new kind of theatrical event 
– what he coined ‘music-dramas’ – that would be superior to all others as they would 
offer ‘the fullest possible perception’ (Bonnier in Crary 2001: 253) and thus be relevant 
to all kinds of audiences.  
Wagner sought to produce consensus both aesthetically and cognitively by linking 
the dramaturgy of European myths with perceptual experiences that would be quasi-
identical for each and every audience member. To this end, Wagner chose to enhance 
the delimitation of the stage and its imagery by way of constructing a theatre, the 
Bayreuth Festspielhaus (1876), in which the orchestra was now concealed in a pit, 
thereby making the borders of the stage clearer and neatly separated from the 
auditorium. The distinction between these two areas in the theatre was further 
reinforced by the extinction of all lighting within the auditorium, ‘focus[ing] all eyes on 
the stage [and thus] tying [the spectators] with invisible bonds that prevented them from 
looking to left or right’ (Wiles 2003: 229).  
Cognitive and perceptual unilateralism in Wagner’s work can be seen as a reaction 
to the increasing presence of non-Western cultures and myths in the European society of 
the nineteenth century and the scientific discoveries that unsettled pre-existing 
22
 
 
 
understandings of human perception, and vision in particular. Indeed, the ‘holistic or 
atomistic nature of sensory perception’ (Crary 2001: 155) traditionally instituted in 
vision was destabilized in the nineteenth century by findings such as Hermann von 
Helmholtz’s identification of a delay in the neurological transmission and processing of 
visual stimuli in 1850. The existence of such an inexorable ‘gap between stimulus and 
perception’ (Crary 2001: 309–10) suggested ‘the loss of direct vision’ (Crary 2001: 
226) and the ‘disintegration of a faith in perception’ (Virilio in Crary 2001: 226).  
By ‘invok[ing] the body not as a unified receiver of orderly representations but as 
a composite apparatus’ (Crary 2001: 153), visual perception revealed individual 
disparities that made collective unity all the more difficult to achieve. Thus, stricter 
regimes of visual control emerged as attempts to maintain homogeneity and clarity in 
perception, as demonstrated by the specialist of graphology Austin N. Palmer, who 
defined in 1896 ‘practical writing for the people as a style devoid of all superfluous 
lines; made up of letters that can, to the greatest possible extent, be formed without 
lifting the pen, or checking the motion; an unshaded style’ (Palmer in Schwartz 1992: 
83–4). Similarly, Wagner plunged his audiences in darkness so that the stage became an 
escape from darkness: ‘an Ariadne’s thread’ (Nietzsche in Harries 1997: 342) to 
vanquish how our individual conditions ‘lack the strength to show us a way out of the 
labyrinth (Harries 1997: 342), to orient us so as to conquer ‘the path into the labyrinth 
[which] is the path within the darkness we bear within ourselves’ (Harries 1997: 346). 
The theatre becomes a socializing environment inasmuch as it is a labyrinth in 
which one cannot get lost but, quite the contrary, is compelled by a clear direction out 
of it: a regime of visual ‘attention [that is] a means by which a perceiver becomes open 
to control and annexation by external agencies’ (Crary 2001: 5). By ‘triumph[ing] over 
gravity’ and ‘banish[ing] the terrors of the labyrinth’ (Harries 1997: 349), the theatre 
environment seeks to stabilize its audiences according to a positionality that is the same 
for all individuals so that ‘it was through the collective act of seeing that the semblance 
of a community would come into being’ (Crary 2001: 251). Undoubtedly, such visual 
precepts through which ‘the human being [is made to] be first of all firm [like] stone’ 
(Nietzsche in Harries 1997: 349) have later pervaded the formation of opaque and solid 
Nazi architectures and bodies as further anxious reactions to the increasingly 
heterogenous empirical realities of bodies: ‘We, all of us, are no material for a society’ 
(Hitler in Harries 1997: 349).  
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In reinforcing the perceptual borders of the stage and its division from the 
auditorium as a strategy to exacerbate visual clarity, Wagner did not actually innovate 
as such but rather drew from and reinforced the historical and dominant tradition of 
visual perception in the theatre. Indeed, the sensory experience of performance had 
already been established in predominantly visual terms through the imposition of linear 
perspective.  
According to its etymology, perspective means rationalized sight or clear 
seeing, and as such it presupposes a conscious suppression of [other] 
senses […] and a consequent distancing from a more direct experience of 
the environment (Frampton 1998: 32).  
 
Through the invention of the monoscopic device of the camera obscura in the 
Renaissance, linear perspective was developed as a ‘mighty aesthetic organism of 
humanist hegemony in which all the component parts are ruled and informed by a single 
principle’ (Eagleton 1990: 392). The gathering up of vision within a single point in 
space, the vantage point, was further accentuated in the Wagnerian event by visually 
effacing any perception of the material and actual complexities of the theatre (the 
peripheral spaces of the wings, the rig, the backstage areas, etc…). In return, the 
complex and stereoscopic sensory apparatus of the audience is similarly streamlined as 
monoscopic vision’s ‘all-at-oneness [is necessarily] founded on the cancellation of the 
empirical conditions of perception’ (Krauss in Crary 2001: 46): it is ‘the product of the 
chronic habit of civilized men of seeing the world as a picture’, whereby the ‘visual 
field’ has become an ‘alternative to ordinary perception’ (Gibson in Gombrich 1993: 
277).  
This ‘longstanding privilege of vision and the one-point perspectival system 
upon which it is based’ (Hansen 2002: 17) strongly linked scenography and architecture 
in the Renaissance with artists such as Alberti and Brunelleschi, who were keen to apply 
linear perspective in their architectural and scenic practices as well as to advocate it to 
all practitioners. As a ‘kind of geometrisation of the space of the world [within which] 
we become observers of a world which has become an object of observation’ 
(Romanyshyn in Nechvatal 1999: 219) linear perspective helped create ‘space[s that 
are] both technically and mentally a window and a symbol [of] the scale of the world’ 
(Lehmann in Baugh 2005: 218). As such, it consolidated the cognitive dimension of 
visual experience and its related requirement of a separation, a division, between the 
observer and the object of visual observation. Indeed, visual or ‘classical representation, 
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from Alberti onward, define[d] itself by the fundamental subtraction of the body from 
the constitution of a visual field and by the related intellectual distinction between 
observer and object’ (Crary 2001: 220): a ‘withdrawal from the world in order to 
regulate and purify one’s relation to the manifold contents of the now “exterior” world’ 
(Crary in Nechvatal 1999: 391).  
Discursively cogent, perceptual experience then establishes the material 
exteriority of the visual object as an inferior component to the intellectual interiority of 
the observer in which the production of meaning ultimately resides. Traditionally, then, 
scenography followed  
architecture [in] concretiz[ing] vision. The hierarchy inherent in all 
architectural space begins as a structure for the mind’s eye. The interiority 
of architecture more than any other discourse defined a hierarchy of vision 
articulated by inside and outside (Eisenman in Hansen 2002: 16–7).  
 
Wagner’s innovations can thus be seen as ways of strengthening the perspectival 
window of the stage and precisely enhancing the hierarchical dichotomy between inside 
and outside. Immobilized in darkness and frontally presented with a luminous window, 
the Wagnerian audience could silently pay better attention to the stage image, observing 
and interpreting it with more precision. More importantly, ‘the histories of perception 
teach us that every version of microperception is already situated within and never 
separate from the human and already cultural macroperceptions which contain it’ (Ihde 
in Garner 1994: 9). Wagner’s silencing of the audience and thus of its vocalization of 
individual responses establishes each and every audience member as a static receptor, 
solely viewing and listening, part of a mass of similarly behaved individuals. In this 
way, ‘the sense of vision serves to reinforce one’s place within the social whole’ 
(Weiner in Crary 2001: 248) wherein the social whole is understood as a homogenic 
and passive group: the ‘dream of the reciprocal affirmation of the unity of the individual 
subject and the unified object of perception’ (Crary 2001: 160).  
Indeed, Wagner endeavoured to strengthen the traditional ‘logic of the fixed 
gaze’ (Nechvatal 1999: 220) according to the assumption that actual correlations 
between ‘perceptual attentiveness and social cohesion’ (Crary 2001: 247) could be 
engineered. This socializing function to the ‘hegemony of vision’ (Crary 2001: 3) takes 
on a predominant position in nineteenth-century Europe as the arts become highly 
institutionalized. As Raymond Williams (1988) explains, the term aesthetics was coined 
in English by Alexander Baumgarten in 1750–58 in reference to its Greek etymology of 
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‘sense perception’ as the material realm accessible through all the senses. Yet the term 
went on to define the qualities of visual perception in and of art, producing 
institutionalized viewers called aestheticians in the nineteenth century, up to 
formulating the adjective ‘aesthetic’, which ‘is now in common use to refer to questions 
of visual appearance and effect’ (Williams 1988: 32). 
With vision raised onto the pedestal of aesthetics, art theory has produced a 
term, ‘visuality’. This is now so ubiquitous in discussions ranging beyond solely artistic 
experiences and practices that it has come to be seen as a template for the very 
construction of everyday life. Such ‘aestheticization of social life’ (Eagleton 1990: 44) 
thus implies a model of everyday life in which collectivity is achieved through 
individuals who are solely expected to observe and listen. The arts then become one of 
many ways in which a certain understanding of ‘social harmony registers itself on our 
senses’ (Eagleton 1990: 37). Indeed, this model assumes that everyday life unfolds as a 
Wagnerian stage image so that ‘the subject itself is accordingly aestheticized, living 
with all the instinctual rightness of the artefact’ (Eagleton 1990: 41). Thus, the aesthetic 
dimension of Wagnerian scenography can be seen as the culmination of a reversal in the 
very function of art in society: from the conception of a language that seeks to 
apprehend the complexities of the multisensory compound of experience to the 
application of an ordering and reductive model for producing human beings as audio-
visual subjects. 
As such, the aesthetics of Wagnerian scenography provide a potent example of 
how ideology is ‘not limited to matters of direct political control but seek[s] to describe 
a more general predominance which includes, as one of its key features, a particular 
way of seeing the world and human nature and relationships’ (Williams 1988: 145). 
This rather more discrete facet of ideology is, to be more precise, conducted through 
visual representation, or how visual content establishes cognitive and discursive clarity. 
Grounded in ideological structures, aesthetic/visual representation then becomes ‘a form 
of power based on leadership by a group in many fields of activity at once, so that its 
ascendancy commands widespread consent and appears natural and inevitable’ (Hall 
1997: 259). Wagner’s alterations of the visual environment that is the theatre were 
indeed replicated through many other theatres and have become ubiquitous, 
notwithstanding the subsequent emergence of cinemas. To a larger extent, the notion of 
scenography as an art that etymologically binds space and the visual with language and 
meaning is doubled-up, and reinforced as such, under Wagnerian precepts since its 
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graphic dimension (visual cognition) is now found both in the stage image and the 
environment that frames it. This has powerful ideological consequences for how we 
think about space and the body, to which we now turn in order to conclude this section. 
Within the ideological ‘dream of a unified, homogenized, wholly transparent 
society’ (Habermas in Eagleton 1990: 406), the sceno-graphic division between and 
autonomization of inside and outside, intellect and materiality, body and space may then 
be posited as a paradigmatic emulation of broader everyday structures of experience 
that have been fathomed/explored/interrogated under the pervasive spell of aesthetic or 
graphic ideologies. Through such an understanding, we may see the visuality of space 
as a geographic ‘closure of the map’, the loss of ‘terra incognita’ (Bey 2003: 100) and 
the rise of ‘a fetishism of the space itself … as de-eroticization’ (Jay in Foster 1988: 
27). Similarly, the visuality of the body finds its climax in ‘pornography [as] the body’s 
chaste and unerotic dream of itself’ (Ballard in Crary and Kwinter 1992: 271). Either 
way, the graphic stands for a ‘concept of reality based on an original self-presence’ 
(Vasseleu 1998: 3) and aimed at maintaining the ‘reflexive or specular autonomy of 
self-presence’ (Derrida 2005: 290) that is an illusion of ‘uninterrupted-organic-
sameness-present-to-itself-in-its-wholeness-and-singularity’ (Wills in Smith 2001).  
However, drawing from both Marxist theories and Social Constructionism, 
ideological interpellations that ‘subject and qualify subjects by telling them, relating 
them to, and making them recognize: 1. what exists… 2. what is good… 3. what is 
possible’ (Therborn 1982: 18), form a system striving towards ‘hegemony’ (Gramsci in 
Eagleton 1990: 17). On the other hand this ‘strategy’ of domination can be prone to 
producing dissident and subaltern ‘tactic[s]’ (de Certeau in M. Carlson 2003: 44–5). 
Thus the ‘internalised repression’ which Horkheimer (in Eagleton 1990: 28) sees as 
being produced by ideological interpellation may at the same time give way to its own 
‘counter-claim’ (Therborn 1982: 106). To bring this back now specifically to visual 
aesthetics, hegemonic ‘strategies in which individuals are isolated, separated, and […] 
disempowered’ would find ‘potential for resistance [in] counter-forms of attention’ 
(Crary 2001: 3) as ‘emancipatory force[s]’ (Eagleton 1990: 28).  
These counter-forms could then be said to fall under the category of distraction 
inasmuch as ‘attention and distraction cannot be thought outside of a continuum in 
which the two ceaselessly flow into one another, as part of a social field in which the 
same imperatives and forces incite one and the other’ (Crary 2001: 51). If attention is a 
focused, immobilizing, consensual and meaning-making process of observation, then 
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visual distraction should be unfocused, invigorating, dissensual and meaning-
confounding.  
So we have established that the Wagnerian moment brings to a point of intensity 
the domination of the visual, together with its ideological efficacy. From here we have 
suggested that such ideological efficacy may at the same time generate its own counter-
claim. To put this in Crary’s language of visuality, attention always has a relationship 
with and contributes to the potential of distraction. If we now take this insight back into 
the historical journey of scenography, we need to posit some questions: can we then 
find examples of such tactics of distraction taking place in the late nineteenth century 
and which could initiate an understanding of their critical take on cognition and 
meaning? Furthermore, in light of the predominating legacy of Wagner in theatre and 
scenography, how did such tactics evolve and impact upon later generations? 
 
 
1.2 Subverting Wagnerian predicaments 
In the second half of the nineteenth century – while Wagner exacerbated ‘the illusion of 
detached spectatorship for which perspective is a conceptual metaphor’ (Bleeker in 
Baugh 2005: 215) – the ‘subversion of a Renaissance-based pictorial order’ (Crary 
2001: 153) can be found in various artistic practices such as in the paintings of Edouard 
Manet and George Seurat. ‘[T]he demise of the punctual or anchored classical observer’ 
in Manet’s works seemed to refuse ‘the standardization and regulation of attention’, and 
instead ‘embodied another path of invention, dissolution, and creative syntheses that 
exceeds the possibility of rationalization and control’ (Crary 2001: 148). Similarly, the 
Pointillist paintings of Seurat were subversively premised upon traditional 
‘scenographic values [such as] the consummate demonstration of one-point 
perspective’, as they moved ‘between two scopic regimes [:] between the metric and 
homogenous tableau loosely synonymous with classical space, and a decentered and 
destabilized perceptual regime with its mobile and embodied observer’ (Crary 2001: 
190–91). For instance in Parade de Cirque (1888), Seurat positioned a figure at the 
centre of a scene populated by more figures yet  
we are denied one of the key elements that determined the coherence of 
classical scenography: we cannot see the literal location of figures on the 
surface of the stage or on the ‘checkerboard’ ground of perspectival 
painting […] none of the figures […] are ‘grounded’ in any visibly 
legible way (Crary 2001: 190). 
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2 George Seurat, Parade de Cirque, 1888 
 
This positional uncertainty is also exported to the viewer: since Pointillism offers an 
image at a certain distance from the canvas which becomes a blur at other distances, the 
viewer is impelled to move back and forth accordingly. The work ‘disavows the stable 
identity of either the image or the observer’ (Crary 2001: 153). It can be said that Seurat 
‘reversed traditional perspective by making the viewer the vanishing point’ (McLuhan 
in Crary 2001: 200) insofar as this viewer is understood as a mobile and active agent. 
Parade de Cirque thus implements the ‘uprooting and dislocation of vision from the 
stationary relations of a classical model of geometrical optics’ without the 
‘reterritorializing [or re-] disciplining of perception’ (Crary 2001: 320). Seemingly 
immersed in its audience, the central figure in the painting then suggests the situation of 
the observer whose perception oscillates between the perception of an image and 
immersions into its hazy and fragmented structure. The spatial dimension of the work is 
then stretched beyond the sole canvas as the volumetric space surrounding the painting 
offers differing visions of the space depicted with paint on the canvas. The situation of 
the viewer, then, like the centrally located yet ‘antiscenographic character’ (Crary 2001: 
191) – the ‘figuration of an undifferentiated being’ by spatial means – constitutes an 
‘attempt to recover a perception prior to any “divisionism”’ (Crary 2001: 209) between 
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the viewer and the viewed, between body and space, so that ‘identity and reference are 
marginalized in favor of exchangeability and flux’ (Crary 2001: 199). 
Seurat’s ‘antiscenic space [–] like shadow figures, puppet theatres [– belongs to] 
a countertradition of magical display and behind-the-scenes manipulation of optical 
appearances’ (Crary 2001: 191) which were re-emerging in the late nineteenth century 
infused by scientific and technological discoveries in the domain of optics, electricity 
and lighting. This ‘cult of light’ (Valery in Crary 2001: 227) signals a significant 
moment of transition in European society as the advent of electricity suggested possibly 
important yet uncertain changes in modes of communication, transportation and 
everyday living in general. This is embedded in Seurat’s work as ‘Parade de Cirque 
itself is a field of different kinds of artificial light: the gas lamps, the apparent aura or 
halo around the figures, and the photochemical interaction of Seurat’s pigments’ (Crary 
2001: 225–6). The collision of old and new lighting phenomena then results in a blurred 
vision, an uncertain outcome that sought ‘to reveal a void, glittering but menacing’ 
(Crary 2001: 227). 
Compelling the viewer to move at various distances from the image as it 
coagulates into a more or less visible depiction of a scene, Parade de Cirque opposes 
the Renaissance predicament/construction of the painting that remains consistently the 
same as one moves towards and away from the image. Instead, the image is formed in 
the eyes (or brain) of the viewer by way of an enactive immersion in and negotiation 
with spatial and lighting conditions. As such, the piece further subverted the Wagnerian 
reinforcement of inside/outside delineations that maintained Renaissance principles. 
Thus, it disavows attentive and cognitive observation by triggering intuitive navigation 
within a rather theatrical scene which remains visually and semiotically enigmatic all 
the same. As the piece conspicuously deals with the scopic action of looking (central 
figure looking at its audience and the actual viewer paired with its audience looking 
back at it) while seeking precisely to complicate such action and even frustrate it, it 
formulates a potent example of a visual field seeking to extract itself from cognitive 
clarity. Such ‘illuminations of disenchantment’ (Crary 2001: 149) indeed aimed at  
undermining traditional representational codes [through] the calculated 
construction of new semantic and cognitive models […] intertwined with 
the accelerating reorganization of perceptual experience in the late 
nineteenth century and with an emerging social environment structured 
around the attentive capacities of both individual and collective subjects 
(Crary 2001: 150). 
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This constitutes a disavowal of aesthetic ideology inasmuch as the representational 
framework is used in order to be unravelled and critically questioned. That is, 
both a reflection of the forms of social experience in developed capitalist 
societies and a specific artistic strategy to express such experience 
(alienation) through its distance from and dissonance with established 
aesthetic norms (Adorno in Mercer 2006: 17).  
 
Indeed, in the late nineteenth century, a renewed interest in magic shows and puppetry 
occurs partly due to the emergence of technological devices that offer new possibilities 
for optical illusions, but also partly due to the increasing presence of non-Western 
cultures in which cultural and artistic practices refer and indeed mesmerize the Western 
audience back to its more primitive activities. Potently combining both influences 
within the domain of performance, Marie-Louise Fuller (aka Loïe Fuller) created 
cabaret works which are somehow transpositions of the Pointillist endeavour especially 
in terms of ‘counter[ing] the Western tendency to interpret the environment in 
exclusively perspectival terms’ (Frampton 1998: 32). Amongst Fuller’s first 
performative appearances was the role of Aladdin in The Arabian Nights (1887). Within 
this non-Western and primitive myth, Fuller’s male character was draped in silk, 
sometimes flying on a magic carpet and often overlayered with projections of 
atmospheric and abstract depictions, all of which helped produce its magical qualities. 
Subsequently, Fuller went on to create her own solo performances based on the 
prosthetic inclusion of her body within the disparate variability of drapery supplemented 
by mirrored sceneries and slide projectors derived from Pepper’s Ghost and Magic 
Lanterns.  
 
                        
3 Henry Dircks, Dircksian Phantasmagoria, 1862 
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In contrast to Wagner’s technical re-engineering of the theatre house to make 
use of darkness to delineate the stage window and divide the scenic space from the 
auditorium, inventions such as Henry Dircks’ Dircksian Phantasmagoria (1862), later 
renamed Pepper’s Ghost, used Magic Lanterns or slide projectors to confront audiences 
with ghostly and dark visual phenomena through ‘effects of gloom […] inkier than a 
slide projector can achieve, and certainly richer in depths than computer imaging’ 
(Warner 2006: 154). Differently, Louis Daguerre’s Diorama (1822) also explored the 
animation of imagery by way of overlapping ‘slides’. However, these slides were large 
and translucent paintings that were illuminated by natural light. Unlike 
phantasmagorias, dioramas were actually moving images by way of a revolving stage. 
While anticipating aspects of cinema, the diorama sought to produce accurate depictions 
of environments by putting painted scenery into motion according to the nodal 
traditional rule of linear perspective’s vantage point. Although functioning through a 
monoscopic and projective apparatus inherited from the camera obscura and the early 
seventeenth century, Magic Lanterns can also be traced back to the Middle Ages and 
thus remain entirely different from any monoscopic apparatus striving to reproduce 
stereoscopic vision (Warner 2006: 137). Rather, they ‘play[ed] out the conflict between 
mimesis and fantasia, in which fantasia gains the greater value to the constitution of the 
self’ (Warner 2006: 116). 
 
 
4 Louis Daguerre, Diorama, 1822 
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Fuller can be seen further to develop the Magic Lantern as she fused projection 
screens, painted scenery and costumes into a most unusual prosthetic structure which 
she patented in 1894. Sometimes white (Fire Dance, 1895; Ballet of Light, 1908), 
sometimes black (Firmament and Night, 1896) Fuller’s draped outfit functioned as both 
a screen and a set to her Magic Lantern’s projections. In this way she animated her own 
visual obliteration thereby bringing upon her self an ‘epistemological uncertainty’ 
(Crary 2001: 12): a ‘sensual approach [that] questions the powers of the rational mind 
and circumvents rather than demonstrates its powers’, that is an ‘art of total illusion that 
also contained its own critique’ (Gunning 2009: 30). Fuller thus embodied new 
considerations of human ‘perception and the constitution of meaning, objects and their 
appearances, subjectivity and otherness, presence and absence, body and world’ (Garner 
1994: 3). 
 
        
5 Loïe Fuller, Patents of the Mechanism for the Projection of Stage Effects and Garment for 
Dancers, 1894 
 
In addition, Fuller designed discrete scenic panels made of reflective and 
transparent materials, located on horizontal and vertical planes of the stage, to augment 
the unfathomable presence of the moving drapery. The confusing overlap of body and 
space by way of intersecting light and drapery produced visual phenomena in which 
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corporeal and spatial materialities affected one another at every movement. The body’s 
kinesis modulated the visual perception of both its costume and its surrounding volume 
of space. At the same time, the material nature of the costume and space affected how 
the body moved as they produced a high level of disturbance to the body’s 
proprioceptive skills, which informed Fuller’s language of movement.  
 
 
6 Loïe Fuller, 1901 
 
  
7 Loïe Fuller, La Mer, 1925 
 
As such Fuller proposed the conception of a scenographic space which not only 
responded to the body’s presence but also in which the body could only move in a tense 
negotiation with spatial materials: 
[a] bodied spatiality [or] phenomenal space governed by the body and its 
spatial concerns, a non-Cartesian field of habitation which undermines the 
stance of objectivity and in which the categories of subject and object give 
way to a relationship of mutual implication (Garner 1994: 4).  
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In other words, a physical and controlled investment in instability and vertigo 
enabled the dialogic potentials of interaction between body and space: 
The dancer who appears lost in the dense jungle of her gestures, in reality 
is secretly taken by the hand of her own aporia and gently led out of her 
own labyrinth (Agamben 2000: 113). 
 
While Wagner also sought to advance labyrinthine scenographies, the ‘infinity-
of-space effect’ (Baugh 2005: 107) in Fuller’s work was engineered in a way very 
different from Wagner to weave audiences and stage together. Indeed, not only was 
Fuller amongst the first practitioners to plunge audiences and stage into darkness at the 
onset of the performance, but also the movements of air and the visual phenomena she 
created could not be contained onstage and would regularly affect the audience. In 
producing this, Fuller initiated the dismantling of the ideological containment of the 
scenic window and its related delineation of surfaces onstage. As a body that is at once 
both conspicuously concealing and exposing itself, she embodies a breach of the 
devices that organize the exposure of the stage and the concealment of the off-stage. 
Fuller’s work not only disclosed but also immersed her audience into an on/off-stage 
dimension which further punctured all surfaces and boundaries.  
Since the bridge between performing and witnessing areas is visually and 
tangibly uncertain, we should talk of a blur rather than a link. Indeed, the blur 
disenfranchises the audience from any privileged point of view or perception in 
general. Though this had not yet been intentionally implemented in theatres, it is 
possible to find an instance of such a radical blur before the nineteenth century in the 
small indoor Elizabethan theatres. Having reconstructed one such environment in order 
to understand the perception of performing bodies and costumes in particular, 
Elizabethan theatre specialist Jennifer Tiramani found that the replica of the fat-based 
candles used then would produce so much smoke that audiences, however near to the 
performers, could no longer see much of the drama performed in front of them. As 
such, she argues that ‘sharing the same light’ (Tiramani 2008: 35) was also about 
sharing the ‘shadowy quality to the light onstage’ (Tiramani 2008: 35) since both 
informed an accentuated auditive, tactile, olfactive and gustative experience of the 
performance. Just as importantly, this multisensory complication would cause the 
audience to direct their gaze towards other audience members, becoming distracted 
among themselves within the greasy and sensual haze that would permeate the entire 
theatre house. Though the blur in Elizabethan indoor theatre was the result of its 
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necessary reliance on candle lighting, it did not restrict experiences but impelled a set 
of bodily responses, from the emphasis on actors’ vocality to the distracted behaviours 
of audiences. By similarly ‘mak[ing] and break[ing] the performance space’ (Dervaux 
in Howard 2002: xiv), Fuller offered a relational structure of experience to her audience 
that was borderless where ‘instead of a lighted space’ she created ‘a light-producing 
space’ (Saltzmann in Baugh 2005: 109). But whereas Elizabethan theatre was not 
established on the basis of the framing device that is the proscenium arch, at the end of 
the nineteenth century this divisive frame and its associated fourth wall had become a 
convention. Critically, then, Fuller explored 
potential means for distilling play between material, craftwork and 
gravity, so as to yield a component which is in fact a condensation of the 
entire structure […] the presentation of a structural poetic rather than the 
re-presentation of a façade (Frampton 1998: 31) 
 
As such, Fuller’s work challenges not only the structural agency of theatrical 
experience but also its architectural ramification and thus wider relevance to a society 
which had, by then, developed an ideological obsession with vision as the privileged 
sense for communicating information. Very differently, she suggested a 
‘reappropriation of the body, in association with the reappropriation of space [to] avoid 
a variety of brutal techniques and extreme emphasis on visualisation’ (Lefebvre in 
McAuley 2000: 281–2). Thus, Fuller’s work could never be too clearly defined in terms 
of the representation of a narrative, characterization or any specific type of discursive 
information:  
[E]verything is visible, barely disguised, but we fail to recognize it’, no 
longer ‘held back by the clamor of “meaning”, by what is fixed and 
stationary […] the object of our quest twists and turns, passes in and out of 
the shadows, but remains throughout on the exterior, beneath our confused 
gaze (Dagognet in Crary and Kwinter 1992: 540). 
 
Fuller offers a potent example of how visual imperceptibility induced by a 
particular  kind of bodily movement can elude the normative interpellation of bodies as 
discursive surfaces: ‘the image is a thorn in the eye and bodies write a text that defies 
publication, the prison of meaning’ (Müller in Cody 1998: 291). The epistemological 
problems resulting from Fuller’s exploration of the scenographic space as such ‘a 
spelling mistake’ (Zizske in Howard 2002: xiv) are intrinsically linked to ontological 
issues vis-à-vis the ‘ambiguity and variability of the body’s modes of givenness’ 
(Garner 1994: 5) which were, at that time, increasingly pathologized and stigmatized. 
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Contemporaneous with Fuller’s practice, Gilles de la Tourette’s ‘study on a nervous 
condition characterized by lack of motor coordination accompanied by echolalia and 
coprolalia’ – later called Gilles de la Tourette syndrome – highlighted a body whose 
‘whole musculature is engaged in a dance (chorea) that is completely independent of 
any ambulatory end’ (Agamben 2000: 106).  
By proposing the self as a subjective stance separate from intentionality, Fuller 
challenged ‘the grounding of theatrical representation in the performing body which 
asserts itself as visual element and spatializing center’ (Garner 1994: 2). The 
scenographic construction of a bodied space, then, whilst profoundly anchored in 
corporeality, does not offer a stable position to the body which, in turn, resists the 
stability and thus axiomatic structure of its architectural container. As such, the bodied 
space no longer simply reflects everyday spaces but also defracts them at its threshold. 
In this way, Fuller initiated the potential to subvert the traditional and ideological 
‘mirror-structure of the stage’ (Althusser in Van Den Berg 2006) where ‘the portraits in 
the mirror [were] an excuse for a display of the mirror’s remarkable powers’ (States 
1987: 206). Instead, she created spatial phenomena that made portrayal impossible. Yet 
this does not seek to achieve some form of pure anonymity.  Quite to the contrary, it 
exports a critical and relational sense of self onto her audience. 
Through Fuller’s work can be conceived the possibility of a body whose 
movement is not predicated upon its subjectivity nor its architectural surrounding. The 
bodied space does not pre-order movement. Its discrete elaboration by Fuller lends itself 
to the wider interrogation of everyday spatial constructions. Indeed, ‘architecture and 
the cities to which it gives rise are frozen habits [wherein] our possible movements are 
now laid down once and for all in concrete’ (Noë 2009: 122–3). To reconsider 
architectural structures away from their ‘fourth dimension [–] ‘which coerce[s] 
behavior in accordance with their own dynamic patterns’ (Hall & Hall 1975: 8–9) – 
initiates the path to the black box. And although such a proposal was barely conceivable 
at the time of Fuller, some of its seeds can be found in some architectural phenomena.  
These phenomena will be discussed later in order to establish the 
interdisciplinary landscape of practices that shed light on upcoming scenographic 
innovations up to the emergence of the black box. However first, I shall pause this 
historical analysis to introduce the practice I undertook alongside it. Indeed, this 
practice tested the suggestion that Fuller’s work anticipates radical changes in 
scenographic practices that led to the black box by bringing key elements of her work 
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into the frame of the black box. Projections in scenography, whether located in 
traditional theatres or black boxes, have hitherto remained largely contained within flat 
screen surfaces. Fuller’s rejection of the flat screen and exploration of a bodied screen 
that is volumetric and kinetic are gestures rarely seen in contemporary performance. If 
the black box partly draws from such innovative ideas, then it should not only smoothly 
accommodate them but also offer potential for further development. 
 
  
1.3 Heterotopian speculations 
Through historical analysis, the thesis has so far demonstrated how, alongside dominant 
and traditional scenographic strategies, such as Wagner’s, another strand of practices or 
tactics emerged as subversions that drew from this tradition in order to disrupt it. These 
tactics of disavowal (such as Fuller’s) produced a displacement of normative 
understandings of the human subject: they rubbed off the cognitive borders of the body 
thereby opening the human figure to possibilities of embodiment spanning beyond the 
mere societal categorization of bodies (gender, age, class, etc…). Further, by weaving 
body and space together they virtually opened the scene for rethinking spatial 
constructions, firstly as subversions of everyday spaces. Conceptually this tactic can be 
better understood through Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘heterotopias’, a spatiality which 
is only reflective of other spaces by way of disavowing, that is where mirroring 
exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy […] I discover 
my absence from the place where I am […] it makes this place that I 
occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once 
absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and 
absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this 
virtual point which is over there (Foucault in Betsky 1997: 194). 
 
Heterotopias operate a fragmentary reversal that skews and diffracts: ‘outside of all 
places and yet […] actually localizable’ (Foucault in Betsky 1997: 193); they are 
‘places that do exist […] formed in the very founding of society’, and ‘in which the real 
sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously 
represented, contested and inverted’ (Foucault in Betsky 1997: 193). If ‘heterotopia 
[seeks] to destroy the continuity of syntax and to shatter the predictable modes of the 
homogeneous grid’ (Porphyrios in Velibeyoglu 1999: 13) then Fuller’s work qualifies 
as a heterotopian inversion of the diagrammatic order of the environment she occupied: 
divisions between off-stage, stage and audience area are effaced by her performances 
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since the concealing function of the off-stage is brought on stage while the revealing 
function of the stage spills over the audience. This can be said to be exacerbated by the 
black box and, indeed, later stages of my practice endeavoured to develop this 
disordering potential further. However, initially I sought to translate the key empirical 
and conceptual constructs found in Fuller’s performances into the black box 
environment and to respect the contemporary state of tools and technologies. Indeed, 
Fuller’s work operated through challenging the use of technologies that were 
undergoing significant progress, namely the new media of photography, film and 
projection. While these were being developed in relation to flat and framed screens to 
achieve the clearest images in visual and cognitive terms, Fuller turned them on their 
head to produce imprecise images in spatial and discursive terms. Being positioned now 
in twenty-first-century Europe, however, the technological conditions and developments 
of media are digital, and so I sought to involve and challenge the digital media of 
projection within the black box.  
Dramaturgically, Fuller’s performances’ titles referred to natural phenomena, 
clearly affirming a desire to translate exterior and non-human events into interior and 
man-made instantiations. This explains in part why her work punctures the architectural 
structure in which it takes place. More importantly, this further reflects her desire to 
erase divisions between stage and audience, between an inside and an outside, a focal 
point and its periphery, and to achieve instead an all-encompassing peripherality. To 
test the validity of such a critical periphery I chose to follow Foucault’s model of 
heterotopia as a space that reverses other man-made spaces in terms of their axiomatic 
containment and ordering of bodies in space. In other words, following Fuller’s blurred 
structure of relation to her audience, I questioned, through practice, whether the mere 
positioning of bodies in everyday spaces can be diffracted into a multipositional 
peripherality and animated as such in the black box. Furthermore, if the speculation that 
the black box has roots in practices such as Fuller’s is correct, then it should allow for 
interrogating ways of making space alterable by means of bodily alterations and vice 
versa, and in doing so develop even more radical spatio-corporeal diffraction than Fuller 
achieved. By undertaking this practical journey I could therefore position myself as a 
practitioner developing Fuller’s innovations further like other past practitioners, whom I 
researched in parallel to my own practice to advance and include myself in Fuller’s 
legacy. 
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Heterotopian Speculations are a series of sketches that bring everyday 
architectural spaces and elements into the black box to challenge their axiomatic 
perspectival order by diffracting it through the intersection of moving bodies, materials 
and digital media of projection. I undertook to draw situations in which the bodies of 
performer and audience are distinctively positioned yet digital projection phenomena 
confound their positions. In doing so, as I am about to analyze, the Heterotopian 
Speculations rapidly overlapped these positions up to the point of fusing them and 
rendering the terms performer and audience redundant. Here I will present and discuss 
the drawings that most significantly bear on the process of advance towards the 
heterotopian mirroring discussed above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Heterotopia #2 The Dressing Room, 2007 
 
Heterotopias #2 The Dressing Room and #6 The Glass Door demarcate clear 
positions for the physical presence of one performer and one audience member. 
Respectively using the black box’s own walls and a gauze as projection screens, these 
situations use video projection to mirror and superimpose the performer’s and 
audience’s bodies live in order to enable their movements to unfold dialogically – as in 
a duet – though making it impossible for either agent clearly to perceive the other. 
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Importantly here, the projection surface is not the focal point for the audience’s 
perception as they can also perceive or sense some aspect of the performer’s actual 
presence in space (behind the audience member in #2 and behind the gauze in #6). In 
this way, both sketches speculate on the kinetic relation and interaction of performer 
and audience. These relational interrogations are engineered spatially by way of 
positioning the performer as a double of the audience: the performer’s location in space 
formulates a kind of shadow of the audience. 
 
              
Fig. 2 Heterotopia #6 The Glass Door, 2007 
 
Heterotopias #11 The Bedroom and #12 The Wall do not include a performer 
because the audience’s double is now animated directly, and thus digitally, within the 
projection. Further, the spatial positions and material conditions given to the one 
audience member are kinetically invigorating and visually responsive in different ways. 
In The Bedroom, the audience is required to lie down in order to confront a distorted 
image of themselves on a suspended ceiling-screen. This clear positionality is, however, 
disrupted by another perception of their distorted body found within the reflective and 
circular edges of the bed. In The Wall, the audience member is required to engage with 
an unevenly curved climbing wall-screen within which their distorted double is 
projected. Here no particular focal point is implemented since the proximity between 
the audience and their projected double, as well as the distorting curves of the wall, 
force the body to shift its visual attention constantly across the surface of the wall. 
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Thus, in both cases positionality is again disturbed by projection and accommodated, if 
not enhanced, as such, by the space.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Heterotopia #11 The Bedroom, 2007 
 
 
Fig. 4 Heterotopia #12 The Wall, 2007 
 
Subsequently, I endeavoured to test further the multipositionality of such 
mirroring by eliminating any pre-ordered positionality. To do so, I chose to transpose 
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everyday spaces that edge towards visual imperceptibility and are thus ones in which 
bodies tend to develop idiosyncratic physicality and movements. Heterotopia #15 The 
Shower Room is the best example of this last phase of the series in that it sparked the 
next phase. Importantly this sketch does not include a body, for the physical and 
interactive questioning of the body, had become highly uncertain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Heterotopia #15 The Shower Room, 2007 
 
In showers and shower rooms, water and steam occupy all surfaces as well as the spatial 
volume. Bodies react and respond to these conditions in very different ways. Most 
importantly, the attenuation of visual clarity in these environments enables physical 
instability and confused orientation to occur. I thus conceived of a constellation of 
suspended fragments of screens dispersed throughout the volume of a black box. Again 
live-stream digital media would capture and project the presence of the audience onto 
the micro-screens, parts of the walls and floor and the audience’s body. The experiential 
emphasis on volumetric space and the inspiration coming from steam and water falling 
down make this sketch most conspicuously similar to a Fuller-like scenographic 
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scenario. However, here there is no requirement of a particular position in space for the 
work to unfold. Thus, the body can not only explore new movement potentials at any 
particular point in space but also in terms of travelling across the space. The sketch 
allows for speculation on an expanded field of bodily kinesis. And therefore it requires 
the responsive distortions of the content of digital projection (already animated in space 
by the nature of the fragments of screen) to be further diversified so as to respond 
differently to the possible range of physical actions. 
Importantly, in The Shower Room the material additions made to the black box 
have decreased to a minimum, thereby allowing much more space for the body 
kinetically to unfold and its ‘sensations and stimuli [to] have no reference to a spatial 
location’ (Demos in Haralambidou 2006: 11). The incremental reduction of tangible 
materials in space led to questioning how the multipositionality of the heterotopian 
mirror could be induced at the source of light itself as if emanating from the very 
architecture of the theatre-house. In relation to The Shower Room, this meant removing 
the fragments of screens and incorporating this fragmentation within projection. 
Evidently this provoked a complication to the media content required to realize such a 
situation experimentally as it meant that the content would not merely be distorted live 
during the audience interaction but would also have a pre-existing structure of 
fragmentation. Conceptually, the progressive move from projecting digital media onto 
flat surfaces to dispersing it more and more into the volume of space can be formulated 
as a way of returning projection to what it really is: light, as a phenomenon that 
permeates volumetric space before ending at a surface. In return, the consideration of 
the body under such light must be one of an elusive volume before being a solid 
surface. This conception is certainly recognizable in Fuller’s work. Further historical 
research into early twentieth-century Avant-Gardes would specifically uncover such an 
interest in bodily and spatial volumes revealed by light at the core of their further 
development of the bodied space of scenography. At this point, however, I shall return 
to the historical inquiry in order to describe further concepts and contexts that would be 
appropriated in the next stage of my practice. 
 
 
1.4 Discrepant abstractions 
The following section is taken up with an analysis of how facets of the bodied space 
were also to be found in the wider artistic and socio-cultural context of the end of the 
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nineteenth century and specifically in the early twentieth-century Avant-Gardes as 
noted above. This widening of the frame of reference beyond theatre will offer a further 
understanding of the perceptual and cognitive assets of both bodily and spatial 
constructions in such innovative practices. I shall argue that key aspects of the bodied 
space of scenography were reflected in visual arts and architecture with respect to their 
advancement of a haptic abstraction, which informs, in turn, the context of early 
twentieth-century stage designers Adolphe Appia and Edward Gordon Craig. 
It may be speculated that Fuller’s experimental use of screens for projection was 
prompted by a more general lack of pre-existing structures and locations for positioning 
them. In 1907, Freud was in Rome where, in the Piazza Colonna, he witnessed ‘a 
screen on which [were] project[ed] lantern slides’ of publicity, ‘flashing on and off’ and 
‘interspersed with pictures of landscapes’ (Freud in Crary 2001: 363). Firstly 
‘spellbound’, Freud quickly abandoned the crowd’s ‘commotion’ to return to his hotel 
room and write a letter to his family about the scene of perceptual confusion he had just 
attended. Though resistant to admitting his profound disorientation, taking care not to 
pathologize himself under his own concept of the unheimlich, ‘uncanny’, experience – 
of ‘not knowing one’s way’ (Freud in Royle 2003: 29) – Freud attested to and rejected 
the perceptual conflicts between the screen and the classical architecture wherein ‘the 
screen not only dissolves a classical notion of a façade but is also part of a 
multidirectional field of stimuli’ (Crary 2001: 367):  
the dematerialization of architectural surfaces into projection screens 
signals the reversibility of what had been established figure/ground 
relations within an urban fabric [towards] the oblivion of a cognitive 
periphery (Crary 2001: 366)  
 
The emergence of projection screens in the 1900s thus brought about new 
challenges to the relation between bodies and the built environment and to the ‘numbing 
standardization’ (Crary 2001: 359) of cognition in architecture. Its disruption in strictly 
architectural terms can, however, be found in the same period in the work of Antonio 
Gaudí. Gaudí’s Park Güell (1894–1914), in Barcelona, withholds any rectangular or 
perspectival dissection of space as a tactic to blur the distinction between the built and 
the natural environment. It does not present itself as a way of framing nature, and 
thereby shaping the landscape, but rather as a way of penetrating and being penetrated 
by its living organisms. Thus, Gaudí’s architecture takes on the textures of stone, cork 
and other natural elements while using random mosaics to fragment built surfaces into 
45
 
 
 
an unsettled array of depths. Though not actually integrating any lighting or projection, 
Gaudí’s mosaic-based pixellation of architectural surfaces does echo, as Seurat’s 
Pointillism did, technological developments ‘from three-color printing processes in the 
1880s to the mosaic of photoelectric cells in color television’ (Crary 2001: 226).  
 
 
8 Antonio Gaudí, Chapel of Colonia Güell, 1894-1914 
 
Like Loïe Fuller, Gaudí drew his inspiration from nature yet the result is not 
simply replicating the natural world. Critically, the visual reduction of recognizable 
forms and the self-obliterating appearance of Park Güell have no cognitive impact upon 
its visitors. By rejecting flat and right-angular surfaces, Fuller and Gaudí’s works 
initiated the volumetric conditions for a type of visual reduction, or abstraction, of 
which the cognitive dimension was exactly that which was despised by the then 
dominant strategies of abstraction. These dominant strategies were based on the clarity 
of geometry. In 1901 and 1902, Ernst Mach published essays in which he defined 
abstraction according to the mathematics of geometry. Mach argued that geometry 
originated out of discriminating the multisensoriness of empirical perception: ‘certain 
definite forms, that is, certain specific combinations of space-sensations, which man 
learns to know through intercourse with his environment, are unequivocally 
characterized even by purely physiological features’ (Mach 2004: 40). To Mach, 
abstraction then is the ability to extract these clear forms, to clarify, so to speak, the 
46
 
 
 
fuzziness of the world starting with an emphatic trust in vision and mistrust of the other 
senses.  
Although our sensations of sight and touch are primarily produced only by 
the surfaces of bodies, nevertheless powerful associations impel especially 
primitive man to imagine more, or as he thinks, to perceive more, than he 
actually observes. He imagines to be filled with matter the places enclosed 
by the surface which alone he perceives [...] It requires considerable 
power of abstraction to bring to consciousness the fact that we perceive 
the surfaces only of bodies – a power which cannot be ascribed to 
primitive man (Mach 2004: 40). 
 
Mach identifies the civilized body through geometry by means of a conceptual 
distinction between surface and depth/matter, wherein touch is recoded away from 
matter’s textures so that one only touches with one’s eyes. Mach’s concern with the 
civilized body sought to reinforce how ‘Western civilization habitually identifies itself 
with civilization as such on the pontifical assumption that what is not like it is a 
deviation, less advanced, primitive, or at best, exotically interesting at a safe distance’ 
(Van Eyck in Frampton 1998: 24). But the ‘primitive’, or non-Western, cultures 
potentially offered a different way of perceiving. 
Increasingly present in the European continent, the primitive exoticism of non-
Western artworks reminded European culture of its own ancient arts and cultures. At the 
end of the 1890s, primitive Western and non-Western arts and crafts were investigated 
by art historian Alois Riegl. Focusing on ancient arts, Riegl argued that visual 
perception was intrinsically permeated by a tactile mode of perception that he named 
haptic. Riegl’s perspective both related the haptic to and contrasted it with the visual. 
Though perceptual experience can be primarily ‘optical or haptic, farsighted or 
nearsighted, isolating or bonding, sub-idealistic or naturalistic, crystalline or organic’ 
(Kemp in Gubser 2006: 4–5), ‘haptic and optic are not autonomous terms but together 
constitute an indivisible mode of knowledge’ (Crary in Gubser 2006: 198). Two 
centuries before Riegl, George Berkeley had initiated an understanding of ‘the spatial 
content of vision [as] consist[ing] of the association between visible properties and 
tangible properties’ (Noë 2004: 101).  
In the twentieth century, the senses’ connections were to be further elaborated 
under the term ‘synaesthesia’, which ‘by its psychological nature […] is association, 
specifically intersensory association [starting with the ability] to connect in 
consciousness the visual and audible phenomena inherent to everyone’ (Galeyev in 
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Harrison 2001: 244). The synaesthetic turn suggests that vision is not inherently 
predominant above the other senses, and the intersection of visual and tactile senses in 
haptic perception is not hierarchized in itself. 
We will [thus] speak of the haptic whenever there is no longer a strict 
subordination in either direction, either a relaxed subordination or a virtual 
connection, but when sight discovers in itself a specific function of touch 
that is uniquely its own, distinct from its optical function (Deleuze 2003: 
124). 
 
Haptic perception discredits the primacy of vision and sensory simplicity. For 
Mach and his form of abstraction it had to be admitted that ‘the fundamental assumption 
of geometry thus reposes on an experience … of an idealized kind’ (Mach 2004: 42).  
But Mach conceived of this idealism as a practically uniting principle: ‘in the place of 
an individual and non-transmittable intuition of space are substituted the universal 
concepts of geometry, which hold good for all men’ (Mach 2004: 96). Indeed, behind 
Mach’s rejection of tactility and the volumetric dimension of matter in abstraction was a 
social concern with streamlining human perception and identity to produce a consensual 
mass similar to Wagner’s vision. Such a concern was further reflected in the emergence 
of Gestalt psychology, which was similarly based on a visual ‘simplicity hypothesis 
[…] in favour of geometrical simplicity and cohesion’ (Gombrich 1993: 222) between 
the body and the environment conceived as figure and background: the background is 
an object that demands cohesion with the figure so that the figure can assimilate it and 
emerge autonomous while ‘the environment, in turn, becomes background again’ 
(Robine 1998: 28; present author’s translation). Such an approach to perceptual 
experience is congruent with the monoscopic simplification of vision in cinema: ‘the 
total ambiguity of one-eyed static vision is logically compatible with the claims of 
geometrical perspective but incompatible with the idea that we “really” see the world 
flat’ (Gombrich 2003: 330). Although some Gestalt theorists such as Ehrenfels ‘made 
clear that Gestalt qualities were not necessarily a privileged order of sense data[,] later 
Gestalt theory would insist on the essential primacy and even ethical value of the whole 
[…] to establish an image of the observer as an autonomous subject […] an observer 
marked by innate form-giving and form-apprehending capacities’ (Crary 2001: 157–
58).  
Since ‘only in our conscious experience has [perception] the firm and stable 
structure which the Gestalt psychologists postulated’ (Ehrenzweig in Morris 1969: 882), 
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the haptic abstraction that we have noted in Fuller and Gaudí’s works may be said not 
only to move away from the idealized and ‘monological quest for absolute “truth”’ 
(Mercer 2006: 8) but also to object to and disturb the autonomization of the observer’s 
experience and consciousness. The abstraction of haptic perception thus grafts the body 
onto what Rosalind Krauss calls a ‘pulse [that] involves the constant threat of 
interruption [of any] law of repetition [or] recurrence’: ‘not a good form, not a good 
gestalt [but] on/off, on/off, on/off [,] the oscillating presence and absence of contact’ 
(Krauss in Foster 1988: 66–7).  
I shall return to the presence of such a ‘discrepant abstraction’ (Mercer 2006: 7–
8) in the mid-twentieth century, where further developments in abstract artforms would 
contend more polemically that ‘there has been no “abstract movement” as such, but 
many manifestations of a powerful trend in modern art away from the representation of 
recognizable objects in pictorial space’ (Gooding in Mercer 2006: 19-20). But for now, 
the emergence of this discrepant abstraction enables us to pinpoint some of the key 
initial problems in the perceptual and cognitive experience it offers. Indeed, the bodied 
space itself is an abstraction which is not based on representational and hermeneutic 
certainties, for it dis-locates and dis-positions bodies both materially and cognitively.  
I get the sense, sometimes reassuring, sometimes uncomfortable (because 
forever dependent on the unfinished […] that points to the unsayable 
towards which the desire to write despairingly tends), that [I am] 
following a path […] marking out a space […] tracing a tentative itinerary 
[…] describing point by point the stages of a search the ‘why’ of which I 
can’t tell, only the ‘how’ (Perec 2008: 143).  
 
The bodied space may therefore be conceived as modelling a counter-claim to, 
although resulting from, the cognitive clarity that is ‘symptomatic of the priority given 
to sight’. It thereby establishes ‘the tactile’ as ‘an important dimension in the perception 
of built form’, covering ‘a whole range of complementary sensory perceptions which 
are registered by the labile body: the intensity of light, darkness, heat and cold’ 
(Frampton 1998: 31). By resisting the predominant ideology of a human perception 
hierarchically hinging on vision, the haptic dimension of the bodied space suggests the 
possibility ‘to inter-relate with the world in ways that are not “framed”’ (Baugh 2005: 
219). It is a ‘space [that is] no longer perceived as an initial datum, an a priori starting 
point [but constitutes] instead an architectonic proposition resulting from […] 
movement, vision and touch act[ing] together’ (De Solà-Morales 1999: 94).  
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By focusing on the ‘redemption of [the very] matter’ (Toulmin and Goodfield in 
Crary 2001: 226) that Mach rejected from his definition of abstraction as a civilized 
perception, architectonic propositions elaborate new considerations of the civilized that 
are ‘alien to any quest for certainty and stability’ (Baugh 2005: 218). Thus, the 
emerging bodied space of an ‘architectonic approach to scene design [–] where the 
physical boundaries between performer space and audience space, and between actor 
and spectator have shifted and blurred’ (Baugh 2005: 213) – cannot be defined by a 
‘pluralistic (post-modern) […] quintessential relativism and ephemerality’ (Baugh 
2005: 216–8) that would constitute another ‘more universally accepted art [that is] 
defining essential qualities of human perception’ (Baugh 2005: 216). Rather, an 
architectonic approach intertwines the body and the built, thereby upsetting any 
subjective stance based on aesthetic autonomy and resetting the possibility for a 
consciousness that is interactively elaborated through the outside, that is to say 
‘subjectified and intersubjectified’ (Garner 1994: 3). 
Such epistemological and ontological crisis was to be core to early twentieth-
century scenographers who would, like Adolphe Appia and Edward Gordon Craig, seek 
to evolve a ‘New Presence’ (Appia in Beacham 1993: 109) by ‘remov[ing] the Pictorial 
Scene [in order] to leave in its place the Architectonic Scene’ (Craig in Baugh 2005: 
145). As the next chapter will demonstrate, their forceful interrogations of the material 
and perceptual conditions of the ‘performance space’, pushing it to become 
‘fundamentally incomplete […] not […] pictures […] nor […] sculptures’ (Baugh 2005: 
61) furthered the ‘tectonic’ approach as far as conceiving spaces ‘in which the 
syntactical form of the structure explicitly resists the action of gravity’ (Frampton 1998: 
30). Consequently, they were to articulate more clearly the cognitive, or dramaturgical, 
challenges of their architectonic abstractions in theatre and performance where 
‘suggestion, not representation, is relied on and nevertheless variety is obtainable’ 
(Craig in Baugh et al. 1999: 1). Not only do they foreshadow the next visual arts’ 
developments of ‘architectonic installations in which space is physically and 
perceptually destabilized [– thereby] confound[ing] the body’s ability to locate itself in 
space according to tangible coordinates’ (Iles 2001: 37) – but also they conceived of all 
the various elements that would influence further scenographic developments and the 
creation of the black box half a century later. 
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1.5 Carnivalesque cognition 
Having generated an initial understanding of a discrepant abstraction that reduces visual 
clarity in the performances of Fuller, the paintings of Seurat and the architecture of 
Gaudí, the thesis has exposed the emergence of an aesthetic tactic – provisionally called 
architectonic – the dissidence of which lies in the deregulation of body–space 
delineations and orders, and of the perceptual experience holistically conjured by vision. 
Within the architectonic rise of a haptic and bodily space in theatre, the substitution of 
painted scenery with kinetic draperies and curtains offered a significant shift from 
representational and perceptual clarity to cognitive and sensory uncertainty. This section 
will therefore consider a set of advanced experiments which interfered further with 
visual clarity by, in particular, blurring the distinctions between body and space. We 
begin with Craig’s concept of the ‘Architectonic’. 
 
 
9 Edward Gordon Craig, Sketch for Hamlet, 1909 
 
 Edward Gordon Craig’s use of the terms ‘Pictorial’ and ‘Architectonic’ was, in 
the contemporary context, attributed to specific trends and styles related to disciplinary 
domains such as painting and architecture (Packman 1931). But, if it can be taken that, 
as is suggested, aesthetic ideology pervaded all artistic disciplines, then the 
architectonic need not be simply comprehended in dialectical opposition to the pictorial 
as it was in the early twentieth century. Instead, and by way of producing a historical 
and interdisciplinary legacy that underpins its contemporary significance, the 
architectonic is here considered within the terms of a bodied spatiality (found across a 
variety of artistic practices) where space affects and is affected by the moving presence 
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of bodies thereby causing the distortion – ‘compress[ion]’ and ‘expan[sion]’ – of ‘time 
and space’, as if struck by ‘non-human forces such as the rush of waters’ (Packman 
1931: 4). While this opened up a wider sensory field of experience, the practitioners 
engaged in this critical shift were more concerned, as Craig noted, with the 
suggestiveness of visual reduction, or abstraction, because of its stimulation of the 
audience’s creative imagination away from discursive interpretation. To this end and 
like Fuller, Craig patented a scenic device, the Screens (Patent 1771, 1910), reliant upon 
projection and lighting:  
The object of my invention is to provide a device which shall present the 
aesthetic advantages of the plain curtain but shall further be capable of a 
multitude of effects which although not intended to produce an illusion 
shall nevertheless assist the imagination of the spectator by suggestion 
(Craig in Baugh et al. 1999: 1). 
 
 
10 Edward Gordon Craig, Patent 1771, Improvements in Stage Scenery, 1910 
 
Actualized through Stanislavski’s production of Hamlet in 1911, the Screens 
were ‘further intended to combine the artistic variety and mechanical advantages of 
painted scenery with the portable nature of the curtain’ (Craig in Baugh et al. 1999: 1) 
to enable ‘1000 shapes’ (Craig in Innes 1998: 142). The mobility of the Screens enabled 
the multiplicity of their positioning on stage but also constituted Craig’s attempt to 
embed the performer’s body within the spatial structure since the Screens were designed 
to be pushed on stage by the hands of performers.  
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11 Edward Gordon Craig, Hamlet Model-Box, c1912 
 
In producing various multiperspectival landscapes seemingly stretching well 
beyond the stage, Craig’s Screens can be seen as a complex development from an 
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innovation that had taken place in theatres a few years before. In 1907, fashion and 
lighting designer Mariano Fortuny patented the cyclorama under the name ‘cupola’. 
This large, curved and rigid screen, positioned as a backdrop, enabled the 
accommodation of new lighting technologies that allowed more control and more 
variety of lighting effects, leading to the possibility of lighting phenomena that were a 
spectacle in themselves. This new and rapidly popular device could seemingly expand 
the volume of space on stage as it erased the upstage borders. Fortuny translated this 
borderlessness into another creation he patented in the same year: his ‘delphos’ dress 
sought to rub off bodily borders via the use of endless pleats and trailing inspired by 
Ancient Greek clothing.  
 
         
12 Mariano Fortuny, Delphos Dress and Cupola, 1907 
 
 
Craig’s Screens constitute a fragmented and mobile version of the cyclorama. 
They alone can be seen as a development of Fortuny’s inventions since Craig’s 
approach to the body was also shaped by a particularly radical conception derived from 
the return of Carnivalesque cultures in the nineteenth century and, in particular, the 
Commedia Dell’Arte and Heinrich von Kleist’s theory of puppetry. Following Kleist, 
Craig conceived of the performer as an Übermarionette: a ‘new form of Acting and a 
new form of Drama’ (Craig in Rudlin 1994: 163) that innovated the performer’s 
physical presence by bringing it to the level of the inanimate made animate as ‘only 
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mimes and not actors’ (Craig 1972: 150) could do: ‘up sprang portraits with flushed 
faces, eyes which bulged, mouths which leered, fingers itching to come out of their 
frames, wrists which exposed the pulse’ (Craig 1911: 260). Craig’s interest in framing 
and unframing that which is visually presented on stage was not simply applied to both 
body and space but also hinged their interactions, hybridizations and thus 
incompletions. This is most relevant to the early twentieth-century’s renewed interest in 
Ancient or primitive arts, when a set of ‘Carnivalesque’ practices were developed, 
based on Ancient Greek aesthetics, puppetry and Commedia Dell’Arte. But the 
Carnivalesque had previously emerged as a mode of hybridizing and mobilizing 
corporeal, spatial and temporal contexts. Carnivalesque cognition thus offers semiotic 
and hermeneutic problems that are relevant to discuss here within a broader historical 
perspective as their precedents inform the endeavours of Craig and the Avant-Gardes of 
his time to revive and develop it further.  
From the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, Commedia artists had ‘borrowed 
their narrative frameworks from classical Roman comedy’ and ‘turned to contemporary 
carnivalesque practices in order to create specific masks, costumes and movements’ 
(Wiles 2004: 141). The multi-referentiality of the Carnivalesque participates in 
establishing how ‘commedia dell’arte […] was a phase of the dramatic art almost 
without parallel [as] it appealed not only to the people but to the aristocracy […] for 
three centuries’ (Craig in Rudlin 1994: 163), yet ‘the marionette theatre [–] as the last 
vestige of the commedia’ (Green and Swan 1993: 20) – was used by Craig’s 
Ubermarionette as a critical revision of the performer’s characterization: ‘fingers 
itching to come out of their frames […] all the colours higgledy-piggledy; all the lines 
in hubbub […] form breaks into panic (Craig 1911: 260).  
The Carnivalesque destabilization of characterization is also based on hybridity 
as it was brought about by the performer’s body splitting into part-character and part-
real human being without seamless cohesion. This dissonant characterization – found in 
Commedia’s ‘half-mask [which] establish[es] the sense that a particular actor has a 
unique physical presence’ (Wiles 2004: 141) while dethroning its singularity through an 
emerging character – operated a ‘return to the particular and a constant overriding of 
identity’ (Eagleton 1990: 337), ‘as being-for-itself and being for others’ (Hyman and 
Malbert 2000: 80): ‘a boundary phenomenon of hybridization or inmixing in which self 
and other become enmeshed in an inclusive, heterogenous, dangerously unstable zone’ 
(Stallybrass & White 1986: 193-4). 
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Craig’s interest in Commedia included the nomadic mobility of its scenic 
structures. His Screens can therefore be seen as an extension of the destabilization of 
Carnivalesque characterization into environmental matter. And  this too is in line with 
the earliest manifestations of the Carnivalesque. The merging of environment and 
bodily excess can be seen in Ben Jonson’s Bartholomew Fair (1614), the large 
character of Ursula, ‘mother o’ the Pigs’, epitomizes the ‘Body o’ the Fayre’ (Jonson in 
Homem 2008: 114) whereby 
the city finds its enabling and redemptive other, with which it can enter a 
dynamics that proves productive of a more balanced and reconciled 
relationship to experience and to the spaces against which it is lived 
(Homem 2008: 115). 
 
That Carnivalesque blur between body and space can be seen to be revived by early 
twentieth-century Avant-Gardes within a perceptual domain which may be qualified as 
‘fusional haptics [–] the perception of the physical body in the environment up to 
fusing’ (Laval-Jeantet 2008: 91). In 1912, the Ballets Russes dancer and choreographer 
Vaslav Nijinsky presented The Afternoon of a Fawn in collaboration with the stage 
designer Leon Bakst, who designed scenery and costumes in a way that accentuated 
visual effects of two-dimensionality across, and between, bodies and environment. The 
opening scene of the Fawn is a key moment, at which the large flat painted backdrop 
appears at first devoid of anyone, but suddenly reveals the presence of the Fawn as he 
starts moving.  
 
 
13 Vaslav Nijinsky, The Afternoon of a Fawn (opening scene), 1912 
56
 
 
 
              
    14 Leon Bakst, Design for the Fawn, 1912        15 Nijinsky, The Afternoon of a Fawn, 1912  
 
Ballets Russes’ grand master Sergei Diaghilev went on to develop such spatio-
corporeal overlap with more explicit relation to architecture and urbanism in his 
collaborations with Jean Cocteau and his Carnivalesque ‘travelling theatre’ works 
(Cocteau in Goldberg 2001: 77) such as Parade (1917), The Eiffel Tower Wedding 
Party (1921) and The Blue Train (1924).  
 
 
16 Jean Cocteau, The Eiffel Tower Wedding Party, 1921 
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17 Jean Cocteau, Parade, 1917 
 
Pushing the body to become a fragment of space, and space a fragment of the 
body, led to even more radical configurations of spatiality, recovering bodily qualities 
and kinesis. In Futurist artist Giacomo Balla’s collaboration with Igor Stravinsky on the 
five-minute opera Fireworks (1917), no performer inhabited the space, and light’s 
interaction with the scenery informed all the action onstage. Designed through drawing, 
painting and a model-box, Fireworks presented a large composition of projection 
screens of various shapes, hung throughout the volume of the stage with dark gaps 
between them. The presence of the screens was modulated via various lighting colours 
and intensities, all participating in the production of phenomenal oscillations between 
two- and three-dimensionality. In return, the dark empty spaces between the screens 
would be more or less accentuated, modulating their fragmentary impact upon the 
overall image. Although Fireworks did not include actual bodies on stage it posited 
itself as a prosthetic extension of bodies as it implied the importance of the concealed 
presence of ‘stage hands’, of bodies working to operate and animate the work. Indeed, 
the conception of space as itself a body followed Futurism’s interest in puppetry where 
‘motion, light and air’ (Prampolini in Salter 2010: 86) become core to the perceptual 
stimulus. Conceptually, this can be better understood through Enrico Prampolini’s 
manifesto for a Futurist Scenography (1915), in which an ‘electromechanical 
architecture, powerfully vitalized by chromatic emanations from a luminous source 
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[would execute the] mutual permeation [and] intersection of lights and shadows 
[producing] vacant abandonments, exultant, luminous corporalities [,] assemblages [,] 
unreal shocks [and the] exuberance of sensations’ (Prampolini in Drain 1995: 23).  
 
 
18 Giacomo Balla, Model-box for Fireworks, 1917 
 
Clearly hybridizing industrial and technological advancements with 
Carnivalesque precepts, Futurism’s radical approach to space underlined a 
reconsideration of the body as one which cognition is overwhelmed by sensation. 
Haptic perception provides not only the disturbance of vision but also of tangibility by 
raising tactile interrogations at the core of the perceptual experience. As a result, 
materialities are highly equivocal, and can no longer be entirely distinguished from one 
59
 
 
 
another. By ‘transgressing the body’s frontiers in a play of erotic solidarity with others’ 
(Eagleton 1990: 337), the ‘material bodily principle’ of the Carnivalesque – where ‘all 
that is bodily becomes grandiose, exaggerated and immeasurable’ – advances the 
‘pitting [of] sensation against concept’ (Bakhtin 1984: 19) within corporeal terms that 
extend beyond the body into the environment: ‘an evidence in the realm of flesh which 
has nothing to do with the evidence of reason’ (Artaud in Nechvatal 1999: 373).  
Sensation in Carnivalesque cognition resists any singular ‘idea or meaning’; 
rather it issues a polysemiosis from an irreducible ‘collection of images [with] many 
meanings’ (Green and Swan 1993: xi) where the audience then ‘ought to turn, baffled, 
to the images, to let them speak for themselves’ (Green and Swan 1993: xi). Indeed, as 
the ‘mobile, pluralized, disarticulated body of Bakhtinian carnival disowns all 
instrumentality in the name of sensuous repleteness [,] the body’s libidinal practice 
explodes the languages of reason, unity and identity into so many superfluous bits and 
pieces’ (Eagleton 1990: 337) that both  body and space are ‘conceptualized as corpulent 
excess[es] always in [a] process [of] becoming’ (Stallybrass and White 1986: 8–9). 
Carnivalesque’s ‘poetics of mobility’ where ‘notions of movement, kinesis, energy, 
exploration’ (Boehrer in Homem 2008: 115) ‘call on the flesh to disprove a monolithic 
construction of authorship’ (Homem 2008: 115) ‘render things non-identical with 
themselves in order to adumbrate a golden age of friendship and reconciliation’ 
(Eagleton 1990: 337). 
We have noted that Carnivalesque modes and practices move between the 
seventeenth century and twentieth-century Avant-Gardes. Practices such as Commedia 
and puppetry, like the ‘magical effects […] of medieval theatre [,] disappeared after the 
17th century [– due to theatre’s professionalization, institutionalization and 
sedentarization. – But they were] ‘resurrected in the second half of the 19th century’ 
(Dawes in Butterworth 2005: xvi). This resurrection has to be specifically noted in that 
it constitutes, within the history of scenographic practice, a precursor to what may have 
been assumed to be of Modernist origin. In the same way the dissonant cognition 
resulting from their kinetic energy in weaving body and space may be seen in the work 
of early Renaissance artists, who were challenging the classical codes of Pictorialism 
that were then being implemented. An example of such can be found in Leonardo Da 
Vinci who, dissatisfied with the restricted singularity of linear perspective, developed 
(sometimes mathematically flawed) perspectival systems, one of which led him to the 
technique he invented and coined as sfumato (‘hazy’). A painterly technique responsible 
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for his depiction of clouds, blurred landscapes and the fuzzying of bodily borders, 
Sfumato’s production of incomplete and uncertain surfaces and borders would create a 
pulse ‘hovering between the seen and the unseen’ (Vasari in Gombrich 1993: 185), and 
thereby disturbing the legibility of spatial and corporeal identities.  
 
                        
19 Leonardo Da Vinci, Mona Lisa, 1503                 20 Michelangelo, Awakening Captive, c1516  
 
In Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa (1503–6), as in Seurat’s Pointillism, sfumato ‘cut[s] 
down the information on the canvas and thereby stimulates[…] the mechanism of 
projection’ (Gombrich 1993: 185). Contemporaneous with Da Vinci, Michelangelo 
produced a series of unfinished sculptures that have been referred to as non-finito. 
Michelangelo’s non-finito, like Da Vinci’s sfumato, dissolves the borders between body 
and environment and proposes a sculptural presence that is quasi-immersed in the 
spectator’s own spatiality. Space and body gnaw on one another, inviting the viewer 
into their dialogic imprecision: ‘sfumato [contained] the seeds of an immersive counter-
tradition in opposition to the geometricised optics of point perspective’ (Nechvatal 
1999: 222).  This relation is propelled by how sfumato, like non-finito, evokes kinesis, 
movement and the ‘rapid actions of figures’ (Da Vinci in Warner 2006: 110).  
However, this evocation is not hermeneutically closed, for the movement 
elaborated by the image may be understood in different ways. Thus the viewer, as E. H. 
Gombrich (1993) argues, is required to undertake a mechanism of projection:  a process 
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of ‘making and matching [, of] errors and trials’ (Gombrich 1993: 24), ‘making guesses 
and modifying them’ (Gombrich 1993: 231), that constitutes a relational cognition 
Gombrich calls the ‘beholder’s share’ (Gombrich 1993: 154). Sfumato’s emulation of 
hazy phenomena recovers sensory stimuli’s ‘infinite ambiguity’ (Gombrich in Noë 
2004: 163) and, as such, requires that we develop an ‘understand[ing of] what one does 
not see’ (Barbaro in Gombrich 1993: 186): ‘look at walls splashed with a number of 
stains or stones of various mixed colours. If you have to invent some scene, you can see 
there resemblances to a number of landscapes […] and an infinite number of things’ 
(Da Vinci in Warner 2006: 110).  
Thus the viewer’s experience of sfumato’s cognitive imprecision and  
polysemiosis is in itself prefaced by the artist’s speculative process of creation: 
‘Leonardo recommended staring at stains and clouds to stimulate the mind’ (Warner 
2006: 125) in a similar way to how Michelangelo peered through the raw chunk of 
stone and perceived a figure out of the mineral’s own material structure. And although 
Carnivalesque practices were seemingly to disappear for two centuries, their heritage of 
cognitive imprecision would last in processual strategies just as the phenomena of 
clouds and rocks would continue to be regarded as structures of visual imprecision 
within what Marjorie Hope Nicolson calls ‘the development of the aesthetics of the 
infinite’ (1997). Focusing on how English poetry denoted various understandings of 
cognition and subjectivity by means of depicting the human approach to, relation with 
and conception of the natural landscape, Nicolson’s study traces between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth century the emergence of a dissonant subjectivity in the 
face of, and projected onto, the particular image of the mountain. Whereas the 
seventeenth century attributed to the mountain the non-divine and non-human 
allegories – what Nicolson names ‘Mountain Gloom’ – of threatening monstrosity, 
‘shapelessness and confusion’ (Nicolson 1997: 279), the eighteenth century developed 
an observational engagement with mountains in which human bodies confidently 
approached mountains through a direct, scientific and optical possessiveness: 
‘Mountain Glory’. This confidence in visually capturing natural ‘polymorphousness’ 
(Warner 2006: 111) became more conspicuously advanced as a speculative process of 
creation by Alexander Cozens’ ‘New Method’ of picturing landscapes ‘by blotting and 
crumpling the paper beforehand’ (Warner 2006: 104). Cozens ‘encouraged his students 
to follow chance’ within the ‘adventitious camouflage mottling of light and shade’ 
(Warner 2006: 113). This too, then, is an anticipation of  the return of anti-perspectival 
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structures of spatiality in the nineteenth century when, alongside the revival of 
carnivalesque cultures, Nicolson suggests that gloom and glory merge and the 
landscape is apprehended as the shapeless and confused corners of the human mind. As 
‘the caves that were Ruins of Nature to the eighteenth-century poets have […] become 
symbols of secret places in the soul of man’ (Nicolson 1997: 379), ‘ruins [and] 
asymmetry’ became understood as part of a human subjectivity that follows the 
‘irregularities of mountains and clouds’ (Nicolson 1997: 336). 
 
 
21 Alexander Cozens, 1759 
 
Though such cognitive dissonance in the human subject was embraced and 
celebrated by some, it was predominantly depreciated and even pathologized. Thus, for 
instance, Justinus Koerner’s drawings of smudges and blots in the 1850s offered a 
‘practice [of] stains and marks […] fold[ed] to produce a symmetrical image [and] took 
a psychological turn in Romantic literary circles in Germany’ (Warner 2006: 309) as 
Romantics sought to comprehend ‘clouds [as] extensions of the mind’s vagaries’ 
(Warner 2006: 110) in parallel with ‘numerous techniques of unravelling nature’s 
riddles and reconstituting its secret patterns to become intelligible’ (Warner 2006: 310). 
Though ‘Koerner suffered from very poor eyesight, so this was his way of transforming 
incapacitating blurs into aesthetic “creatures of chance”’ (Warner 2006: 309), his 
drawings were subsequently recycled by psychologist Hermann Rorschach in 1921 by 
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way of producing a psychological test out of random inkblots, the readings of which 
were deemed to provide ‘a form of psychological illumination’ (Warner 2006: 310): 
‘the Rorschach test entails precisely finding meanings where there is nothing 
represented, only abstract and random symmetries [to] result [in] the diagnosis of 
character’ (Warner 2006: 310). While the streamlining of visual imprecision’s plurality 
of suggestive readings towards one singular defining interpretation has proven 
inconsistent in psychological terms, and its ‘adherents are losing ground and have 
recently come under scrutiny and serious criticism’ (Warner 2006: 311), such dismissal 
had already been articulated by practitioners who valued the suggestiveness of 
imprecise imagery such as Fuller, Seurat, Gaudí, Craig and the Avant-Gardes. 
 
 
22 Hermann Rorschach, Psychodiagnostik 1921 
 
Returning to Edward Gordon Craig’s scenographic practice we may now 
observe the Screens as Carnivalesque structures with fragmentary yet cohesive 
combinations and arrangements of infinite landscape-like structures. Their invention 
results from various speculative processes of creation of which the most significant may 
be a series of speculative designs for Bach’s St Matthew Passion. Begun in 1900 and 
developed throughout his life, Craig’s Passion shifted from ruins, asymmetry and ‘a 
structure of dark scaffold poles’ (Craig 1972: 148) to a cathedral environment taken 
from the twelfth-century Italian church of St Nicolao. Though the monolithic frontal 
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part of the set would suggest that it is a faithful replica of the church, it also includes 
underground spaces leading the eyes through to find the upstage areas stripped of much 
of the architectural features that should continue the frontal environment. This 
seemingly ‘ruined’ and less visible bare back section of the model enabled Craig to 
increase the number of positions and directions of light that circulated in the cavities of 
the box and, therefore, to break the physical and frontal wholeness of the overall 
architecture into maze-like aggregates of spaces melding into other spaces. Indeed Craig 
was looking to exacerbate the phenomenal rather than the tangible qualities of the 
church: 
a structure that is essentially a denial of gravity and of determinate form, 
undermin[ing] normative categories of space and time by creating a spatial 
and temporal dimension, that, through the complex interplay of ritual, light 
and structure, is immeasurable. At the same time, the uncertainty, a denial 
of clear boundaries, engenders a condition where the discrete differences 
between subjects and objects are questioned; without clearly defined 
objects, there can be no separate, identifiable subjects. In cathedrals, space 
and time are wedded to structure, construction, light, and material, while 
the program is structured according to the traces and orchestrations of 
movement that occur within an indeterminate realm (Burns Gamard 2000: 
123–4). 
 
 
23 Edward Gordon Craig, Sketch for St Matthew Passion, 1901-2 
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24 Edward Gordon Craig, St Matthew Passion (Model by E. Craig 1972) 
 
To this end, Craig was also inspired by the ‘little boxes, or luogi deputati’ found 
within ‘the sacred plays of the Middle Ages’ (Craig 1972: 149) from which he 
developed a scenic structure where multiple platforms, semi-contained boxes and ‘more 
and more steps’ constituted much of the stage further surrounded by a ‘huge orchestra 
[…] hidden behind the “houses” and distributed around the theatre’ (Craig 1972: 149–
50). In this speculative project, Craig conceived of the performer’s presence as an 
intrinsic part of the space: his Passion ‘was to be without action, just the movement of 
lights and background – form and colour – the music and voices coming from invisible 
sources’ (Craig 1972: 148). Performers would stand still in various places and thus 
would be more or less fully visible. Audiences’ bodies were also invited to immerse and 
disperse: ‘people could have wandered in and out’ (Craig 1972: 150). Such fragmentary 
inclusion of bodies was further supported by lighting: not only its ebb and flow 
pulsating in different areas at different moments – ‘a light [...] would come up in one 
place [...] die down and come up […] elsewhere’ – but also evolving gradients of 
darkness as various areas would ‘grow darker and darker’ (Craig 1972: 150).  
Similarly to Balla’s Fireworks, Craig’s syntactic use of darkness to punctuate 
and puncture the overall spatial structure constitutes another way of bringing the dark 
periphery of the off-stage onstage and, in return, of stretching the stage to a never-
ending landscape: a Carnivalesque revision of the stage as a cyclorama, suggestive of a 
spatiality spreading beyond the stage. Similar to how the Screens were ‘mounted on 
castors and provided with struts [to evoke] the corner of a street-or the interior of a 
building’ (Craig in Baugh et al. 1999: 3), Craig’s Passion oscillates between inside and 
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outside without settling for one or the other. This two-fold semiosis is a dichotomy, a 
paradox that calls for reconsideration of the conceptual dualism of interiority and 
exteriority which is assumed in regard to both spaces and bodies. In this respect, Craig 
further speculated on the possible structures and phenomena of such a Carnivalesque 
modulability of the stage in his Theatre of the Future (1907) by expanding on the 
‘Asphaleia System [which] at the turn of the century, made it possible to raise sections 
of the stage floor to form platforms of various heights [that] could even be tilted or 
rotated’ (Innes 1998: 181). Perhaps one of the most potent anticipatory designs of the 
black box theatre, the work sought to augment and complicate ‘deep wells, open spaces, 
steps, platforms or partitions’ (Innes 1998: 177) by forecasting the Asphaleia System 
beyond the floor:  
each section of the floor can rise and fall at will by mechanical means; 
each section of the roof can descend or ascend, echoing as it were the 
movement of the floor; each side can as it were fold and unfold at all 
parts and can be moved at will (Craig in Innes 1998: 178). 
 
 Thus, ‘the floor seems to be an absence – the roof a void […] slow shapes […] 
continue to arise in endless numbers […] until there stand before us vast columns of 
shapes, all single yet all united – none resting’ (Craig in Innes 1998: 181). Craig’s 
conception of the scenographic space as a ‘void’ seeks to articulate the semiotic 
multiplicity and unrest of Carnivalesque cognition. The Carnivalesque and sfumato can 
be seen as part of an abiding counter-tradition, or lineage of multiplicity, which finds 
twentieth-century expression in Craig’s scenography. The void points to a critical 
metanarrative of multiplicity which blurs divisions between interiority and exteriority as 
well as presence and absence. Instead absence is now to be construed as a minimal 
degree of presence similarly to how darkness is no longer opposed to light but is seen as 
a minimal degree of light. Exteriority then is to be apprehended as a minimum level of 
interiority, one where cognition is at its most feeble and yet where meaning is not lost 
but is at a fragile point of emergence: 
The place is without form – one vast square of empty space is before us – 
all is still – no sound is heard – no movement is seen […] nothing is 
before us – And from that nothing shall come life – even as we watch, in 
the very centre of that void a single atom seems to stir – to rise – it 
ascends like the awakening of a thought in a dream (Craig in Hannah 
2003: 25). 
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25 Edward Gordon Craig, Scene 58 (reconstructed) c1970 
 
Carnivalesque cognition provides a reduced and fragile polysemiosis whose 
‘suggestiveness’ led Craig to investigate the abstract depths of a void where forms and 
thoughts are not pre-given but speculatively and infinitely possible. Not quite empty, 
this void must then be understood as a speculative threshold where all imaginable and 
unimaginable spatial and bodily forms may emerge. Although Craig wrote about new 
considerations of the theatre-house based on such a speculative threshold, it is his friend 
Adolphe Appia who would propose a potent precursor to the black box: a ‘changeable 
space […] in which the traditional architecture […] would […] be radically 
transformed’ (Beacham 1993: 110) – a ‘cathedral of the future’ (Appia in Beacham 
1993: 109) – as a theatre-house where the speculative threshold was even conceptually 
applied to the audience’s presence since it could be ‘with or without spectators’ (Appia 
in Beacham 1993: 110): a ‘living space’ in which ‘a moment of living art with no one 
viewing it except the performers themselves exists fully, and with more dignity than 
when reflected in the eyes of passive onlookers’ (Appia in Beacham 1993: 162).  
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Where Wagnerian scenography strove to isolate the visual phenomena on stage 
from and for the viewers, Craigian designs looked for the precise inversion of Wagner’s 
precepts. As a result, perception was no longer to be tied to representation and cognitive 
clarity. Rather, it could be conceived in terms of an intensity of experience that cannot 
be fully grasped in discourse. Thus through such cognitive challenges Craig’s 
Carnivalesque approach suggests an ontological reversal that is exemplified by his void: 
whereas prior built spaces and bodily understandings were based upon mathematical 
and geometric rules that referred symbolically to religious or philosophical ideologies 
and orders, space and body could now be elaborated from a speculative threshold. On 
the one hand, this led practitioners to conceive of and realize spaces that anticipate the 
mid-twentieth-century emergence of the black box. On the other hand, the speculative 
threshold offered ways to reconsider how bodies move, are seen and understood. And 
since the formation of such a speculative threshold is based on a bodily space, the 
further spatial developments that led to the black box should simultaneously provide the 
further developments of such bodily innovations.  
The next section thus discusses various instantiations of black box-like spaces 
after Craig, including Appia and artists from the Bauhaus. As it traces further the spatial 
implications of the speculative threshold, the section will highlight bodily consequences 
which can again be related to Craig in terms of his Ubermarionnette theory. Through 
continuing this historical analysis I hope to delineate more precisely the ontological and 
epistemological issues and revisions that are embedded in the cultivation of the 
speculative threshold. 
 
  
26 Adolphe Appia, Tristan and Isolde, 1896 
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1.6 Speculative Threshold 
Like Craig, Appia began his career with multiple speculative designs that sought to 
undo scenography’s Pictorial tradition. Appia used Wagnerian music dramas to develop 
dark, fragmented and borderless scenic spaces. In his sketches for the staging of Tristan 
and Isolde (1896), Appia’s scenery shows an unbalanced and gaseous interplay of 
darkness and light. Subsequently, his series of drawings called Rhythmic Spaces (1909), 
no longer related to any specific textual scripts, showed endless arrangements of stairs, 
columns, platforms, curtains, scrims and screens that were sometimes mobile, and 
always conceived as canvases altered by and altering light phenomena.  
 
 
 
27 Adolphe Appia, Rhythmic Spaces, 1909 
70
 
 
 
Craig’s speculative drawings of the Steps (1905) equally emphasized the visually 
shifting presence of stairs and curtains. In one of those drawings, Craig traced a 
labyrinth on the floor of a stage made of stairs as well as plain and draped walls. 
Comparing this drawn space to Appia’s actual ‘study site’ reveals much resemblance as 
to the core structural elements that populate the stage. In both cases, the drapes do not 
function as devices to conceal off-stage areas but rather operate on a vertical plane as 
much as the floor’s design (stairs and labyrinth) does on a horizontal plane. Stairs 
interface phenomenal dialogues between floor and walls as they literally intersect their 
own vertical and horizontal planes, therein offering multiple levels and new micro 
platforms/stages. At the same time, stairs present protruding and receding corners and 
thus create a complex three-dimensional assemblage of angles, cascades of minute walls 
and floors that all interact with light in ways that are comparable to the folds of curtains 
and draperies. 
 
      
28 E. Gordon Craig, The Steps, 1905                     29 Adolphe Appia, Study Site, 1912 
 
Thus stairs and drapes can enable a high degree of visual modulation of the 
environment just as they affect the body. This section will begin by exploring the kind 
of spatiality suggested and constructed by drapes of various sorts, from curtains as 
screens to the draped body. From drapes it will move to the spatiality of caves, which, 
as in the case of Plato’s cave, explicitly raise issues in relation to the dualisms which 
have historically shaped our thinking about space. Caves will in turn lead us to touch on 
scaffolds, those structures which are neither walls nor not walls.  
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Similar to how ‘the kinetic impetus of the body in climbing the stair is […] 
checked by the friction of the steps’ (Frampton 1998: 31), curtains and draperies can 
facilitate the corporeal exploration of multiple levels and axis in motion thereby freeing 
the body from its fixed centring in the torso and the correlated ‘upward training of the 
body’ (Vigarello 1989). Collaborating with composer and choreographer Emile Jaques-
Dalcroze, Appia conceived and realized in 1911 a theatre-house in Hellerau, Germany, 
he called his ‘study site’ (Appia in Baugh 2005: 61). A large and modulable white box, 
the study site mostly comprises mobile stairs and curtains. These are relatable to the 
bodies because all performers are dressed in white Ancient Greek-like draperies. Bodies 
and space are further brought together by way of broad washes of light permeating both 
stage and auditorium. As Appia’s collaborator, Jaques-Dalcroze, developed a movement 
language (‘eurhythmics’) which sought to augment the body’s three-dimensional 
mobility, spatial design was equally acquiring a broader visual and kinetic language.  
However these languages are to be understood within the terms of an abstraction 
that is less concerned with referring to fictional narrative and more interested in 
revisiting everyday metanarratives. Though the eurhythmic body (like the puppet) could 
elaborate a bodily torsion and torque that evoked ‘a process of character transformation’ 
(Schwartz 1992: 77), Mary Wigman, one of Dalcroze’s students, left his Eurhythmics to 
look for even further ‘dissonance […] to express […] character’ (Perrottet in Schwartz 
1992: 73). In Wigman’s Hexentanz (1913), the draped costume participates in 
producing extreme physical contortion, asymmetry and the near loss of the human 
shape. By nurturing ‘the lack of the proper deportment prescribed mainly by socialized 
ethics’ (Vigarello 1989: 149), Wigman attacked the tradition of ‘granting privilege to 
rigidity and rectitude’ (Vigarello 1989: 155) that had permeated dance and everyday 
behaviours for centuries. ‘What began with adherence to lines of the body result[ed] 
eventually in the opposite: the imposition of a conventional shape’ (Vigarello 1989: 
155) correlatively producing ‘the stigma of deformity’ (Vigarello 1989: 149). Wigman 
vigorously performed deformity, rejecting the prescription that ‘a lady [should] “walk 
without looking or turning her gaze toward any man or woman who might be to the 
right or to the left”’ (Vigarello 1989: 150). Since proper deportment was underlined by 
the civility of how ‘one’s posture as a whole must also show […] self-possession’ 
(Vigarello 1989: 150), Wigman’s oblique gestures subverted ideologies of civility and 
civilization by applying precision and control to the most unstable confines of human 
motion and new propioceptive relations between body and space. As such, the 
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speculative threshold of spatio-corporeality can be said not only to erode the stability of 
characterization but also to seek a reconsideration of the self separated from authorship 
as ownership.  
 
 
30 Mary Wigman, Hexentanz I, 1914 
 
Traditionally ‘drapery is the aestheticisation of cloth’ and ‘aestheticization is 
associated with civilisation’ (Doy 2002: 230) and ‘high culture’ (Doy 2002: 213). Thus 
the use of drapery to participate kinetically in the ‘soft, imprecise “picture”’ (Doy 2002: 
54) of a destabilized subject may be seen as a critique of any civilized body that would 
be defined by cultural dominance and supremacy. Fuller, Craig, Appia, Wigman and 
others’ attempt at making ‘the draped cloth […] devoid of any cultural and political 
associations’ (Doy 2002: 181) circumvent a critical ‘co-existence of civilisation and 
barbarism’ (Doy 2002: 215) wherein drapery subverts both and, with it, the very 
ontological and epistemological foundations of Western  culture. Indeed, conceived in 
the architectural terms of walls, drapery’s shifting porosity produces a destabilized 
spatiality by way of collapsing the spatial divisions that previously ordered the built (as 
an inside) against the outside. Thus, when director Harley Granville-Barker, having 
visited Appia’s theatre in Hellerau, affirmed: ‘what is really needed is a great white 
box’ (Granville-Barker in Dymkowski 1986: 77), the ‘box’ must be understood 
differently from a closed container. To be sure, from 1912 to 1914, in London, 
Granville Barker directed a series of Shakespearean plays at the Savoy Theatre in 
which he extended the stage into the auditorium, creating the proximity Appia was 
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striving for while developing it further by employing large amounts of curtains whose 
‘patterns suggest walls’ through a ‘new hieroglyphic language of scenery’ (Granville-
Barker in Dymkowski 1986: 78). The stage’s extension, like the suggestion of walls 
through curtains, enabled the ‘set[ting of] our scenes in a shell […] something that will 
not tie us too rigidly indoors or out’ (Granville-Barker in Dymkowski 1986: 7–8). 
Granville-Barker’s proposal for a ‘shell’ denotes a particular attention paid to the 
membrane that actually separates the outside from the inside. His call for a constructed 
environment that no longer connives at dialectic conceptions of outside and inside is 
underlined by an insistence upon a border that must be seen as an interface in which 
outside and inside penetrate one another. This conceptual border philosophically dates 
back to Ancient Greek thinkers and to Plato in particular. It thus contributes to a more 
general Western ontology where dualisms order being and experience: inside and 
outside, self and other, mind and body, etc. In Appia’s study site, the porosity of 
boundaries suggests, as did Granville-Barker, the demise of dualistic thinking which 
could not be more different to how ‘Wagner carried the logic of Plato’s cave to its 
conclusion’ (Wiles 2003: 229).  
 
 
31 Harley Granville-Barker, Twelfth Night, 1912 
 
Granville-Barker’s shell may thus be seen as a kind of spatiality that predates 
Plato. Let’s first remind ourselves of Plato’s Allegory, or Simile, of the Cave, in which 
he articulated his dialectic division ‘between soul and body, between intelligible and 
sensory realms of experience’ (Wiles 2003: 211). Plato formulated an oppositional 
distinction between cognition and sensorimotor experiences precisely through the 
opposition of light and dark conceptualized as form and formlessness. Plato theorized 
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the notion of form by arguing that sensory experiences are attached to the dark 
formlessness of shadows, thereby preventing us from grasping forms originating from 
the sun’s light and constituting (cognitive) truth. He thus regarded the cave as the 
paradigmatic space of the formless, criticizing it because of the ways in which bodies 
are immersed in phenomena weaving light and shadows, and creating, allegedly, 
unintelligible images. As a result, Plato demanded that one comes out of the cave: 
extracting one’s body from sensory experiences (formlessness) and dividing one’s self 
from one’s body to focus on the clarity of forms drawn from sunlight. Plato posited a 
homogenizing hierarchical and socio-political model in which light and form are 
privileged against darkness and formlessness, where the latter are located to the 
background of humanity and the former to the foreground. 
This influential Platonic view, in which darkness is strongly depreciated by the 
civilized mind, was already instated within the ontologically hierarchizing structure of 
the Ancient Greek Dionysian chora. Indeed, chora produced rituals with the political 
(and rather Wagnerian) agenda of educating the mass, giving a specific form and limit 
to Greek society: the ‘gathering of the polis around the dancing circle’ (Wiles 2003: 
211). The divisive and socializing ontology of the polis established through chora went 
on to develop in Hellenistic theatre ‘where the actors stood as if in a relief on a narrow 
stage, and the empty space of the orchestral circle created aesthetic distance, with 
choral songs helping to separate the imitators of life from those imitated’ (Wiles 2003: 
212).  
The very interval created by the orchestra has a precise depth for which ‘Greek 
scene painters developed the art of perspective […] not the single-point perspective 
beloved of renaissance princes but a looser form that satisfied spectators in all parts of 
the auditorium’ (Wiles 2003: 212). Through this non-linear perspective, ‘the art of 
trompe l’oeil scene-painting was developed to enhance the proposition that the stage 
was a two-dimensional mirror’ (Wiles 2003: 212). The scenography of chora leads to a 
distortion of three-dimensionality into two-dimensionality, yet separates, and privileges 
as such, the mimetic reproduction from its real instantiation as it makes use of spatial 
intervals to organize and order form, representation, meaning and subjectivity: thereby 
advancing ‘the materialist proposition […] that reality exists out there to be observed 
and imitated on a stage; and the collectivist proposition […] that we are social beings 
before we are individuals’ (Wiles 2003: 238). As an allegory, Plato’s cave offered a 
fictitious situation, yet the cave, its darkness and shadows all referred to actual 
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prehistoric caves in which drawings can be found. If these drawings’ complex forms 
were then seen as disordered primitivism, they have since revealed a key stage in the 
advancement of fundamental human technologies such as lighting and architectural 
devices. At Lascaux, walls display a mix of figures and motifs that were partly drawn 
from the stone reliefs and their shadows revealed by the fire of tallow lamps. As there is 
‘no longer any space outside of the figures to define them [–] space is immersed in the 
overlapping figures’ (Nechvatal 1999: 157) – those are ‘super-imposed […] entities 
[…] leading to the articulation of new identities [and a] dizzying sense of 
spacelessness’ (Rothenberg in Nechvatal 1999: 397). Form is conceived through, and 
remains woven in, formlessness, resulting in a ‘visual turbulence’ or ‘flooding-over 
effect’ that is ‘stunning our senses’ (Bataille in Nechvatal 1999: 151) while producing a 
‘cognitive dissonance’ (Nechvatal 1999: 159, 161) and  
a corporeal vituperation against the obligations of spatial form, of 
perspective, of measure, of equilibrium, of dimension, and through this 
demanding vituperation a condemnation of the psychic world incrusted 
like a crab-louse on the physique that it incubates or succubates by 
alleging to have formed it (Artaud in Weiss 1994: 41). 
 
Prehistoric caves, like Granville-Barker’s shell, draw attention to their walls as 
porous membranes since their surfaces are also semi-reliefs oscillating between flatness 
and depth. Two-dimensional depictions of the outside are conditioned by the physical, 
three-dimensional and fragmentary conditions of the inside space and the diffused 
multidirectionality of the tallow lamps’ lighting. Drawings proliferate onto all the walls 
and ceilings and the cave turns into an in/outside space. Without any frame setting 
limits to the work, Prehistoric artists ‘abandoned their oeuvre to the next to come after 
them in ant-like activity’ (Bataille in Nechvatal 1999: 158). Furthermore, to attain those 
illuminated ceilings and remote corners of the cave’s walls they would have 
‘constructed a scaffold’ (Nechvatal 1999: 156). Although the history of scaffolding had 
been lost at the time of the Renaissance, when papers and books suspiciously 
disappeared (Robertson 2003: 153), scaffolds are seminal to understanding architecture 
as an interface that mediates interactions between bodies and the environment. The 
prosthetic extension of scaffolding to reach for the ceilings of the cave is in itself 
neither an inside nor an outside space but a transient architectural response to and 
corporeal inhabitation of the cave’s irregular volumes and surfaces, developed further 
through the drawings on the wall. 
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‘Scaffolding [–] to storm by mounting a wall by ladders’ (Robertson 2003: 162) 
– ‘explain[s] what a wall is without being a wall [, thus,] detached from the severity of 
an origin [,] the scaffold wants to fall away from support’ (Robertson 2003: 79, 163). 
Prehistoric caves provide a hazy spatiality that serves as an indication as to what a 
spatial void may be. They implicate body and space by way of a vertiginous and 
reciprocal decentering. This prehistory nonetheless remains connected to progress in 
terms of adapting and developing tools intensely to engage with the environment. This 
apparent paradox we already found in Loïe Fuller’s conflation of primitive and natural 
images with innovative technologies. Craig and Appia similarly sought to apply and 
innovate the developing technologies of their time to produce similar spatial voids. It is 
as if the more technical tools were developed to see (lighting and projection), the more 
some artists appropriated these devices to inquire into imperceptibility. In doing so, 
they uncovered new spatial forms as well as another configuration of the human subject 
in which cognition and consciousness are not settled in the interiority of the body but 
rather, by way of an embodied consciousness, remain entangled in and diffracted by 
exterior materiality. In this way, they proposed not only the possibility of new kind of 
subjectivities – ‘metamorphing personalities and destabilized identities’ (Warner 2006: 
380) – but also, as a result, a renewed understanding of human relations and 
interactions. 
Artists, performers, and writers who are grasping the imaginary fabric that 
swathes and freights our consciousness [by] answering the call to grasp 
technologies as the prime shaper of human identity […] and recognize 
their effects, engage with social issues, and revision the seductiveness of 
illusions as a first step towards dreaming them differently. They can help 
[…] reorientate […] audiences’ perceptions, and shape subjectivity within 
a mesh of reciprocal and social relations (Warner 2006: 381). 
 
 
Having deciphered the compound of problems and new opportunities that lie, 
often since very ancient times, at the core of the speculative threshold, I shall now turn 
to unpicking how the dismantling of perceptual clarity and the correlated subjective 
stance it implies were furthered by way of conceiving of and realizing new 
phenomenal, architectural, bodily and social projects. In line with Craig’s innovations 
based on lighting and projection technologies, the following section will focus on these 
as catalysts for problematizing the perceptual act of seeing and the experience of being.  
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1.7 To see and not to see 
Craigian and Appian endeavours to integrate new technologies on stage were paired 
with conceptions of entirely black or white environments. Blackness and whiteness 
indeed provided surfaces with high sensitivity to lighting phenomena: by absorbing 
much of light’s photons blackness enables the activity of isolating and sharpening, 
while photons bounce off and slide on white surfaces. Black and white presented artists 
with much potential to explore lighting phenomena that ranged from the near absence 
of light to its blinding presence. While blackness and whiteness became rigidly 
organized in cinemas, the Avant-Gardes’ ethos of interdisciplinarity sought to bring 
projection technologies into hybrid artforms of a performative and/or sculptural kind. In 
doing so, they challenged the passive and precise positioning of the live body vis-à-vis 
(or rather outside of) the filmic image and looked for the exact opposite: the multi-
positioning of screens, projections in relation to, and as well as, live bodies. As 
darkness was more effective visually to control the filmic medium onstage, as opposed 
to bright whiteness, which is rather detrimental to the perception of projected imagery, 
it is alongside the increasing ubiquity of film and cinemas that scenography can be seen 
to shift its developing interest in the attenuation of visual clarity from blinding 
intensities of light to the quasi-absence of light. This section explores various Avant-
Gardes, to which Craig and Appia paid much attention, and how their radical 
playfulness with technological innovations offers important instances of the 
foundations upon which the black box space would be realized while, at the same time, 
denoting more critical social projects and revisions of the human. 
In the Surrealist ballet Relâche (1924) Francis Picabia’s scenic design was 
comprised of a unique cyclorama: an ‘enormous backdrop of metal discs, each 
reflecting a powerful light bulb’ (Goldberg 2001: 90), which would occasionally flash 
and blind the audience from perceiving the performing bodies on stage. During the 
piece’s intermission, the auditorium was plunged into darkness and the closed curtain 
would become a screen for the projection of Picabia and René Clair’s film Entr’acte, 
which was comprised of unusual camera perspectives showing Marcel Duchamp and 
Man Ray playing chess, as well as views of ballet dancers from underneath. Immersive 
relations between stage and auditorium were orchestrated in three ways: the backdrop of 
light bulbs onstage illuminating (spilling over) the auditorium, the curtain that 
delineates the boundary between stage and auditorium turning into a screen that brings 
another kind of spatiality (from below) to the audience, and, at the beginning of the 
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performance, the performers walking from the auditorium seats to the stage. As part of 
its interdisciplinary rejection of defined artistic fields, Relâche itself is a term 
traditionally used to refer to a closed theatre: no performance tonight. Yet Entr’acte 
refers to an intervallic moment between acts which therefore implies the experience of 
performance on its peripheral, off-stage, borders.  
 
 
32 Francis Picabia & Erik Satie, Relâche, 1924 
 
33 Francis Picabia & René Clair, Entr’acte, 1924 
 
Since Picabia called Relâche an ‘Instantaneist’ ballet, the work can be said to resist 
altogether the immediacy of performance in order to formulate an understanding of 
instantaneity as an in-between experience in perceptual terms: privileging short delayed 
moments between perceptual stimulation and visual processing, those intermittent 
seconds in which visual content has not yet taken shape as such but still occurs as 
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flickering abstract particles that are remnants of past perception. Such an attempt to 
produce ‘the loss of direct vision’ (Crary 2001: 226) suggests the ‘disintegration of a 
faith in [visual] perception’ (Virilio in Crary 2001: 226). As with Kasimir Malevich’s 
Black Square (1915), we confront ‘a visual image that tells of the impossibility of 
seeing, embodied in an object whose very reason for existing is to be seen’ (Morrison 
2006: 140). Though this may seem negatively paradoxical, the contradiction here does 
not prevent the work from offering productive developments. Indeed, in his 0.10 
Exhibition (1915), Malevich presented Black Square in the corner of the exhibition 
space, thereby disrupting that architectural element which signals the integrity of the 
container as a closed inside. This subtle attack on the architectural space then takes on a 
much larger scale in Malevich’s speculative architectural projects titled Architekton 
(1923–6). Although those projects present models of speculative buildings of a rather 
monolithic kind, Malevich also developed them in photographic records and collages, 
revealing their highly fragmentary appearance under their own lighting and within the 
urban landscape. In the photo-montage Architekton in front of a Skyscraper (1924), the 
work is shown as a parasitic and composite structure of surfaces and volumes that 
derives traces from the neighbouring skyscrapers, and whose disparity not only 
disunifies itself but also the buildings upon which it is grafted.  
 
 
34 Kasimir Malevich, Black Squares in 0.10 Exhibition, 1915 
 
80
 
 
 
     
35 Kasimir Malevich, Architekton Gota, 1923 
 
 
36 Kasimir Malevich, Architekton in front of a Skyscraper, 1924 
 
Architekton in front of a Skyscraper echoes and complicates further the 
introduction of screens into the urban landscape. However, as a screen it does not offer 
its own content but rather reflects and diffracts, like a broken mirror, the adjacent 
surfaces and forms of the skyscrapers. It bridges two buildings in a way that makes 
them seem to overlap in a mishmash of forms. Equally concerned with confounding 
vision, Marcel Duchamp’s work sought to engage viewers further by immersing them 
within overlapping materialities by ‘plac[ing] mirrored pieces of glass on the floor so 
that the room and the viewer are mirrored simultaneously’ (Duchamp in Iles 2001: 38) 
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as if ‘hang[ing] a geometry book from the balcony […] so that the wind would tear 
through its pages’ (Duchamp in Dunhill 2008: 11–12).  
Blurring borders between bodies and space informs ‘Duchamp’s theory of the 
“infra-thin” with which he associated “division, transparency and ‘cottage’”’ (Iles 2001: 
36): ‘reflection from a mirror – or glass – / flat / convex – infra-thin separation – better / 
than screen, because it indicates/interval (taken in one sense) and/screen (taken in 
another sense)’ (Duchamp in Iles 2001: 66). The infra-thin demarcates an intentional 
problem in locating and positioning that which is empirically separate. This problem 
raises cognitive difficulties for the audience as Duchamp’s ‘art [is] still in a raw state, 
which must be “refined” as pure sugar from molasses by the spectator’ (Duchamp in 
Lebel 1959: 78). 
the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings 
the work in contact with the external world by deciphering and 
interpreting its inner qualifications and thus adds his contribution to the 
creative act (Duchamp in Lebel 1959: 78). 
 
Considering such visual experience with respect to the filmic medium, Duchamp 
created artworks such as The Small Glass (1918) or Anemic Cinema (1926) where he 
orchestrated ‘the dismantling of the two-dimensional picture plane’ through ‘multiple 
perspectives’ that countered ‘the hypnosis induced by the pitch-blackness of the 
cinema, within which the single bright screen seizes our minds’ (Iles 2001: 34). The 
Small Glass has another title: To be Looked at (from the Other Side of the Glass) with 
One Eye, Close to, for Almost an Hour. The work is ‘to be looked at like a screen, but it 
also instructs the viewer to look through it from behind, like an aperture’ (Joselit in Iles 
2001: 36). It is a ‘slippery surface’ producing ‘a movement away from the opposition 
of surface and depth in favour of an awareness of the oscillating and constantly 
changing movement from one into another’ (Imperiale 2000: 5): 
[m]y eye riveted to the magnifying glass, I see – or rather I don’t see – the 
work vanish from my visual field only for there to appear an inverted and 
reduced image of the gallery […] where the object is exhibited [and when] 
by chance another visitor passes [and] appears […] upside down and in 
my former place, since I was initially on that side of the glass where the 
title/instruction sheet was to be read […] a missed encounter has just taken 
place [: because] between the two of us was nothing but the instrument of 
this encounter [and] since he occupies the place where I was, it is also 
with myself that I had this missed rendezvous to which I arrived late, and 
it is with himself that he will have, or that he already has a rendezvous, 
with all kinds of delays  (De Duve in Iles 2001: 35). 
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Duchamp employed the Avant-Gardes’ immersive subversion of artistic 
tradition where ‘painting was no longer an exterior scene, the setting of a theatrical 
spectacle’ (Boccioni in Goldberg 2001: 14) and ‘the spectator [must] live at the centre 
of the painted action’ (Soffici in Goldberg 2001: 14). As such, the position of the 
viewer’s body dislodges and is dislodged by the body of the artwork. But Duchamp 
confounded and dis-positioned the viewer in both physical and discursive ways by 
underlying the works with textual structures (titles) that conflict with the objects 
attached to them in such a way that materiality and discourse interactively coalesce to 
prevent the settling of meaning. The window-like quality of looking through the Small 
Glass turns against the very tradition of the pictorial window that precisely framed and 
secured meaning onto the world behind, and continued to permeate new technologies 
and media such as cinema. This is most conspicuous in Fresh Widow (1920) where 
Duchamp presents us with an actual ‘French window’ with the title an obvious pun: on 
one hand, the title seems to offer meaning inasmuch as the window has been somehow 
veiled in darkness like a widow; yet, on the other hand, the object is not entirely veiled, 
only its glass panels are and thus what is here mourned, or contested, is the window’s 
content as it now frames and focuses on darkness.  
 
 
37 Marcel Duchamp, Fresh Widow, 1920 
 
Thus, the piece is not physically positioned at eye-level but much lower, touching on 
the floor as if it had just been dismantled off the wall or is about to be inserted into the 
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wall. Fresh Widow is a paradigmatic Duchampian attempt at suggesting positions in 
order the better to reject them, thereby making the artwork relationally unstable. By 
placing this window on the floor, the object becomes less divided from the viewer and 
more part of his or her own space, but this window has no function anymore, and 
consequently inviting the viewer similarly to accept and immerse into its disposition 
and dysfunction. This was already in place in the Small Glass, for looking at a close 
surface and looking at another one at a distance cannot be simultaneously achieved by 
the human eye and requires different locations and positions for each action.  
 
 
38 Marcel Duchamp, The Large Glass, 1915-65 
 
Duchamp pursued the Small Glass on a larger scale with The Bride Stripped 
Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (The Large Glass) (1915–23). The Large Glass can be 
associated with a window as much as with a door due to its material, size and shape. 
Like the Small Glass, it has physical limits but seeks to unframe perception by requiring 
us to attend both to its fragmented surface and the fragmenting view through it towards 
the environment. Duchamp requested that the work should not be presented against a 
wall but perpendicular to one so as to allow viewers to observe it from all around and to 
see other viewers through it. As such, the piece also constitutes (a fragment of) wall in 
itself, but this wall-door-window does not regulate the audience’s perceptual and 
physical mobility. Quite to the contrary, it operates as a parasitic architectural 
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component within the museological space, in which the textures of the artwork, the 
environment and the viewers all collide without settling down into the one and only 
image. In this way, Duchamp initiates an exploration of an architectural domain that is 
equivocally embedding and embedded within live moving bodies, resulting in an 
embodied object. And the object of The Large Glass had indeed been conceived like an 
architectural body. In Man Ray’s photograph of The Large Glass called Dust Breeding 
(1920) the artwork is shown to lay on (and as) a floor covered in dust. From this short 
sleep of the object, Duchamp would retain some of the dust, glued in some etched areas 
of the glass, before it was brought back to a vertical, upright, position. The process of 
realization, like the presentation of the finished object makes it comparable to a body. 
 
 
39 Man Ray, Dust Breeding, 1920 
 
Duchamp’s intervention in the architectural domain was taken further within his 
own home. In his Paris flat, he realized Door: 11 rue Larrey (1927) and became both 
creator and audience to an architectural element that impacted on his life and the lives 
of others on a daily basis – inasmuch as the normally unequivocal function of the door 
as an open or closed framing device was subverted in that it would simultaneously open 
and close, connect and disconnect different rooms at the same time, therein offering to 
multiple bodies simultaneous possibilities of relation and interaction with a singular 
door. But it is in his very last work, Given: 1. the waterfall 2. the illuminating gas 
(1946–66), that Duchamp radicalized his subversive approach to positionality in 
architectural and bodily terms, and, as such, provided a clearer delineation of the multi-
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positional subversion of both the filmic medium’s relation to architectural and corporeal 
matters in particular and assumed norms of visuality in general.  
 
 
40 Marcel Duchamp, Door: 11 rue Larrey, 1927 
 
   
41 Marcel Duchamp, Given, 1946-66 
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Given first presents a large wooden door integrated seamlessly within the white 
walls of the Philadelphia Museum of Art. This door cannot be opened and functions 
instead as an accidental window since there are broken apertures in its wood that allow 
it to be peered through to see what is on the other side. As such, the work can only be 
seen by one viewer at a time, who must bend her body and adjust her eyes to the holes – 
a position that cannot be sustained for very long. In addition, the wood between the 
holes imposes a dark gap in the field of the viewer looking through them: an effect of 
cropping happens to the viewer, which can be partly modulated by the viewer’s eyes’ 
movement. The content behind the door is a landscape presenting a naked female body 
whose legs are wide open and whose distorted genitals are projected at the forefront of 
the image. Her head cannot be seen as it is obscured by grass. The illuminating gas 
lamp appears three-dimensional and working but its light doesn’t seem to be the only 
source of lighting in the space. The waterfall on the other hand appears two-dimensional 
like most of the landscape, which nonetheless seems to extend to the apparently three-
dimensional grass bursting around and upon the figure. The cold artificial and static 
plasticity of the body and the landscape is juxtaposed with the warm and vibrating light 
of the gas lamp. Though the flickering of the gas lamp is like the incessant flickers of 
early cinema, the filmic image’s smooth flattening of the three-dimensional world is 
here disclosed as an irresolvable intersection of two-dimensionality and three-
dimensionality thereby impelling the ‘blossoming of perspective’ (Haralambidou 2006) 
out of ‘the centralism of perspectival vision [and] the linear viewpoint, after the fashion 
of the cinematographic sequence’ (De Solà-Morales 1999: 68).  
Further enhanced by the surface of the door visually obliterating some of the 
three-dimensional content, Given offers ‘a new understanding of vision as active 
process, proposing a cognitive operation that is subjective, contingent and constructive’ 
(Demos in Haralambidou 2006: 10). Indeed, the physical and visual struggle required 
from the viewer is paired with hermeneutic problems linked to the rather unhelpful title 
and the presence of a headless body. ‘[I]ndeterminate, flexible and transposable’ 
(Demos in Haralambidou 2006: 11), Given ‘signal[s] a space where the reified 
“identities” of classic genders lie defeated’ (Demos in Haralambidou 2006: 11). 
Duchamp appears to take on Da Vinci’s sfumato within three-dimensional terms in such 
a way that Given could be ‘the result of Mona Lisa’s fall from her balcony into the 
landscape. During the fall she undergoes a transformation: she loses her clothes and 
blossoms into three dimensions’ (Haralambidou 2006: 6–7). Given orchestrates a three-
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dimensional tension between the vertical format of the portrait and the horizontal format 
of the landscape. As a result, Duchamp created an unruly, destabilized and 
destabilizing, three-dimensionality that attempts to immerse the viewer in turn. This is  
evident in the way that the female body’s obscured head parallels how the viewer’s 
head is similarly placed in the concealed situation of a voyeur: a ‘voyeur [who] is not, 
therefore, in a position of pure manipulation of an object, albeit distant, but is always 
threatened by the potential exteriorisation of his own function’ (Rose 1986: 194).   
Thus in Given the three-dimensionality of viewer and space is part of ‘a 
multimedia space of inquiry […] the space of perspective’s other, which breaches the 
picture plane’: ‘a space of “becoming”, where materiality always holds within itself the 
virtual possibilities of its visual transformation that extends beyond any notion of a 
static material reality allowing sightlines to multiply endlessly and identities to 
metamorphose in the act of viewing’ (Demos in Haralambidou 2006: 11). In this way, 
Duchamp suggests the potential for bodies and spaces to be reconsidered according to 
the uncertainty of an ever-shifting three-dimensionality. Such concern with a volumetric 
perception freed from perspectival orders was also, at the time of Duchamp, a potent 
strategy for creation within the Bauhaus movement. Indeed, in the Bauhaus, the 
rejection of visual clarity and the correlated blossoming of new potentials of three-
dimensionality fell under the theoretical concept of Raumempfindung or ‘felt volume’: 
‘a space filled with a soft pliable substance’ (Schlemmer in Goldberg 2001: 104).  
By investigating the kinetic animation of volumetric spatiality and weaving the 
body into it, Bauhaus produced works in which the experience of seeing involved 
acquainting oneself with degrees of difficulty in seeing, or progressively peering 
through the various depths and layers of the visual stimuli. In Frederick Kiesler’s 
‘endless stage’ or Space Stage (1924), a scaffolded and revolving set upstages any 
attention paid to two-dimensional surfaces. Like Craig’s Screens, Kiesler’s set was put 
in motion by means of the performers pushing its various parts. The scenic structure 
itself becomes comprehensible, as a spiral, only by means of its interaction with bodies. 
Yet during this interaction bodies and scenery are entangled and obscure one another. 
Thus, both performing and viewing bodies are engaged in a constantly changing 
perceptual experience without a visual centre and where the entire volume of space 
becomes a multiplicity of perceptual points. No longer frontal but spiralling, the three-
dimensional space designed as repudiation of surfaces makes it possible to recover an 
unruly 360° ‘thousand-eyed’ (Moholy-Nagy in Goldberg 2001: 117) perception. Such 
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perception always exceeds what the individual human can grasp, yet, as Kiesler 
demonstrated with his further works, this perceptual excess and the difficulty of settling  
the body in and in relation to space can be productively imagined in everyday life: see 
the Mobile Library (1939), the Endless House (1950) and the City in Space (1925).  
 
 
42 Frederick Kiesler, Space Stage, 1924 
 
 
43 Frederick Kiesler, Inside Bucephalus, 1964 
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                        44 Frederick Kiesler, Endless House Model, 1950 
 
 
45 Frederick Kiesler, City in Space, 1925 
 
Further still, Bauhaus artist Kurt Schwitters implemented felt volume in the 
everyday architecture of his home. In 1923, Schwitters started his Merzbau (1923–30): 
a growing composition of found objects brought in by Schwitters and others visiting his 
flat that covered the walls and ceilings and even devoured some of the floor of his flat. 
This accumulative three-dimensional collage coagulated under the white paint 
Schwitters applied to it, forming a grotto-like environment in which the pre-existing 
corners and surfaces of the architecture have disappeared, giving way to an ungraspable 
array of volumes modulated by changes of natural and artificial lights. Schwitters first 
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titled the work KdeE, standing for Die Kathedral des erotischen Elends, ‘The Cathedral 
of Erotic Misery’ (Burns-Gamard 2000: 87), thereby referencing, as Craig’s Passion 
did, a cathedral-like environment; yet Merzbau’s volumetric complexity emphasized a 
maze-like and cave-like pre-Renaissance spatiality ‘like the labyrinths under Chartres’ 
(Burns-Gamard 2000: 124). 
 
 
46 Kurt Schwitters, Merzbau, c1930 
 
Disorientation in Merzbau is also dramaturgical and philosophical as the work is 
composed of the remnants of the artist and others. As such, it carries out Schwitters’ 
artistic philosophy, which he called Merz: a conceptual intersection of art and life in 
terms of a ‘shock’ and a ‘change of state’ (Burns Gamard 2000: 117) that challenges 
individual identity. ‘Anyone could do or “be” Merz’ (Burns Gamard 2000: 117). Thus, 
Schwitters sought to advocate his Merz philosophy to friends, family and strangers by 
applying it to both private and public environments: alongside his Merzbau, he 
developed a ‘Merz-Theatre [of] solid, liquid and gaseous bodies’ (Schwitters in Drain 
1995: 24), for which he created the tonal performance Die Ursonate (1922–32) in which 
‘he mesmerized his audience with his staccato voice’ (Goldberg 2001: 71). Transposing 
this bodied and aural fragmentation into the architecture of his flat required an 
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unravelling of the geometric axis of the built space, which also entailed the dismantling 
of the possessive proprietary demarcation of the home as an identity marker.  
Considered a degenerate artist by the Nazi regime, Schwitters had to relocate his 
Merzbau to other flats where he moved to avoid repression, until he had to flee 
Germany and landed in the UK where his last Merzbau was revived one last time. The 
political obstacles Schwitters encountered made it difficult for him to apply his Merz 
approach to the body as well as to space. To understand the impact of felt volume on 
corporeality more fully therefore we might turn to the head of the Bauhaus stage, Oskar 
Schlemmer. Drawing from Craig’s Übermarionette, Schlemmer named the performer a 
figure of art, or ‘Kunstfigur’ (Carlson 1993: 353). In his drawing Mensch & Kunstfigur 
(1925), Schlemmer shows a performer who is connected to the entire volume of space 
around him. In the performance Slat Dance (1927), prosthetics extend the body’s 
relation to its surrounding volume and thereby challenge and reconfigure bodily motion. 
The performer’s sculptural decomposition and puppet-like motion sought to articulate 
the ‘dismembered, crazy, meaningless, foolish, banal and mysterious’ presence of the 
body as in Schlemmer’s Dance of the Stage Wings (Goldberg 2001: 119).  
 
 
47 Oskar Schlemmer, Mensch & Kunstfigur, 1925 
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The ambiguities at play in animating spatial volume were thus imported onto 
and supported by scenic materials and performing bodies alike: scenery could be 
engineered to disperse throughout the volume of the stage, and so too could the 
performing body. Following Craig’s Screens, Schlemmer also found lighting to be an 
effective medium to link body and scenery in a felt volume: ‘we have constructed 
simple flats of wood and white canvas which can be slid back and forth on a series of 
parallel tracks and can be used as screens for light projection’ (Schlemmer in Baugh 
2005: 124). Schlemmer’s geometric approach was drawn from mathematical 
innovations such as Georgy Voronoi’s mathematical decomposition of the metric space 
to understand natural phenomena like rainfall or the growth of forests. So-called 
Voronoi diagrams model, in the artificial conditions of geometry, an approximation to 
the visual complexities at play in the spatial and volumetric distribution of such 
phenomena. Felt volume pursued this decomposition through solid materials, 
performing bodies and lighting: in Metal Dance (1929), Schlemmer made extensive use 
of reflective materials such as scenery and costume to diffract light waves and, in 
return, disturb the overall volumetric content onstage (body included).  
 
     
         48 Oskar Schlemmer, Slat Dance, 1927                49 Oskar Schlemmer Metal Dance, 1929 
 
While lighting enables the enhancing and complicating of spatial volumes, 
projection on the other hand is prone to flattening the environment. Following on from 
the practices of Loïe Fuller and Craig in using complex scenic structures to make use of 
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projections in three-dimensional and volumetric ways, Bauhaus artist Erwin Piscator 
developed more advanced kinetic spatial structures to host, and to challenge, the two-
dimensionality of filmic projection. In Hoppla Such Is Life (1927) Piscator’s revolving 
set formed a tower of adjacent screens that juxtaposed multiple filmic projections on a 
vertical axis yet in each projection presents different perspectival camera – one-eyed – 
viewpoints, thus confounding the vertical singularity of the tower. Piscator’s screens 
taken together point to various perspectives diverging from the overall perspective 
produced by the tower. As a large moving body the tower can then be inhabited by 
performing bodies who can then be related to the projections in different yet 
simultaneous ways. 
 
 
50 Erwin Piscator, Hoppla Such Is Life, 1927 
 
Such an attempt to embed filmic projections into the three-dimensionality of 
space and bodies was further developed into a never realized theatre-house by Bauhaus’ 
grand master architect Walter Gropius. The plans of his Total Theatre Project (1926) 
show a conflation of various past forms of theatre-houses, resulting in an arena-like 
spherical environment in which ‘projection screens surrounded the interior like 
wallpaper suspended some distance from the walls – behind the stage and throughout 
the auditorium’ (Baugh 2005: 126). Rejecting the positionality of the ‘deep stage, which 
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lets the spectator look at the other world of the stage as through a window, or which 
separates [itself from him] by a curtain’ (Gropius in Goldberg 2001: 114), Gropius 
sought to create a ‘flexible building, capable of transforming and refreshing the mind by 
its spatial impact alone’: a ‘Playhouse […] made to dissolve into the shifting, 
illusionary space of the imagination [to] become the scene of action itself’ (Gropius in 
Baugh 2005: 160). By diffracting the stage image all around the audience, Total Theatre 
Project opposed any ‘optic’, ‘stolid and dormant […] geometry of vision’ (Evans in 
Gooding 2006) to produce a multidirectional perception and multipositional situation  
similar to how ‘the world is around me, not in front of me’ (Merleau-Ponty in Iles 2001: 
72). By positing a perception where ‘our attempt at focusing must give way to the 
vacant all-embracing stare’ (Ehrenzweig in Morris 1969: 881), Gropius enacted a 
counter-position to the Wagnerian ‘Total Work of Art’: ‘what we need is not the 
“Gesamtkunstwerk” alongside and separated from which life flows by, but a synthesis 
of all the vital impulses spontaneously forming itself into the all-embracing 
Gesamtwerk (life) which abolishes all isolation’ (Moholy-Nagy 1969: 17). 
 
 
51 Walter Gropius, Total Theatre Project, 1926 
 
In the Bauhaus, the relation between body and space is conducted by prosthetic 
extensions and technologies that affect both in terms of motion and perception. That is 
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to say, whilst the body is placed ‘on an equal footing with the other formative media’ 
(Moholy-Nagy in Carlson 1993: 353), these media are equally redirected towards 
corporeality in three-dimensional, movable and even wearable terms. It is not a matter 
of redefining the body in technological terms but, quite the contrary, of reconfiguring 
technology within embodied terms so as to draw out a ‘recognition of that which [in the 
body] can not be mechanized’ (Schlemmer 1961: 264). This constitutes a critical 
approach to technology since, at the time, corporeality was undergoing an increasing 
mechanization found in societal domains such as industrial production and warfare 
which were underlined by broader and extreme political ideologies. The body of the 
social subject was required to be more obedient and controllable. Against such a 
politically normative and socializing conception of technology, Bauhaus projects such 
as Lászlo Moholy-Nagy’s ‘Theatre of Totality’ conceived of a radically opposite 
understanding of technology as a ‘mechanized eccentricity’ that formed an 
‘ORGANISM’ (Moholy-Nagy in Packer and Jordan 2001: 16) with the body, and thus 
sought to expand rather than limit bodily life. Pursuing Craig’s interest in ‘the relation 
of light to [the] scene […] akin to that of the bow of the violin, or of the pen to the 
paper’ (Craig in Baugh 2005: 124), Moholy-Nagy’s theatre was to be achieved through 
lighting by asking the ‘ACTION OF LIGHT [to be] equal to that of all other theatre 
media’ (Moholy-Nagy in Baugh 2005: 124).  
 
          
      52 Lászlo Moholy-Nagy, Light Play, n.d.                   53 Moholy-Nagy, Light Prop, 1922-30 
 
Accordingly, he developed his famous kinetic lighting source Light Prop (1922–30): 
opposed to a follow-spot that would highlight the body in space, Light Prop was meant 
to stand visibly on stage and deploy lighting states and shadows that would visually 
fracture the stage’s volume. Between a light source and a projector, the physical 
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presence of Light Prop on stage would have emphasized the levelling up of the 
scenographic apparatus’ presence to that of the performers, and the levelling down of 
the performers’ presence to that of the scenography.  
Light Prop was never implemented in this way and instead became an 
autonomous sculptural object full of unrealized potentials. Nonetheless, parallel to its 
development, Constructivist artists can be found similarly exploring ways of embedding 
bodies within fragmentary lighting phenomena such as El Lissitzky’s approach to 
scenography which strove to create an ‘electromechanical peep show’ (Lissitzky in 
Salter 2010: 20) where ‘beams of light, refracted through prisms and mirrors follow[ed] 
the movement of bodies’ (Lissitzky in Salter 2010: 22). Again these innovative 
conceptions of embodied lighting states are correlated with the revision of the theatre 
space. In 1926, Constructivist artists Vsevolod Meyerhold, El Lissitzky and Sergei 
Tretyakov began to collaborate on a new production called I Want a Baby (1926–8) 
which would lead them to conceive of a multidirectional and scaffolded theatre-house. 
Inspired by the Carnivalesque Commedia Dell’Arte’s Russian equivalent Balagan, such 
bodily space as a theatre would have better supported Meyerhold’s approach to 
performing as a mode of scenographic embodiment.  
 
 
54 Vsevolod Meyerhold, I Want a Baby (reconstructed model-box), 1928 
 
Indeed, what Meyerhold called biomechanics asked of performers to weave together 
animate and inanimate kinetic qualities by adjusting their physicality to the materiality 
of spatial elements in another puppet-like kinesis: 
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the art of the actor is the art of plastic forms in space, he must study the 
mechanics of his body […] organising his material [so that] the creation 
by the actor of plastic forms in the space of the stage is a manifestation of 
the force of the human organism (Meyerhold in Baugh 2005: 63–4). 
 
Similarly, the scenography’s ‘raw material[ity]’ would also comprise the ‘juxtaposition 
of surfaces and shapes of tangible materials [which allowed] artists […] to throw away 
their brushes and take up axes, picks and hammers to hack stage sets out of the 
materials of raw nature’ (Meyerhold in Baugh 2005: 71). Thus, to support the 
innovation of new forms in the actor’s body, responsive and kinetic sceneries made of 
scaffolds became landmarks in Meyerhold’s performances. Their radicalism required 
the modification of architectural aspects of the theatre-house.  
 
 
55 Vsevolod Meyerhold, The Magnanimous Cuckold, 1922 
 
In The Magnanimous Cuckold (1922) stage designer ‘Lyubov Popova took the brutally 
stripped, and “liberated”, stage of Meyerhold’s theatre and made a construction of 
timber, metal components and minimal paint’ to consolidate ‘actors and [scenic] 
construction [as] an orchestrated device’ where ‘actors ran, walked and manipulated the 
“machine” in their performance’ (Baugh 2005: 89). But for I Want a Baby, ‘Lissitzky 
created a scenography of multiple stages that took over the complete interior of the 
theatre, entirely obliterating the division between stage and audience’ (Baugh 2005: 73) 
and propelling the need to revise the theatre-house entirely: 
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[i]n 1930, inspired by the thinking of the Bauhaus, Meyerhold planned to 
create an adaptable theatre allowing performance in different 
conformations [where] the romantic vision of a popular audience, bonded 
by the unifying spatial principles of Greece and Rome, seemed to be over 
(Wiles 2003: 203). 
 
Although the stage was to be divided into two parts –  
 
1. The proscenium, constructed according to architectural principles, 
intended exclusively for ‘reliefs’ and the figures of the actors (who 
perform only in this area). The proscenium to have a forestage projecting 
deep into the auditorium. No footlights. No prompt box.  
 
2. The upstage area, intended exclusively for painted backdrops, is not 
used by the actors at all, except in the finale … and even then they will 
appear only on the dividing line between the two areas (Meyerhold in 
Baugh 2005: 68-9; my italics) 
 
– performers were to embody both parts like oscillating semi-relief presences. As such, 
Meyerhold was pursuing the elaboration of conflicting corporeal interplays which, like 
his forestage penetrating the auditorium, formulated another tactic for weaving space 
and bodies together. The ‘intensification of the play of bright light – both from the stage 
lighting and from the lights in the auditorium […] left on throughout the performance’ 
(Meyerhold in Baugh 2005: 69), similar to how the ‘set was to be on split levels with 
transparent floors [,] disorienting and asymmetrical [, seeking] to exploit not the […] 
unity of his audience but its divisions’ (Wiles 2003: 203).  
 Such heterogeneous multipositionality informed Meyerhold’s dehierarchizing 
‘conception of the theatre as an artist’s “studio”’ (Wiles 2003: 252) as it required the 
‘[theatre] artist to become both artist and engineer’ (Meyerhold in Baugh 2005: 63) and 
thus ‘to develop a technical personnel as important as the actors, one whose job would 
be to bring [the scenographic] apparatus into view, undisguised and as an end in itself’ 
(Loew in Goldberg 2005: 114). Importantly then, dehierarchization is exported to the 
audience as their included, yet diffracted, experience echoes the performer’s embodied 
and conflicting relation with a fragmentary set of objects, materials, structures and 
lighting phenomena. These experiments are part of the development of what I have 
called the gloom. Their consequence can be modelled in the theoretical terms of a 
critical and innovative aesthetic:   
[B]y revolutionizing the relations between part and whole, the 
constellation strikes at the very heart of the traditional aesthetic paradigm, 
in which the specificity of the detail is allowed no genuine resistance to 
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the organizing power of the totality. The aesthetic is then turned against 
the aesthetic (Eagleton 1990: 330). 
 
Taken from Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin, the concept of the ‘constellation’ 
helps to indicate how the critical aesthetic of the gloom ‘sets its face against the 
Cartesian or Kantian moment of subjectivity, less concerned to ‘possess’ the 
phenomenon than to liberate it into its own sensuous being and preserve its disparate 
elements in all their irreducible heterogeneity’ (Eagleton 1990: 329). In this way, the 
constellation safeguards particularity but fissures identity, exploding the 
object into an array of conflictive elements and so unleashing its 
materiality at the cost of its self-sameness’ (Eagleton 1990: 330) 
 
The gloom’s perceptual dissensus sought to topple any dominant and homogenous 
vision of the human that underlined the aesthetic domain. By ‘rejecting an organic 
notion of the integrated artwork’ I Want a Baby ‘work[s] against any residual belief in 
the body politic as an organic metaphor of naturally legitimated super- and sub-
ordination’ (Jay 2003: 172). Unsurprisingly, the work was banned by the Stalinist 
regime and only revived by Meyerhold’s legacy in the 1960s.  
 Thus through the practices of the Bauhaus and related practitioners of the early 
twentieth century we find the seeds of an immersive scenographic space that is visually 
difficult to grasp. This would become the black box. In the practices described 
perceptual difficulties are engineered by technical and technological structures woven 
into spatial and bodily components. The bodies of performers and audiences alike are 
confronted with physical and perceptual challenges that require radical reconsiderations 
of visual and corporeal experiences. These are particularly drawn from attempts to 
embody tangible materials and intangible lighting phenomena. In all cases the 
performer absorbs qualities from, and extends his or her physicality into, space. This 
twofold paradigm of relational interaction can be said to have drastic consequences on 
the body’s physicality given the unusualness of movement seen in Bauhaus performers 
and those of Meyerhold. 
Such ways of articulating the body in space operated as a means to critique and 
attempt to resolve issues surrounding the mechanization of the body. Moving away 
from an understanding of technological progress where the body is increasingly limited 
and objectivised, these artists sought to invoke a technologization of the body that opens 
new potentials for embodiment and, in particular, the possibility of embodying the 
physical and phenomenal environment as a way to create it anew. As such, these artists 
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attempted to renovate built spatiality according to the injunction of a corporeal lability 
as well as attempting to renovate the body by means of an architectural flexibility, or 
modulability: see Frederick Kiesler’s plans for a scaffolded theatre-house called 
Universal Theatre (1961) which drew from his earlier Universal Theatre for Woodstock 
(1928). 
The obsolete formula of a monolithic construction, suddenly solidified and 
permanently and fictitiously thrust upon the scene, is out of the question. 
The changing demands of stage production and the need for proper 
correlation between actors and audience made necessary a flexible 
ephemeral construction and a building technique best achieved through 
tensional structures, light-weight easily fabricated tubular supports of 
metal, and web coverings of weatherproofed fabrics (Kiesler 1932). 
 
Hypothetically, then, the environmental radicalization that would emerge in the form of 
the black box should offer even more new potentials for the development of spatio-
corporeal phenomena. At the same time, the technological advances that have since 
taken place and the advent and consolidation of digital technologies can also be said to 
offer new tools which have divisive and paralyzing effects that may in turn be critiqued 
and reverted to become new and productive spatio-corporeal connections. In order to 
press further the exploration of the ways environment can be radically embodied, and 
specifically to experiment with digital technology as an agent for this, I commenced on 
another phase of practice-based research. This phase was undertaken under the 
influence of and as a specific response to Moholy-Nagy’s proposition for a relational 
structure between body and light as constituting an organism. Derived from his Light 
Prop, my practice used digital projection technologies to produce fragmentary fields of 
light to be inhabited, interacted with, in the black box. This, as I am about to show, 
consolidated the understanding of an innovative form of visual perception suggested by 
the Avant-Gardes’ interest in multidirectionality. At the same time, the practice raised a 
set of new conceptual problems regarding the positionality of the body or, to be more 
precise, it raised problems about the nature of embodied subjectivity when extricated 
from constructions of the body-politic. 
 
 
1.8 Cycloramic Lighting  
I concluded the first phase of my practice as research with questions of light pertaining 
to my sketch The Shower Room. This drawing speculated on the possibility of lighting 
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phenomena behaving as volumetric, quasi-tangible particles by way of fragmenting and 
diffracting the light beam. This speculative scenario sought to expand light’s behaviour 
in order to make it more prone to interaction with live bodies and, by this means, 
question bodily kinesis, or to ask how the body would fragment and diffract physically 
in space to create relations and interactions with lighting. These interrogations, as we 
have seen, were key to the Bauhaus’ innovations. Corporeal fragmentation was indeed 
part of the performing language on the Bauhaus stage and thus inspired radical devices 
for scenography further to support and expand such bodily explorations. Moholy-
Nagy’s Light Prop constitutes such a device, yet since it was never actualized as part of 
a performance, the embodiment of its lighting phenomena remains uncertain. In this 
respect, I hypothesized that laboratory-based research investigation, predicated upon the 
previously discussed speculative threshold of scenography, could offer a particularly 
relevant platform to revive and update Light Prop with a view to exploring its physical 
implications on the body.  
 Since Moholy-Nagy’s device was not conceived to rely on any scenic support to 
fragment light but did so at the source of light itself, I undertook to develop The Shower 
Room further by removing its scenic components (the fragments of screen suspended 
and dispersed in space) and concentrating on the light source. Following the previously 
established critical position of technology within the Avant-Gardes’ corporeal 
speculations, I turned to the contemporary technologies of lighting and projection that 
are increasingly pervading everyday life: digital projectors. These can be seen as 
developments of early projectors inasmuch as the possibilities for creating content to be 
projected are much broader than they used to be. Yet at the same time digital projectors 
are predominantly used with respect to flat white screens which, like early filmic 
projections, organize a limited directionality of perception and positionality of reception 
by way of their frontal experience. Thus, this next phase of the practice sought to turn 
conventional uses of digital projectors on their head, as the Avant-Gardes did, by firstly 
removing the presence of screens and considering the entire space of a black box as a 
screen, or to be more theatrically precise, as a cyclorama. Secondly, for the source of 
light to diffract itself, the projected content would need to be fragmentary so as to 
reveal and complicate the light emitted by the projector. 
To do so, I produced a series of drawings (Cycloramic Lighting) that I aimed to 
process digitally in order to project them. Each drawing was thus conceived as a 
projected field of light with greater or lesser fragmentation to diffract space and the 
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body that would inhabit it. To this end, I drew visual motifs based on the physical 
qualities of light (particles, waves and flows) articulated in varying shapes, sizes, 
colours, textures and directions through a scaffolded operative strategy of drawing: a 
‘directional lability [, a] lacework [,] branchwork stimulating’ (Robertson 2003: 165). I 
drew one motif at a time, each motif growing out of the previous one, or any other form 
near or in contact with it. I would repeat the motif in a loose chain-like structure until it 
would become almost automatic for my hands to draw it, at which point I would morph 
the motif and change the direction of the branch or create a new branch. In this way, I 
could prevent the emergence of a central area, a dominating core or a pre-eminent 
singular direction, as well as balance the distribution of motifs and empty areas in ‘a 
vacillation between […] being opaque, translucent and transparent’ (Graham 1999: 
197). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Cycloramic Lighting #3, 2008 
 
Indeed, because the drawings were conceived as content to be projected onto, 
and thus relevant to, the entire volume of a space, throughout their making I sought to 
disrupt the two-dimensionality of the paper page through creating motifs and areas with 
varying degrees of two-dimensionality and three-dimensionality: two-dimensional 
forms that enhanced the flatness of the page (and projection plane) were constantly 
breached by three-dimensional effects that appeared to create depths piercing through 
103
 
 
 
or lifting off the page. Furthermore, hand-drawing was first employed to produce 
textures and haptic motifs emphasizing touch and three-dimensionality in the visual 
field.  
 
 
Fig. 7 Cycloramic Lighting #7, 2008 
 
The first drawings of the series present complex arrays of textures and colours because 
I started by considering all the possible qualities of the radiant energy that is light and 
which are replicated by theatrical lighting equipment: direction, angle, intensity, focus, 
form, colour and texture. In addition, I first made use of the whiteness of the paper page 
to create gaping fragments that were conceived as empty pockets of spatial volume. 
However, as I implemented the drawings’ projection in a black box, my body’s 
immersion into them found it impossible to interact with the complexity of motifs as I 
could not discriminate them from the white gaps: both were bright and thus the space 
was entirely flooded with light. As a result, I reverted the drawings’ background, and 
gaps, to black (even though the projector still emitted light in these black gaps, the 
intensity of their brightness was much lower than white and much less sensed by the 
immersed body which could, as a result, pinpoint and engage with the brighter motifs).  
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Fig. 8 Cycloramic Lighting #10, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 Cycloramic Lighting #14, 2009 
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Fig. 10 Cycloramic Lighting #16, 2009 
 
Following Meyerhold’s proposition that the stage be considered as an artist’s 
studio and that roles be blurred between artists, performers and technicians, I initiated a 
realization of the practice based on the drawings by following a strict routine: using a 
laptop, I would operate a slideshow of the drawings, activate the link between computer 
and digital projector, switch on the record button of the video camera, and walk into the 
portion of black box space flooded by the projection. After moving through the 
projection, I would return to the camera to pause the recording, rewind it, play and 
watch it until reaching where I had paused and stop it (ready for the next recording). I 
would then walk to the computer’s desk to move to the next slide, the next drawing, 
then walk back to the camera to push ‘record’ again, and walk back into the new 
projection, back and forth … 
First-hand experiences from within offered two separate, yet correlated, 
findings: 
 – Facing the projector, I observe the drawings imprinted upon my body, an 
inwards gazing that slows my body down to quasi-stillness. Although the drawings are 
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static, observing them on my body is intrinsically kinetic as the drawings are always 
distorted by my body’s volume. Every tiny movement, or shiver, seemingly animates 
the drawing on my body. As I accelerate my movements the drawings are further 
distorted, flickering up to becoming fuzzy and unspecified, which makes paying 
attention dizzy and destabilizing: instead, my gaze searches for a stimulus that allows 
the pursuit of velocity without losing balance. The projector’s singular shining source 
of light is such another stimulus. Thus, specifically looking at the projector’s light, I 
sense rather than see the drawing: my eyes can only feel degrees of heat relevant to the 
intensity of the part of the drawing I am passing through. That is to say, I can only 
distinguish whether I am passing through dark areas of the drawing (low heat over my 
eyes) or bright areas (high heat, almost painful, over my eyes): an oscillation between 
being blinded by the lack of light and being blinded by its excess. 
 
 
Plate 1 Static LX, 2009 (also see DVD excerpt Static LX) 
 
– Turning my back to the projector I can no longer see the drawings imprinted 
upon my body but lightly or strongly cast around my own shadow against the black 
wall of the space. While facing the projector I could only see the drawings on myself 
becoming distorted and three-dimensional; turning my back to it suddenly shifts space 
into a more two-dimensional surface. Yet, paradoxically, the projections made the wall 
appear semi-transparent, as if one could go through it, which would often fool my body 
into creating large movements that were cut painfully short by the wall.  
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By undertaking these experiments, I was increasingly able to identify visual 
qualities with which I could physically interact: small, simple and bright motifs were 
most potent as I could perceive them on my body and animate them by way of 
movement. Thus, I continued to refine the drawings by way of cancelling the variety of 
forms, colours and textures to retain only a few, organized through a multiplicity of 
directions and intensities (brightness). Such motifs could also be perceived on the walls 
and floor in such a way that I could intentionally bring my body into them seemingly to 
capture them and make them move. Perceptually, then, my gaze would always return to 
my own body. No longer simply looking at something outside of me, interacting with 
the projected content required me to look outwardly and inwardly. Furthermore, once a 
motif was overlapping my body, I would kinetically isolate the body part on which the 
motif was in order to manipulate it and make it slide onto another body part that would 
then become the new focus of movement. My body was thus starting to move in 
fragmentary ways – a ‘vertiginous tension between forward propulsion and objectival 
inertness’ (Garner 1994: 9) – which felt, at first, very odd as if someone else was 
manipulating some of my body parts.  
 Progressively, what first felt like tip-toeing from one unusual movement to 
another became more fluid and less hesitant to the point of feeling the projection on my 
body as if it were clothed in the projected motifs and particles. By this point, the 
projections offered a most unexpected visual phenomenon, perceivable both from 
within and from without: my body’s movement determined light’s movement. When 
standing still within the field of light, the white particles imprinted on my body were 
quite simply static. Any vibration of my body would make them vibrate too. The 
projections would be animated as I moved so that I could control, to some extent, their 
alterations according to mine. Further, even when still, any sudden and tiny movement 
of light would make me aware of the inconsistency of my stillness, thereby requiring 
greater efforts to remain static. And these were as unusual to my body as much of the 
movements I was exploring through the light’s movements. In both cases, I was 
compelled to become aware of every part and limb of my body and to input similar 
precision and control to articulate each and every body part. 
 As the visual content that surrounded me was imprinted on my body, corporeal 
reactions to stimuli were never separated from the stimuli themselves but, quite to the 
contrary, affected the stimuli which, in return, afforded new bodily sensations and 
reactions. Swimming in the dark pools of the Cycloramic Lighting’s glowing particles, 
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my body seemed no longer a cohesive, singular and autonomous entity but a 
fragmentary, multiple structure whose every movement was impelled by the outside: 
the rather extreme proximity of this outside substituted for any internal instigation of 
kinesis. Between stillness and motion, I unravelled a palette of sometimes painful and 
often vertiginous slow-moving kinesis which I had not experienced before and thus 
could not relate to pre-existing intentions or emotions. The scope of light’s kinesis and 
mutability determined the scope of my body’s uncertain kinesis. But since light (the 
projected motifs) was always present and, being inherently static, could only alter to 
some extent, I could neither, by way of moving, extinguish the light particles nor vice 
versa, nor shift their location in space nor overlap them. Speculatively then, making the 
projected content kinetic (in response to bodily movement) could also further develop 
the uncertainty and unusualness of the body’s movement. Described in the second part 
of the thesis, the next phase of practice thus moves on to develop further the realization 
of phenomena where corporeality and light are woven as one ‘organism’ derived from 
Moholy-Nagy’s Light Prop and informed by later practitioners such as Josef Svoboda. 
This led to the development of an interactive digital programme aimed at animating 
light and, I hoped, the body and the responsiveness of one to the other.  
Although this practice only partially uncovered the reciprocity of interaction that 
was speculated from its onset, it has underpinned the shifting modes of sensory and 
physical experience in the black box. In particular, immersed in Cycloramic Lighting, I 
could no longer maintain a ‘frontal’ perception – where we could ‘see clear 
articulations drawn between the objects that solicit the reactions of our solid body’ – 
but a  
longitudinal [perception, where] we constantly expose ourselves to out-of-
body images in order to always redefine the present of our perception or 
the variable horizon of our contractile body [as] each of these images 
continually interacts with the others and with us, as in a test of resonance 
[:] our longitudinal perception constantly folds and rubs the fabric of 
images against itself, thus allowing the texture of things to emerge (Cache 
1995: 147). 
 
This first section of the thesis has surveyed the emergence of an aesthetic 
domain of visual imperceptibility whose sensory disturbances and innovations demand 
a renewed understanding of cognition. In particular, it has argued that processes of 
creation in this domain are based on a speculative threshold, or void, wherein the 
authorial approach is driven by phenomenal and cognitive uncertainties which, though 
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developed, constitute the core of the spectator’s experience. This attenuation of 
differences between such positions is founded upon a more general effect of the gloom 
whereby physical and cognitive positioning can no longer rest in the safety of a precise 
singularity but rather extend into other positions, multiplying according to the various 
spatial and corporeal coordinates that surround oneself. To conclude, and before 
attending to the intercorporeal and intersubjective implications of the gloom in the next 
section, we need to return to the everyday graphic frameworks and assumptions with 
which we started. These can now be understood more critically. For if the visual domain 
does not divide bodies from spaces, but instead enmeshes them, this has major sensory, 
physical and cognitive implications for some of the ‘everyday’ discourses which carry 
assumptions about space and body. For example, geography’s positioning of confident 
spatial borders would need to radically be redefined. ‘Geography’ would be ‘a line that 
passes through our objects, from the city to the teaspoon, along which there exists an 
absolute outside. This outside is not relative to a given inside; it exceeds any attempt at 
interiority’ (Cache in Ricco 2003: 90). So too the assumptions about bodies and how 
they are viewed that are both carried and symptomatized by pornography would need 
revision.  A (‘New’) ‘Pornography’ would be  
what in the act of presentation exceeds representation […] not objects that 
would confirm them in the comfortable neuroses of their subjectivities, but 
the singular risk of the fetish, withdrawn from the very possibility of 
intelligibility and meaning [...] transform[ing] the white cube into a 
labyrinth, architecture into something undecidedly contingent (Haver in 
Ricco 2003: xii). 
 
 My introduction here of a redefined pornography highlights the fact that the 
development and operation of the gloom have particular implications for our thinking 
about subjectivity. The second part of the thesis therefore explores ways of 
understanding the critical subjectivity – an ‘ontological mutation in action’ (Hardt and 
Negri in Jay 2003: 175) – at play within the radical reciprocity of embodied experiences 
in the gloom. This will be undertaken through the analysis of various instances in which 
the embodied co-existence of the self and the environment delineates the experiential 
domain of the black box and related scenographic practices of the second half of the 
century. These developments not only suggest the continuing relevance and increasing 
importance of the ‘possibilities of the void’ (Svoboda in Baugh 2005: 87) – the gloom’s 
speculative threshold, some of which I have shown through my own research practice –  
but also reflect more explicit theoretical and philosophical discourses regarding the 
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reconception of an embodied subjectivity separated from normative constructions of the 
socio-political being. 
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2 Vertigo 
 
 
 
The black box breathes, swells, sweats, bleeds and breaks; a material place 
in motion (Hannah 2003: 32). 
 
 
[P]roducing within the work a movement capable of affecting the mind 
outside of all representations; it is a question of making movement itself a 
work, without interposition; of substituting direct signs for mediate 
representations; of inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings, gravitations, 
dances or leaps (Deleuze 2004a: 9). 
 
 
Theatre is antibiographic, precisely because it is a place of transformations 
and never a place of the written ontology (Castellucci 2001: 184; author’s 
translation).  
 
 
[T]he vertigo of Plato, discovering ‘in the flash of an instant, as he leans 
over its abyss’ that the simulacrum, the ‘other’ that his philosophy 
strategically creates, can destroy his philosophy’s foundations. It is the 
vertigo of a critical distance, in which ‘the privileged point of view has no 
more existence than does the object held in common by all points of view’ 
(Morris 1998: 151). 
 
 
 
 
The first part of the thesis established historically the seminal instances of the 
emergence of a scenographic concern with visual attenuation and discrepancy which 
was particularly foregrounded by Avant-Garde artists of the late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century. These seeds of the gloom suggested a rejection of traditional 
aesthetics that relied on systematic rules of visual constructions such as perspective. The 
thesis has argued that these creations were instead founded on a speculative threshold, 
or void, whereby their instantiation was drawn out of concepts and processes that drew 
the realizable out of the unrealizable. Furthermore, to explore and question impossible 
physical structures and their physico-perceptual experiences, these artists employed and 
subverted the developing technologies of their time. Where these technologies in 
dominant use were infiltrating everyday life in the form of images separated from 
bodies, these seminal practices sought to redirect them towards and through bodies. The 
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visual problems resulting from these experiments were then productively and 
conceptually framed by broader philosophical concerns and anxieties with respect to the 
ideologies that permeated everyday life. As such, behind those unusual and minoritarian 
events can be found already emerging radical ideas about the human. 
 Rejecting the philosophical Western tradition by which mind and body were 
separated, and granting the mind a higher position in human experience, the ideas 
behind early explorations of the gloom suggested an emphasis on the body and its 
sensory dimension: corporeal sensation as a mode of knowledge offered new potent 
discourses about revisiting our understandings of human beings and society. 
 Although most of these artists and movements were in their own time 
unsuccessful, rejected, persecuted and short-lived, they would nonetheless ensure their 
legacy. For instance, the influence of the Bauhaus movement over the further historical 
developments of scenographic imperceptibility in theatre and beyond can be observed in 
two separate yet very similar strands of practices. After the demise of the Bauhaus 
under the Nazi regime, its artists emigrated towards the East and the West, and 
propagated ideas such as that of felt volume. As early as 1944 the Czech scenographer 
Josef Svoboda can be seen taking on Bauhaus aesthetics and ideas with a project such as 
Roaming (1944), unrealized as a result of the Nazi regime having closed down all 
theatres in the Czech Republic. At the same time, major Bauhaus artists left Europe and 
moved to New York, where their teaching would contribute to sparking a whole new 
Avant-Garde of performance among visual artists and architects. In the wake of a post-
World War II society, the gloom’s ability to critique the body-politic and inspire a 
radical revisioning of Western civilization would become crucial to those seeking the 
reconstruction of a society that could never be led again to engage in genocide. To 
many, the civilized body could not be conceived at such cost. The dehierarchizing of 
social agency amongst bodies of different genders, ethnicities, religions and other 
divisions became an ethos to this end. The convoluted spaces and bodies advanced by 
early Avant-Gardes as a form of resistance against what they saw as the growing 
ideological shackles that individuals were subjected to, found further and more radical 
outlets in performance, architecture and visual arts. 
 As the second part of the thesis demonstrates, this radicalization of the gloom 
suggests an imperative to move beyond recalcitrance to the ideological constructions at 
play in visual systems of social control and the body-politic. The mid-twentieth-century 
emergence of the black box, an environment no longer drawing from past architectural 
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forms but evolving its own radical formlessness, embodies this next phase of the gloom 
in its attempt to extend beyond a merely subversive criticism of the ‘ambiguous 
foundation of culture, body, and consciousness’ (Kwinter in Acconci 2001: 47). The 
second part of the thesis analyzes the various ideas and practices that demarcate what 
we need here to recognize as these changing aspirations for the gloom.  
After the early twentieth century’s major advances in electricity, the second half 
of that century would see the advent of electronic media and the subsequent unfolding 
of digital worlds, all of which would inspire further possibilities of abstract and 
fragmented revisions of the body-politic while being predominantly implemented in the 
form of ubiquitous devices (such as televisions and computers) that participate in 
sustaining the ideological positioning of social subjects. Thus, as I hope effectively to 
demonstrate, the gloom would on one hand continue operating as a vertiginous criticism 
of the epistemological and ontological ‘condition[s] by which subjectivity exists 
subjected’ – to present it ‘as being inessential [:] an insubstantiality that does not 
contain its own resources but knows them only in the exposure to another’ (Lingis in 
Rapaport 1994: 267). On the other hand, it would produce the conditions (both practical 
and theoretical) for a (post)human and intersubjective being in which embodied 
subjectivity is ‘a blotted, perky line, a sleazy gut and visual crackle in gelatinous, 
ridged, and shiny blacks, an indolent pocket where self and not-self me[e]t the superb 
puberty of a concept’ (Robertson 2003: 228). We begin the exploration of this potency 
of the gloom with the emergence and impact of the black box.  
 
 
2.1 Black box as paradigmatic skin 
Profoundly inspired by the preceding works of Edward Gordon Craig, Adolphe Appia 
and the Bauhaus movement, Josef Svoboda began his scenographic work by 
reappropriating Bauhaus images and concepts as part of the performance Tales of 
Hoffman (1946). Putting all components of performance on a par with one another was 
a key concern to Svoboda as he sought to push all of them ‘to act in unison with any of 
the others [,] to be capable of fusing with any of the others to form a new quality’ 
(Svoboda in Burian 1971: 55). Like his influential predecessors, Svoboda’s fusion was 
not conceived in a Wagnerian manner that would conceal a hierarchy that privileged 
some of the fused components: it was ‘not a homogenous totality [but a] separat[ion] 
into a series of partial elements […] flexible and adaptable enough […] to be their 
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counterpoint or contrast’ (Svoboda in Burian 1971: 56). Such dissensual fusion 
forecasted a visual and cognitive fragmentation that Svoboda called ‘polyscenicness: an 
expression of a free and many-sided time-space operation […] breaking up the linear 
continuity of theatre action’ (Svoboda in Giesekam 2007: 53).  
 
   
56 Josef Svoboda, Tales of Hoffman, 1946                   
 
              Though polyscenicness in Svoboda’s work stands for a non-linear form that 
challenges the possibility of narrative, it remains highly attentive to the work of 
affecting the audience’s mind. Indeed, Svoboda’s ‘void’ (Svoboda in Baugh 2005: 87) 
is ‘abstract [and] undefined’, ‘transformable and kinetic’, which allows it to be a 
‘psycho-plastic space […] that continuously form[s] and dissolve[s]’ (Svoboda in 
Burian 1971: 55). Thus, a psychological level of experience continues through the 
speculative threshold. It operates as a phenomenal ‘ebb and flow [part of] the pulse of 
the […] action’ (Burian 1971: 55) undivided from ‘the stream of scenic images created 
by the actor’s performance’ (Svoboda in Burian 1971: 55). In other words, in this work 
psychological and cognitive experience is ‘not simply a rise and fall, a waxing and 
waning, but movement, processes, transmutations (Grosz 1995: 204) between spatial 
and corporeal qualities.  
‘Through its action, scenography becomes performance’ (Baugh 2005: 142) on a 
par with the performer and as a performer. To Svoboda, as to Craig, scenography can 
achieve such a level of corporeal behaviour by way of modulating multipositional 
intersections of space and light to produce a  
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scene which has a changeable nature. This scene also has what I call a 
face. This face expresses … Its shape perceives the light, and in as much 
as the light changes its position and makes certain other changes, and 
inasmuch as the scene itself alters its position – the two acting in concert 
as in a duet, figuring it out together as in a dance (Craig in Baugh 2005: 
125). 
 
To this end, Svoboda also explored scenic structures based on screens. While he would 
have sometimes had his screens physically displaced onstage, however, much of his 
strategy for animating the screens and, as a result, the whole space made use of light 
and projections (without the screens actually moving). In the mid-twentieth century, the 
greater variety of lighting, projection systems and the advance of TV technology 
enabled him to explore a greater reliance on light to achieve scenographic movement. 
But, like his predecessors, Svoboda’s obsession with light phenomena required 
alterations and innovations in the physical conditions of scenery and the stage. 
 
 
57 Josef Svoboda, August Sunday, 1958 
 
In 1958, Svoboda tackled the spatial conditions of scenery and the stage by way 
of sculpting darkness in two separate works which were landmarks both for the creation 
of his company and for a black box theatre, both named Laterna magika, in Prague. In 
one work, Svoboda designed an innovative scenic structure of screens, projection 
surfaces and mirror foils for the play August Sunday. As all the edges of these surfaces 
could not be perceived, large dark areas cross-faded over brightly lit and/or projected 
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pockets of space in such a way that ‘a luminous atmosphere of great depth’ was 
achieved ‘yet as though tangible’ (Svoboda in Albertová 2009: 48). The same year, 
Svoboda represented the Czech Republic at the Universal Expo of Brussels: there, he 
turned the Czech pavilion into a black box environment to present his polyecran or 
Laterna magika where clear gaps of darkness enhance the definition of the screens’ 
borders. In both polyecran and August Sunday, darkness fractures the overall stage 
image, multiple focal points co-exist, and the outside offstage area apparently takes on 
the inside centre-stage. Indeed, Svoboda’s ‘discovery of the “shadow zones” – places 
which remain outside the main and necessary lighting of the set, and where it is suitable 
to place a screen for projections’ (Albertová 2009: 62) – sought to extend the on-stage 
beyond, into the off-stage, by means of creating a ‘link between the action and the 
projection, in such a way that one could not exist without the other’ (Svoboda in 
Albertová 2009: 54).  
 
 
58 Josef Svoboda, Sketch for Polyekran, 1958 
 
 
                   59 Josef Svoboda, Hamlet, 1965                       60 Josef Svoboda, Polyvision, 1967  
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The advent of the black box offers such a porosity between inside and outside at 
its most basic and bare state since no fourth wall is embedded architecturally (the 
proscenium arch) and thus no axiomatic division is pre-inscribed. Whether reviving and 
augmenting Appian and Craigian stair-based sceneries such as in Svoboda’s Hamlet 
(1965), where their apparent endlessness obfuscates the demarcation of the quality of 
being ‘inside’, or whether further complicating his polyecran structure in Polyvision for 
the Universal Expo of Montreal in 1967, the ambivalence of the onstage reaching out 
for the offstage and vice versa constitutes an augmentation of the black box’s basic 
phenomenal qualities. Subsequently, Svoboda would go on to elaborate, and patent, 
even more ambiguous bordering devices such as La Contra-Luce (1967): a lighting 
instrument juxtaposing multiple and small narrow beams of light to create a kind of 
draped curtain, screen or wall, of light made further ambiguous by means of an 
innovative type of haze. La Contra-Luce is part of a range of lighting effects that 
Svoboda employed – following from the virtual disappearance of the offstage borders – 
to push the deployment of ‘virtual wall[s] onstage’ (Albertová 2009: 220). 
 
 
61 Josef Svoboda La Contra-Luce, 1984 
 
Such consideration of visual porosity or semi-transparency was in part still 
linked to developments of the cyclorama in theatres. For the mid-twentieth century also 
saw innovative developments in synthetic silk textiles that rapidly came to replace rigid 
plaster cycloramas. The interest in visual porosity also motivated much larger screen-
based sceneries as seen in the scenographies of Luciano Damiani for director Giorgio 
Strehler’s Cherry Orchard (1973–4) and The Tempest (1977–8).  
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62 Giorgio Strehler, The Tempest, 1977-8 
 
 
63 Josef Svoboda, Faust, 1989 
 
These textile-based walls, as with the walls of the black box itself, do not simply 
perforate the horizontal planes and divides between onstage and offstage but also affect 
the vertical planes and divides between ground and ceiling. When Svoboda collaborated 
with Strehler on Faust in 1989 he created a large-scale spiral of silk screens for 
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projection connected to a flying system. The deregulation of inside/outside phenomena, 
as with La Contra-Luce, is achieved through an effect of transparency that is not ‘literal 
transparency’. In this respect it is not the ‘inherent quality of substance’ of glass 
architecture, which enhances the clarity of visual contact. Instead it is a ‘phenomenal 
transparency’, the ‘inherent quality of organization’ whereby ‘the transparent ceases to 
be that which is perfectly clear and becomes instead that which is clearly ambiguous’ 
(Rowe & Slutsky 1995: 161).  
 
 
64 Josef Svoboda, The Firebird, 1972 
 
Writing in 1970, John Epstein, director of the Black Box Group – one of the first 
black box theatre-based performance companies to emerge in the UK (1965) –  
described his company’s work with screens and projections as ‘relating solid (actual) 
objects to projected images’, to achieve a scenographic phenomenon that is ‘beyond the 
grasp of precise spatial comprehension because of its constantly moving and transitory 
nature’. It is ‘not used to confuse the viewer but rather to heighten experience’ by 
‘demanding [of the] audience [that it] attempt to distinguish the qualities of substance 
and materiality that an image is made of’ (Epstein 1970: 34). Svoboda too sought the 
dissolution of tangible acuity by way of producing porous relations between the solid 
surfaces that mark the environmental borders and the volumetric space they contain, 
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between periphery and centre, between offstage and onstage.  The material container of 
performance becomes an apparatus of not only of spatial but also of corporeal 
decompartmentalization. For Svoboda’s conception was of a psycho-plastic space that 
required, and relied on, an ambiguous porosity that had to be embodied by performers:  
I always try to be sure that the actor is aware of the space in which he 
moves. That means that the space is designed not only to be seen front on, 
from the auditorium, but to be experienced as a total environment for the 
actor, who senses it physically like warmth or wind (Svoboda in Albertová 
2009: 49)  
 
In one of his last unrealized scenographies Das Rheingold (1988) Svoboda 
revisited the Wagnerian dramaturgy within a huge cave-like structure of dark scaffolds 
at the end of which a large and ancient-looking stone wall can be seen as a drastic but 
remote boundary to the volume of the stage. Yet the scaffolds can be seen as extensions 
of the offstage impinging on the onstage from all around. These operate as multiple and 
tentative proscenium arches, or fourth walls, that are (more or less) disintegrating 
(depending on light states) in that they both frame and unframe the backwall.  
 
 
65 Josef Svoboda, Das Rheingold (unrealized project), 1988 
 
As no human figure can be found in the model, the object raises questions as to how 
bodies could inhabit such a structure. Indeed, ‘[s]caffolding […] substitutes for a site [,] 
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by compression or condensation it transforms an atmosphere to a condition of access 
which is also a screen’ (Robertson 2003: 166): ‘irreducible and contingent [,] oblique 
and black [,] everything glimmers, delights, fades, goes’ as it is ‘attached […] to the 
senses [,] sheer porousness [and the] vertiginously unthinkable’ of ‘improvis[ing] 
unthought shape’ (Robertson 2003: 77–9). 
 
 
66 Josef Svoboda, Graffiti, 2002 
 
In his last production Graffiti (2002), Svoboda attempted to embed performing 
bodies within the extreme porousness of a ‘spatial projection onto a non-existent screen’ 
(Albertová 2009: 220). Drawing from the Pepper’s Ghost, he created  
a large screen made of polycarbonate material that is both transparent and 
reflective [while] in the flies above the screen is a large mirror surface. 
Video projection bounces off the screen onto the mirror surface and back 
down onto a virtual perpendicular plane behind the angled screen. This 
produces the effect of the projections appearing in mid-air (Giesekam 
2007: 68). 
 
Layered within the discrepant tangibility and antigravitational qualities of space, the 
body becomes a congruent part of the lighting phenomenon in terms of ‘repress[ing], 
forget[ing] or disavow[ing] that spatialising tracing which marks out the border between 
inside and outside, which generates the field but cannot be located within the field’ 
(Wigley in Buchanan & Lambert 2005: 197). Thus the kind of body that is discerned 
through the gloom may be understood first through a reconsideration of light. It is to be 
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no longer construed as ‘a transparent medium with its own clarity’ (Vasseleu 1998: 45) 
– ‘the light of the physicist [,] radiant energy travelling in waves or packets and to the 
laws governing its behaviour [– but as] ambient light [or] ecological optics [:] light as it 
fills space and interacts with the cluttered environment of the animal’ (Gibson in Noë 
2004: 104). In other words, ‘the so-called “real light” of scientific understanding [–] the 
“natural light” of the perceiving subject […] converted into the “intelligible light” of 
ideas’ (Vasseleu 1998: 43) – gives way to ‘carnal light or [Merleau-Ponty’s] 
“phenomenal light” as a qualitative experience’ in which ‘the body is always other or 
di-visible in the same way in vision and touch’ (Vasseleu 1998: 59). 
 Thus we can suggest that the black box’s ‘bodied spatiality return[s] perception 
to the fullness of its encounter with its environment’ (Garner 1994: 1) inasmuch as its 
carnal light restores how ‘vision and touch as well as the other senses [are] co-extensive 
with each other’ (Vasseleu 1998: 44). This, it must be noted, does not constitute a new 
homogeneous and holistic conception of perceptual experience but rather follows the 
vertiginous vicissitudes of ‘the dynamics of life’ (Svoboda in Baugh 2005: 142). 
Svoboda’s virtual walls have the effect of problematizing both the visual and tangible 
clarity of the performing bodies within them. Woven into bodies, these ‘contradictions 
of spatial dimension’ (Rowe & Slutsky 1995: 160) – inside and outside, two-
dimensional and three-dimensional, solid and impalpable – are applied to corporeality 
and thereby pose challenges to common ideas about the body. Unlike Ernst Mach’s 
ideological proposition that ‘the space of the skin is the analogue of a two-dimensional, 
finite, unbounded and closed space’ (Mach 2004: 9), Svoboda’s performing bodies are 
the constituents of larger ‘nontotalizing structures’ (Taylor 1998: 12) in which bodied 
spatiality may be best described as ‘skinscapes’ (Manning 2007: 111): that is, ‘nothing 
but a strata of skin in which interiority and exteriority are thoroughly convoluted’ 
(Taylor in Manning 2007: 111). 
 The black box thus motivates the production of bodily spaces which, in its turn, 
compels the rethinking of bodies’ surfaces as porous and relational skins. These skins 
do not contain but precisely open the body to being perforated by the outside. This 
paradigm of a radically relational and interactive bodily surface suggests that skin is a 
‘slippery surface […] of maximum interface and intensity [that is] continually 
enfolding’ (Imperiale 2000: 6–7) as it ‘doubles upon itself, duplicitous, touching itself 
as other’ (Manning 2007: 111), making ‘flesh [...] touched-touching’ (Derrida 2005: 
100).  
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[S]kin [is] an excitation screen [,] neither inside nor outside [but an] 
inflection of passage […] rhythmically express[ing] the vulnerability of 
surface by subtracting solidity from form to make something temporarily 
animate [:] this dimension extends beyond the visual plane of the surface, 
as if the entire skin were spun outwards in its excitable permeability [,] it 
shows us how to inhabit a surface as that surface fluctuates (Robertson 
2003: 162–7). 
 
Through the analogy with a porous ‘skin [that] is the expression […] of the passage 
toward a continuous re-emergence [, a] metamorphosis in action’ (Manning 2007: 113), 
the black box can be conceived as an enclosure prone to disclosure, or, to put it another 
way, a container working against its self-containment. Accordingly, then, embodied 
subjectivity in the black box may be revisited within the reappraisal of a consciousness 
seemingly closed down to re-emerge no longer autonomous and self-contained. 
Such subjectivity may be associated with a seemingly primary animal state, but 
its reliance upon technology here would suggest a more complex state of being. This 
may be best described by Posthuman theory where 
[t]he unpredictable nature of complex dynamics implies that subjectivity is 
emergent rather than given, distributed rather than located solely in 
consciousness, emerging from and integrated into a chaotic world rather 
than occupying a position of mastery and control removed from it (Hayles 
1999: 291). 
 
 Having looked at the operation and effects of the black box we have arrived at 
Posthuman theory. That move from black box effects to the Posthuman is driven by a 
question: how are we productively to understand a subjectivity which relations of 
reciprocity with the world disrobe the subject from its singularity, autonomy and self-
ownership? The following section will expand on Posthuman subjectivity by way of 
analysing practical and theoretical instances of the post-World War II Bauhaus’ 
influence over certain artists in the United States.  
 
 
2.2 Autopoietic encounters 
Parallel to Josef Svoboda’s developments of scenographic structures of visual 
attenuation in the black box, a set of Bauhaus-inspired American artists advanced 
further innovations in relational strategies between the body and its surroundings across 
performance, visual arts and architecture. These not only intensified the potency of 
uncertainty and unpredictability in the speculative threshold but also reflected emerging 
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critical discourses regarding the human being’s relation to its environment in the 
growingly technological society of the second half of the twentieth century. To attend 
to these endeavours will enable us to explore further the gloom’s conditions for and 
implications on the reciprocity of embodied subjectivity. 
 
 
67 John Cage, Merce Cunningham, Willem De Kooning  
and Richard Buckminster Fuller, The Ruse of Medusa, 1948 
 
As a result of the Nazi persecution of the Bauhaus movement, some of its key 
artists emigrated to the United States and, in particular, one of its leading architects 
Walter Gropius found himself teaching at the Black Mountain College near New York. 
Thus the influence of the Bauhaus is noticeable there right from the end of the second 
World War. In 1948, Black Mountain College artists presented the performance The 
Ruse of Medusa. Although based on a 1913 Surrealist piece by Erik Satie, its visual and 
carnivalesque aesthetic is undeniably Bauhaus-like in terms of grotesquely extending 
the body into phenomena of felt volume. Performing in this piece, John Cage, Merce 
Cunningham and Richard Buckminster Fuller would themselves soon develop radical 
approaches to the ‘flexibility, changeability, fluency and so forth’ (Cage in Goldberg 
2001: 124) of spatio-corporeal relations. Cage and Cunningham subsequent 
collaborations revolved around chance processes of creation whereby the correlation 
between environmental and corporeal structures was highly unpredictable. In 
Variations V (1965), they not only used chance to create movement and sounds, but 
also required the music, dance, set and filmic projections to be devised separately and 
then brought together into one piece on the opening night of the work. All components 
overlap but none predominates. Chance enabled the disunification of the various 
components at play and thus produced the disparity of visual perception in the work. 
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Perceptual experience was predicated upon a multiplicity of stimuli and forms but none 
of these could be isolated and demarcated. Instead, each stimulus and form was partly 
disrupted by the others, resulting in an ‘operation’ of ‘declassification’ (Bois & Krauss 
1997: 18) or ‘heterology’ of formlessness (Bataille in Bois & Krauss 1997: 15). 
 
 
68 John Cage & Merce Cunningham, Variations V, 1965 
 
 Drawing from Bataille, Yves-Alain Bois and Rosalind Krauss developed this 
heterology using the concepts of ‘base materialism’, ‘entropy’, ‘pulse’ and 
‘horizontality’ (Bois & Krauss 1997: 7) which all converge ‘to bring things down in the 
world’ (Bataille in Bois & Krauss 1997: 18) including any ‘symbolizable theme’ and 
‘given quality’ (Bois & Krauss 1997: 18). Such a ‘crisis of subject matter’ (Bataille in 
Bois & Krauss 1997: 14) can ‘liberat[e] our thinking [from] the servitude of thematics’ 
(Bois & Krauss 1997: 252) as it celebrates ‘what is excluded by idealism […] by the 
ego, capitalism, organised religion and so on’ (Bois & Krauss 1997: 53). Through 
chance and random processes, Cage and Cunningham undercut the subjective control of 
authorship and ownership. As they strove to make the work ‘happen […] in the 
observer himself’ (Cage in Goldberg 2001: 126), the viewer is not so much challenged 
in hermeneutic terms (interpretational challenge) but rather by a cognitive domain that 
resists the singularity of its receptor. To put it more simply, we may say that the viewer 
must attempt to integrate a multiplicity of points of view, stimuli, intentions and desires 
in him/herself. The artists’ relinquishing of authorial singularity in both their creative 
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processes and outcomes is paired with the invocation of the audience’s relinquishing of 
their spectatorial singularity.   
The Black Mountain College had an important impact upon the art scene in New 
York (Goldberg 2001: 127). Cage and Cunningham’s concern with the formlessness of 
relational unpredictability may therefore be seen to flourish in various artistic domains 
and in particular in the further development of an abstract art of 
anti-form [where t]he focus on matter and gravity as a means results in 
forms that were not projected in advance. Random piling, loose stacking, 
hanging, give passing form to the material. Chance is accepted and 
indeterminacy is implied (Morris 1993: 46) 
 
 
 
69 Robert Morris, Untitled, 1969 
 
While in general terms the second half of the twentieth century saw the expansion of 
abstraction into various strands, of which Minimalism sought to pursue claims of an 
absolute reduction of all forms, further explicitly theoretical discourses show a 
continuing criticism of abstract artworks within which ‘the body is summoned’ (Wagner 
1998: 256). This is seen in Robert Morris’s critical exploration of ‘the entire situation’ 
(Morris in Ridout 2006: 8): the ‘fact of co-presence in the act of spectatorship’, of 
‘including the beholder’s body’ (Fried in Ridout 2006: 8). Attacks on any ‘kind of stage 
presence’ (Fried in Ridout 2006: 8) were motivated by an ideological drive to keep 
unspoiled the Pictorial tradition (which we noted in Section 1). In this the ‘possibility of 
a spectator […] who has vanished, as it were, from the scene of her own spectatorship, 
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receded into the complete darkness of a non-existent auditorium the better to 
contemplate the wholly unsituated picture’ (Fried in Ridout 2006: 8). By contrast, 
Robert Morris’ works are situated by way of critically quoting the architectural features 
they rely on: Untitled (1969) is a large surface of felt presented as the melting double of 
the wall against which it is displayed. Similarly, Eva Hesse’s Untitled (Rope Piece) 
(1970) is a network of ropes suspended in mid-air as another, again collapsing, ceiling. 
 
 
70 Eva Hesse, Untitled (Rope Piece), 1970 
 
 Abstraction in Hesse’s and Morris’ artworks has a relational and reciprocal 
dimension not only related to the presence of the architecture that contain them but also 
with respect to the presence of bodies: the intervention of the artist’s body and hands on 
the material (cuts simply and blatantly made manually with a blade; knots that can only 
be done by hands) and its architectural inscription (simple and visible nails and strings 
that attest to the physical intervention of hanging) contributes, in addition to the 
textured materials employed, to the viewer’s tactile invitation into and virtual friction 
with the works. By contrast, abstraction as the pure reduction and idealized isolation of 
both the viewer and the viewed relates to what Katherine Hayles (1999) calls the long-
lasting tradition of ‘the Platonic backhand [which] works by inferring from the world’s 
noisy multiplicity a simplified [version, in which] complexity appears as a “fuzzing up” 
of an essential reality’ (Hayles 1999: 12). Adding to this, Hayles proposes a second type 
of abstraction, ‘the Platonic forehand’, which starts ‘from simplified abstractions and 
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evolves a multiplicity sufficiently complex that it can be seen as a world of its own’ 
(Hayles 1999: 12–13). She then identifies this abstract scheme as pertaining to 
twentieth-century cybernetics and artificial life. As such, both schemes of abstraction 
are seen as privileging the abstract over the real since they take ‘the abstract as the Real, 
downplaying the importance of material instantation’ (Hayles 1999: 13). 
Yet Hesse’s and Morris’ works suggest that ‘even in the realm of pure 
abstraction there is a pervasive and pertinent, if often hidden, spatial dimension’ 
(Lefebvre in Soja 1996: 46). Morris’ ‘entire situation’ – ‘like an encounter with another 
human being’ – compels the audience’s ‘awareness of one’s body as a presence in a 
situation’ (Ridout 2006: 8). Morris and Hesse organize a ‘multidirectional’ sensory field 
by way of ‘pushing through the picture plane to an open space that lay “beyond”’ 
(Mercer 2006: 7–8) whereby the ‘surface “purity”’ becomes ‘sullied’ by means of 
leaving traces of the artist’s body intervention on the material surface now turned into a 
‘freshly cut skin and exposed innards’ (Morrison 2006: 144). The relational condition to 
making the work becomes a relational injunction to the viewer. In this way, abstraction 
continues to play or interplay with issues of simplicity and complexity but, unlike 
Hayles’ twofold model, this interplay is not unilateral but constantly oscillating and thus 
not fixed. Morris and Hesse can thus be said to instantiate another and ‘discrepant 
abstraction’ (Mercer 2006: 7) that proceeds from the simplicity of the Platonic forehand 
– architectural surfaces – to the complexity of the Platonic backhand in order to recover 
the world’s noisy and material multiplicity: wherein ‘abstraction [can] resist […] the 
fixity of “meaning” that essentialism requires and gives rise instead to a plurality of 
readings which are generated by a process of semiosis that cannot be fully closed by any 
one singular interpretation’ (Mercer 2006: 17). Accordingly, the ‘encounter with [an] 
other’ (Ridout 2006: 9) bestowed by such material abstraction is ‘disquieting’ (Fried in 
Ridout 2006: 9) inasmuch as this otherness cannot be reduced to an intelligible and 
singular identity. 
The relational situation of the body in a discrepant abstract art enables us to 
uncover an embodied approach to space that seeks, like the black box, to interrogate 
ontological and epistemological assumptions such as material, cognitive and subjective 
autonomy and singularity. Abstract artworks such as Morris’ and Hesse’s can be seen as 
overlapping bodily presence and action with the pure architectural surfaces of the 
museum/gallery environment. These overlaps thus form a kind of critique of the 
architectural container as they point towards a much different type of architecture that is 
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embodied, interactive and transient. Similarly exposing such an approach, in 1958, 
while Josef Svoboda was presenting his black box-based screens at Brussels’ Universal 
Expo, Yves Klein’s exhibition Le Vide (The Void) offered its audience an empty gallery 
containing only a white curtain and an empty glass cabinet. So as to emphasize the 
whiteness of the gallery’s space, Klein also introduced a blue fabric curtaining the front 
window of the gallery and served blue cocktails to the audience on the opening night. 
Resistant to the white gallery space, the colour blue invites the audience to look away 
from the gallery’s walls towards the window and, through it, into the street, whilst 
simultaneously being aware of its ingestion, as they drink, into the dark interiors of the 
body. Klein’s blue (IKB) is the overlapping point between space and body (as boldly 
exemplified by his more famous Anthropometries, 1960). As he attributed to his blue 
the conception of a ‘void’ (Klein in Nechvatal 1999: 367), the relational domain at play 
in his work suggests both a critique of the wholly visible and situating lines of the 
gallery or the canvas and the very questioning of relationality. Indeed, if neither the 
body nor the artwork are specifically positioned and distinguishable from one another 
but are simultaneously separated and imbricated (hanged blue curtain and ingested blue 
liquid; blue traces on canvas and blue skin), then relations can unfold in any and many 
degree of separation-imbrication, and possible new relations can be invented.  
 
 
71 Yves Klein, Le Vide, 1958 
 
Such prosthetic connection between space and the body lies at the root of 
Posthuman theory within Marshall McLuhan’s proposition of a ‘dis/connection 
advanced in the logic of the prosthesis’ (McLuhan in Foster 1996: 221). Drawn from his 
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theory of ‘autoamputation’ (McLuhan in Hayles 1999: 34) where he ‘argued that 
humans react to stress in their environments by withdrawing the locus of selfhood 
inward’ and claimed that this ‘in turn facilitates and requires compensating 
technological extensions that project the body-as-prosthesis back out into the world’ 
(Hayles 1999: 34), McLuhan’s dis/connected prosthetic being informs Francisco 
Varela’s concept of autopoiesis: an unstable yet ‘structural coupling’ (Varela in Crary & 
Kwinter 1992: 336) between body and environment mediated by technological 
apparatuses.  
 
 
72 Anthony McCall, Line Describing a Cone, 1973 
 
Eventually offering an ontological restructuring rising out of this ‘incarnated 
coupling by sensing and acting’ (Varela in Hayles 1999: 157), Varela’s autopoiesis 
started as a ‘homeostatic self-regulating mechanism whose boundaries were clearly 
delineated from the environment’ (Hayles 1999: 34). Here technology confers an 
interaction that mediates the relation between body and environment in a unilateral way 
whereby neither one nor the other can change or evolve as a result. This is an important 
dimension of the ‘architectonic aspects of the multiperspective projective installations 
of the 1970s’ (Iles 2001: 34) such as Anthony McCall’s Line Describing a Cone (1973) 
which plunges the gallery into darkness to reveal a projector’s beam of light spliced, or 
diffracted, to form a three-dimensional cone of light traversing the room. Seemingly 
static, this light can be penetrated by bodies and, in being so, is revealed as a line 
running across body parts and reacting to their contours and textures. The title then does 
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not refer to the lighting phenomenon alone but to its two-fold appearance, which can 
only be seen by way of physical immersion into it: the title refers to the light in 
interaction with the body which therefore truly constitutes the work. Yet, the lighting 
phenomenon remains a fixed one and, conversely, the body’s interaction with it is 
limited to same interactions of body and light. Similarly, Dan Graham’s Picture 
Window Piece (1974) does not fully exist without the integrated presence of the 
spectator. The work seeks to undo the window as a unilateral Pictorial device of framing 
by way of turning a building’s window (at street level) into a projection screen: cameras 
located on both sides of the window capture inside and outside environments and 
project them onto the window so that the surface becomes a mirror as well as a 
transparent interface in which viewers see themselves on the street as well as 
overlapping with the indoor space and its inhabitants on the other side. Here again, the 
visual device is fixed and the imbrication of body and environment, though intrinsic and 
innovative, unmutable.  
Varela then further developed autopoiesis as ‘a reflexive vision of a man spliced 
into informational circuit that could change him in unpredictable ways’ (Hayles 1999: 
34). Here technology produces a more unstable, and as such potent, relational 
imbrication wherein the reciprocal domain of reflexivity allows some mutation. A clear 
example is Robert Rauschenberg’s Open Score – part of 9 Evenings: Theatre and 
Engineering (1966) – which provides one of the first performative events to use sensor 
technologies of interaction to confound interaction and, in doing so, to innovate and 
mutate relations. In Open Score the movements of bodies trigger an incremental black-
out around them: taking place on a tennis courtyard, at night, two tennis players held 
racquets electrically connected to speakers and the floodlights of the court; as each 
player hits the ball, the sound of the impact is captured and augmented while the light 
decreases in intensity at every hit until total black-out.  
Though in Open Score lighting changes are entirely contingent upon bodily 
action and tactile contacts (emphasized through sound), this apparent bodily control 
over external phenomena is not secure not only because each body moves according to 
another body but also because the environment is visually altered by bodily action and, 
thus, in return, bodies must adapt to the decrease of light in order to succeed in 
executing another action that will further alter the phenomenon. 
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73 Robert Rauschenberg, Open Score, 1966 
 
As the intensity of light reduces, the perception of distances and positions shifts. 
Increasingly, the body must substitute its visual ways of pinpointing the tennis ball in 
space and the moment to hit it with auditive and tactile senses: the textured sounds of 
the ball’s impact upon rackets and ground, as well as of its passage through air, become 
the key sensory stimuli to attend to. As the body needs to retain a sensory understanding 
of the spatial order surrounding it in order to play the game of tennis, it is forced 
radically to modify its perceptual mode of experience and play. This, as with the 
previously mentioned works, suggests that dissolving walls, floors, ceilings and borders 
– any ‘borderline of a spatiality exposed to the outside, offered – precisely – on its 
running border’ (Derrida 2005: 103) – most clearly produces a subversive intermediary, 
in-between zone into which the body is critically invited to alter its sensory make-up. 
Since the body’s presence triggers the revelation of spatial borders as porous interfaces, 
corporeality itself is conjured to attend to its borderline too: the ‘incalculable limit of a 
being that is constantly taking form’ (Vasseleu 1998: 128).  
As an exemplification of these levels of autopoiesis and how they lead on to an 
even more radical conception of relationality and reciprocity, we can consider works by 
Joan Jonas. Jonas’ seminal film Vertical Roll (1972) makes the body and technology ‘as 
inseparable as the guillotine’ (Kantor 1961: 212–13) by presenting her naked body 
visually eroded by self-interrupting electronic signals producing vertical glitches rolling 
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over her figure. Looped and bordered by the video frame, Vertical Roll conforms to 
Varela’s homeostatic conception of autopoiesis.  
 
 
74 Joan Jonas, Vertical Roll, 1972 
 
Subsequently, Jonas created a series of ‘black and white’ live performances that were 
‘deeply material in their form, but ephemeral in their existence’ (Iles 2001: 52) such as 
Mirage (1976), in which she extended her live body’s presence with projections of pre-
recorded actions of herself drawing and erasing white motifs inspired by New Guinean 
sand drawings on a black-board. While the film relates to a homeostatic autopoiesis, the 
performative event formulates an autopoietic reflexivity furthered in the way Varela 
revised it in terms of ‘self-organization theories implying that radical changes were 
possible within certain kinds of complex systems’ where the ‘coupling [of body and 
machine, is] so intense and multifaceted that it is no longer possible to distinguish’ one 
from the other (Hayles 1999: 35). Varela identified such dis/connection as an oscillation 
between habits, or ‘readiness-for-action’ (Varela in Crary & Kwinter 1992: 135), and 
their ‘breakdowns [prone to catalyse] new modes of behaving [: thus,] during a 
breakdown’ (Varela in Crary & Kwinter 1992: 328–9) the body is ‘shaping a world into 
significance [as it is] transform[ing] itself through emergent behaviour’ (Hayles 1999: 
223).  
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In Mirage, the ‘sense of seriality’ of those ‘endless drawings’ (Iles 2001: 51) 
anchored in the video medium can be related to the habituated movement Varela calls 
readiness-for-action. Yet, as Jonas sought to explore the ‘demise of two-dimensional 
painterly representation’ (Iles 2001: 51), the video content is juxtaposed with her live 
body engaging in ‘jerky backward movements [that] appear to pull her image back 
toward us just as it is about to disappear’ (Iles 2001: 52). Kinetic repetition thus links 
the live and the pre-recorded. But, unlike the monotonous hands drawing with chalk in 
the video, Jonas’ repetitive and live movements change in time as her lack of balance 
increases towards highly vertiginous oscillations. Embodied habits such as drawing are 
therefore juxtaposed with the physical exploration of disequilibrium. Repetition is thus 
revealed as a mode both for replicating, consolidating and maintaining a system and for 
unravelling replication to explore new systems. Effectively, then, establishing a system 
and simultaneously dishevelling a systematic structure (such as the proprioceptive 
location of a centre of gravity in the body) echoes the mutating organism of Varela’s 
autopoiesis. 
Faced with a being in the throes of mutation it is impossible to settle that being 
in discursive certainty thereby leaving the audience ‘unsure of where to locate the final 
meaning” (Iles 2001: 52). Indeed, ‘accompanying this [autopoietic] change is a 
corresponding shift in how signification is understood and corporeally experienced’ 
(Hayles 1999: 35). Through autopoiesis, being can be understood as a mode of constant 
transformation whereby the material world can never be absorbed entirely by discourse 
and knowledge but, because it is ever-mutating, requires discourse to break down into 
an uncertain structure of thoughts that also enables discursive mutations: ‘flickering 
signifiers, whose transient patterns evoke and embody […] the context of no context’ 
(Hayles 1999: 47). An autopoietic understanding thus shifts the experiential emphasis 
from the discursive to the physical or, as Varela would have it, ‘actualizes the birth of 
the concrete’ (Varela in Crary & Kwinter 1992: 329).  
Autopoiesis places emphasis on a materiality that cannot be discursively stable 
and, as such, implicates the embodied dimension of subjectivity accordingly. Implicit in 
the autopoietic encounter then is the possibility for subjectivity to be withdrawn from 
the cognitive certainties of being, the discursive borders that frame being in terms of 
self-possession, autonomy and singularity. In an autopoietic encounter, ‘phenomenal 
experience expands my immediate horizons and takes me beyond myself to the world’ 
(Noë 2004: 217): 
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[w]hat is knocked out from the subject’s psychic landscape is the delusion 
of One-ness, the phantasy of omnipotence. To recognize this basic, ego-
deflating principle is the ground zero of subject-formation (Braidotti 1994: 
269). 
 
By identifying a critical type of interactivity between the body and its 
environment in the black box, and emerging out of its visual uncertainties, this thesis 
has refined our understanding of the gloom. It has seen the gloom’s operation as a 
desingularizing involvement through abstract visual artworks which appeared from the 
mid-twentieth century onwards, alongside the emergence of the black box. But the 
legacy of such spatio-corporeal autopoiesis in visual arts was then compounded and 
elaborated in architectural terms. In the case of James Turrell, it can be seen how more 
recent artists have developed autopoietic abstraction into the domain of architecture. 
 
 
75 James Turrell, Spread, 2003 
 
After seminal works such as Soft Cell (1993), in which Turrell explored spatial 
inhabitation through the sensory deprivation of a soundproof and lightproof box, the 
artist developed a series of works called Ganzfeld, drawn from early twentieth-century 
inquiries into sensory deprivation aimed at unravelling the total field of perception 
(‘ganzfeld’). Part of this series, Spread (2003), is a large luminous room inserted inside 
the museum space and mixing various kinds of artificial and natural light in such a way 
that ‘the picture plane is almost pulled over your head like a shirt. The light from inside 
then meets the light from outside in such a way that it becomes insignificant to 
determine from where exactly the light comes’ (Turrell in Nechvatal 1999: 341). 
Entering through a rectangular cut in the museum’s wall, one’s sense of the spatial 
configuration starts shifting from rectangularity to its melting down as the walls and 
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corners that are perceived recede as one moves towards them. The work does not 
actually deprive audiences of any singular sense but rather attenuates and confounds 
vision. As a result, the inside space’s ends, or limits, remain equivocal in visual terms 
and must be eventually verified by tactile means: thus ‘no image’ can be settled thereby 
‘avoid[ing] associative, symbolic thought’ (Turrell in Nechvatal 1999: 123).  
As a consequence of this experience the body itself is unsettled in terms of its 
own embodied thinking: one can no longer move in a way that is familiar and evocative 
of one’s feelings, ideas and self. Instead, one must step out of one’s kinetic habits since, 
throughout the process of finding out the spatial borders, the body must hesitantly tip-
toe and undergo physical disorientation and imbalance as the perception of the space 
changes at every step. One must therefore develop a more intensely relational and 
responsive experience with one’s surroundings just as these themselves appear to react 
to their inhabitants. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, other examples of such autopoietic 
interactivity can be seen in the architectural domain in the form of actions proposing 
‘the experience of urban space not as the result of a compositional order but as a dérive, 
an erratic accumulation of synesthetic experiences’ (De Solà-Morales 1999: 80). So too 
there are speculations, such as Nicholas Negroponte’s Soft Architecture Machines 
(1975), on a ‘responsive architecture’ where ‘walls that move to the touch – relevant to 
the function of support or moving back in retreat – that change color and form: 
streamlining themselves to the wind or shrinking down when unoccupied, are all 
possible’, but would require ‘a dramatically different relationship between ourselves 
and our houses, one characterized by intimate interaction’ (Negroponte in D’Estrée-
Sterk 2003: 88). These examples, as the following sections will demonstrate, signal a 
meeting point between architecture and scenography which will inform later 
developments in both fields. But before we attend to these further developments, it is 
necessary at this juncture to make detail further the conceptual and discursive modelling 
of the effects of autopoiesis and the corporeal and kinetic innovations in play. In order 
to do this I shall report on a second phase of practical research developed specifically to 
enable this modelling. This phase established a structure of autopoietic interactivity 
using digital technologies of projection in the black box. The description of this work, 
and its potential implications, writes first-hand experience into the narrative. Thus the 
next section of the thesis seeks to become more able to identify, in a more detailed way, 
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the specific issues bearing on subjectivity in the context of a spatiality that does not 
support its embodiment in singularity. 
From here, architecture, visual arts and scenography will then be observed 
further in an attempt to formulate theoretically the form of reciprocal being that is 
implied wherever relations between body and space have been engineered to be 
obscure, uncertain, unsettling and unpredictable. 
 
 
2.3 Feeding upon light 
From the onset of the black box’s emergence, the presence of live bodies was exuded 
through spatial phenomena that may be described as aberrant inasmuch as their 
tangibility and shapes were incomplete and questionable. In this respect, Josef 
Svoboda’s ‘non-existent screen’ is a key concept for understanding the spatiality of the 
black box since it embedded all light, objects, scenery and bodies within its confusing 
materiality. This, as we have seen in the previous sections, was reflected in other fields 
of practice where the position of the live body was increasingly established in relational 
and reciprocal terms. 
Such reciprocity between the body and its surrounding is also part of the 
hypothesis that concluded the last phase of my practice: namely, that it was possible for 
a lighting phenomenon to occur solely out of live responsiveness to the body’s presence 
and mobility. This relational structure might suggest a critical type of co-presence prone 
to an autopoietic breakdown inasmuch as visual positioning would collapse and give 
way to new modes of perception and, through them, new modes of physical kinesis and 
of subjective embodiment.  
 Whilst these new modes may be apprehended up to a point through the analysis 
of historical precedents, the fact of their embodiedness presents a problem for a merely 
discursive commentary. It suggests, instead, that there is a need to incorporate 
experiential elements and processes into the work of developing and refining 
understanding. Elsewhere it has been asserted that ‘discursive constructions affect how 
bodies move through space and time, influence what technologies are developed, and 
help to structure interfaces between bodies and technologies’ (Hayles 1999: 207).  
Here, by contrast, as a consequence of developing a technological device (digital 
lighting) that interfaces with the body in uncertain and unpredictable ways in order to 
test its hypothesis, the thesis is able to suggest a reversal of the aforementioned 
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affective structure wherein new modes of moving through space and time may produce 
new discursive constructions in the embodied subject. The implementing and trialling 
of such a device should make it possible to develop more profound understanding of a 
subjectivity embodied by way of an autopoietic breakdown. In establishing its 
hypothesis by practical means, this specific phase of exploration contributes to an 
overall journey of practical experimentation that seeks to consolidate and develop 
further the overlooked legacy of the scenographic gloom. 
 In the previous stage of research practice, Cycloramic lighting, the digital 
projection of the static drawings I had produced led to a particular point in the inquiry 
where the body’s moving presence in the projection compelled its content to move on 
the body’s surface. I concluded this phase with speculation about a possible light whose 
occurrence and kinesis would pivot entirely on the body’s presence and movement. In 
other words, I sought to know whether the previously observed relation between body 
and light could be expanded in such a way that even the appearance and disappearance 
of light could be triggered in response to the body’s presence. 
The use of the digital programme Powerpoint for the purpose of projecting 
various and static drawings as a slide show became obsolete. Or rather, the digital 
nature of this medium could be more profoundly utilized in terms of what is referred to, 
in digital practices, as interactive systems or softwares. However, an interactive system 
requires digital programming, which is not an area of expertise of mine. Therefore I 
turned to digital programmers and developers to discuss the possibilities of creating an 
interactive or responsive lighting software that would still be implemented via a digital 
projector. From the onset of these discussions it became apparent that digital 
programmers working with interactive systems are customarily used to interactions 
being triggered by hands and fingers touching a screen, a surface or an object. As a 
result, the suggestion of a space that is entirely responsive to the entirety of the body 
was not well understood by programmers. I thus decided to draw a sketch which would 
include elements that programmers were used to but that could also be understood 
without these elements (and thus begin to approach my speculations). 
Not conceived for realization, this prototypical template, which I called 
Interactive Scenario, visually presented key operational concepts at stake in the 
research as applied to common understandings of hand-triggered interactivity. The 
drawing shows bodies placing their hands against a screen, resulting in a small beam of 
light appearing right next to the hand. At the same time, the sketch also discretely 
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suggests an attempt to discard the screen: the projected light comes from behind the 
screen, traversing it and continuing throughout the volume of space in front of the 
screen and in which bodies are located. Thus, the body might not only perceive and 
play (with hands) with the light on the screen but it might also perceive that same light 
in the space, finishing on the floor, where the whole body may also be affected by the 
light. Furthermore, the drawing suggests that as the hand moves across the screen’s 
surface, the light beam follows and grows. But this growth was envisioned as occurring 
independently from the body’s kinesis so as to provide additional and unpredictable 
stimuli to which the body could respond. After presenting and explaining this sketch to 
digital developers, I proposed that they rethink this scenario by removing the screen and 
considering the entire volume of space as a screen, and thus abandon the hand’s contact 
with the screen as a trigger of the interactive systems, instead considering the entire 
body as a stimulus for light’s responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 Interactive Scenario, 2008 
 
The programmers first created the skeleton of a custom-made digital software in 
which lighting phenomena were entirely responsive to the body’s movement. This, as 
with any custom-made digital programming, had to be first evolved within the virtual 
space of the computer whereby initial aspects of the visual phenomena and the tracking 
of motion could be tested on the computer screen and with respect to small-scale 
objects such as my hand. Within this two-dimensional context, the basic assets of the 
software could be developed, the first of which concerned responsiveness with respect 
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to the appearance and disappearance of light. Something in the physical world had to be 
detected (tracking) in order to trigger this and it was initially decided that movement 
would switch on the light, and thus stillness would switch it off. The second basic asset 
of the software concerned the visual appearance of light itself: its textures, forms and 
behaviours. It is in this asset that the key perceptual qualities of the light were evolved. 
Once these basic properties were created, the software had to be tried out in practice in 
order to consolidate its skeleton technically and develop it further towards making it 
partly autonomous with a view to providing unpredictable phenomena to which the 
body could respond. 
 
 
Plate 2 Kinetic LX 1, 2009 (also see DVD excerpt Kinetic LX 1) 
 
Initial experiments with the software carried out in a black box show that my 
body was confused by the lighting’s responsiveness: any single movement triggered the 
emergence of light. Even the mildest shifts occurring within the fabric of the t-shirt I 
was wearing would impel small white shards of light to appear. Moreover, when trying 
solely to move my left arm, it appeared that the rest of my body was moving too, since 
light occurred everywhere on me. Thus, in order to develop some control over the 
responsiveness of light, I rapidly stopped moving in the everyday ways I am 
accustomed to. Instead, I would repeat a simple gesture again and again, reducing it and 
slowing it down in order to ensure that only one arm was moving and thus illuminated. 
This involved keeping an awareness of my body’s contrived stillness while paying 
141
 
 
 
attention to how my arm moved or stopped moving. When such precise and dual 
awareness and control of all body parts is achieved, the light should become 
manipulable, almost graspable in a haptic turn of sensation from vision to touch.  
 
 
Plate 3 Kinetic LX 2, 2009 (also see DVD excerpt Kinetic LX 2) 
 
The stillness of the entire body that was required in order to switch the light off 
was very difficult to achieve. At first, whenever I was attempting to be still, light would 
appear and show me areas of my body that were still moving, trembling. Those were 
usually small areas on my body, to which I would normally not pay much attention. 
Some of the trembling movement was coming from within my organs: lungs but also 
visceral activities. To be still meant to calm the internal activity down as well as all 
segments of my body’s surface. Effectively, the stillness that would trigger complete 
black-out was the most physically testing. Opposite to the stillness of relaxation, it is 
the kind of stillness that Andre Lepecki (2004) links to exhaustion and disappearance as 
expanded modes of perception: ‘stillness-in-motion [enables] shifting the limits of our 
senses of time and space’ (Lepecki 2004: 141). In my practice, physical stillness altered 
the sense of space because its triggering of darkness and the loss of visual content of 
volumetric spatiality were paradoxically paired with a stronger sense of being anchored, 
grounded, in space due to the compelling effort to remain still. Yet the sensation of the 
environment’s solid materiality was paired with a highly transient physicality of my 
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body because the efforts that were required to be still were not sustainable for very long 
and thus constantly ran the risk of failing; it was a restless state of vertigo. 
 
 
Plate 4 Kinetic LX 3, 2009 (also see DVD excerpt Kinetic LX 3) 
 
With a view to creating a domain of interaction where both body and 
surrounding phenomena are responding to and affecting one another – and since I was 
becoming physically acquainted with the initial assets of the software – autonomous 
and random lighting behaviours were developed and added to the programme. These 
were aimed once again at confounding my perception and physicality so as to provide 
new stimuli for me to respond to. To be able to observe my reactions, these random 
occurrences were first thought through as bold and obvious disturbances of the 
responsive phenomena: for instance, light would initially respond to bodily movement 
by highlighting any moving part of the body but then some of these highlights would 
start expanding and floating away from the body. Requiring light to behave in such 
different ways meant that the behaviour of this digitally-engineered lighting could not 
simply replicate the real properties of light’s propagation. We thus looked at types of 
natural hazy phenomena to diversify the light’s behaviour as necessary. We selected the 
behavioural properties of clouds which were then algorithmically introduced into the 
software. This additional behaviour provided an unpredictable feature yet one that 
could be controllable since one particularity of clouds’ behaviour, trailing, could be 
implemented either as an expanding phenomenon diverting from the responsive light’s 
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behaviour (thus away from the body’s movement, as if wind had changed directions) or 
remain still connected to the responsive lighting phenomenon (by keeping the former 
aligned with latter’s direction, position and speed). Diverted trailing offered surprises 
with which I could not always engage, whereas aligned trailing allowed me to continue 
developing the kinesis unfolding from the responsive light. It must be noted here that 
these two distinct lighting behaviours are not clearly identifiable as such on video 
footage, as indeed they are fused with one another and as a result look quite similar. 
Seen from an immersed perspective, however, they were physically felt as very distinct: 
moving an arm would bring light onto it and allow me to make that light travel in space 
as I moved my arm (like a torch). Simultaneously this movement would leave light in 
its passage and thus call for a secondary awareness of that trailing’s presence and what 
it may reveal. It felt very much as if I was moving my hand across the surface of a table 
and bits of skin were being temporarily left behind. It was as if the contact between 
hand and table remained visibly in place, only dissipating long after the hand had 
moved away. But instead of it being simply a hand it was the entire body which was 
involved. Overall, then, the developing complexity of this digital lighting made 
sensations and perceptions of a tactile kind grow stronger as I was kinetically honing 
the interaction with light. 
 
 
Plate 5 Kinetic LX  4, 2009 (also see DVD excerpt Kinetic LX 4) 
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The technology and related experiments produced in practice suspended a 
particularly habituated mode of perceptual relation and enabled a new and more 
complex one to unfold. As such, the work can be further analyzed from the perspective 
of Posthuman autopoiesis whereby tactile perception constitutes a sensory breakdown 
as it shifts from the habituated tactility of the hands to the development of a new tactile 
habit in the entire body. This involved a challenging relation between the body and the 
surfaces accommodating it (mainly the floor) as my body had to balance its weight in 
more tentatively elastic and destabilizing ways than in everyday life. Punctured by often 
painful failures to adjust, the process of habituation exposed a more complex tactility 
involving new proprioceptive relations with space and revealing how touch is 
deceptively assumed to be limited by a tactile perception contained in the hands. 
Indeed, ‘habitus’ is particularly informed by ‘tacit conceptions wherein somatic 
inscriptions – of the body’s sensorium into instruments, and of prosthetic perceptions 
into the body – become naturalized’: and thus habit runs the risk of appearing as a 
biological given and a ‘primary interface’ (Iles 2001: 72–3). Touch is naturalized in the 
hands: extended by the arm, the hand can be the sole barrier against tactile contact, a 
distancing touch that prevents proximity; but the hand can also afford a forceful grasp 
or a sensuous embrace. A whole range of cognitive activities is codified in the 
behaviour of the hands and how they animate or limit contact, thereby participating in 
the management of self-autonomy. But if sensorimotor habits are ‘a knowledge and a 
remembering in the hands and in the body’ (Connerton in Hayles 1999: 200), the 
distinction between hands and body, and the positioning of the hands as primary 
interface are all merely constructed. Unravelling such habits through practice would 
then suspend their tacit conceptions and cognitive subtexts. 
To conceive of the whole body as a hand indeed complicates and disrupts 
tactility’s cognitive regulation of physical encounters. However, throughout those 
developments of ways of perceiving and moving (including being still) that were new to 
me, I always remained aware of that which in my body had been previously habituated. 
This was felt as a physical and psychological resistance against returning to my usual 
ways of looking, touching and being effortlessly still. I sensed my entire body in a 
tension between old and new habits. In this sense: ‘presence remains as that which 
belabours the body as generative counterfeit’ (Lepecki 2004: 9). Nonetheless, the 
sensory and kinetic transformations occurring against the background of prior habits no 
longer produced the same sense that prior habits would have. 
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The conventional movements with which I was familiar are attached to 
sensations, feelings, emotions and even precise thoughts: shoulders going up in a 
certain way when irritated, and going up in a different way when perplexed. Although I 
became more aware (on an ad hoc basis) of this cognitive codification ingrained in my 
body, the unusual movements I was discovering did not seem merely to reconfigure 
cognitive expression through the body, but instead to collapse cognition itself. While 
performing unusual movements, even once habituated, no cognitively definable 
sensation or thought would come into sharp relief. What I visually observed on video 
recordings did corroborate the absence of meaning and signification in my bodily 
presence. Thus, although the movements continued to display little meaning, they 
elaborated an increasing sense of contact between my body and another presence, as if 
the volumetric space had become a moving entity. And, again, video recordings showed 
my body moving as if in a dance with another body. This exteriorization of awareness 
and corporeal materiality is also relatable to the demise of cognitive legibility because 
the relation, or encounter, between my body and the space cannot be described in terms 
of emotions or meanings. Within such discursive illegibility, the perception and 
recognition of a subjective identity are destabilized. From an immersed and embodied 
viewpoint, this was quite simply felt as moving like and with another where the other 
lacks discursive and subjective qualities: a slippery other against which both body and 
self are reconsidered. 
Indeed, in my practice, the reconfigured expansion of tactile perception – co-
extensive with the breakdown of visual orientation and positioning – informs how the 
body can no longer regulate its relation to the outside and separate itself from it, therein 
developing ‘a relational self whose desire to empathize predominates over display’ 
(Foster 1992: 495). Embodied subjectivity then becomes defined by an experiential 
reciprocity where it is affected by the outside, mutates and transforms its relation to the 
outside in order to affect it in return: 
[t]he living being resolves its problems not only by adapting itself – which 
is to say, by modifying its relationship to its milieu […] – but [also] by 
modifying itself through the invention of new internal structures and its 
complete self-insertion into the axiomatic of organic problems (Simondon 
in Hansen 2002: 346). 
 
Indeed, 
it is impossible for a being to undergo the effect of some other without 
that effect being mutual. … Every effect modifies the object that is its 
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cause. There is no dissociation of the subject and the object – nor any 
original identity – there is only an inextricable reciprocity (Lichtenberg in 
Baudrillard 2005: 41). 
 
This, in Posthuman theory, relates to how the more an organism is engaged in an 
autopoietic breakdown the more ‘there is no clear line between those who act and those 
who are acted upon’ (Hayles 1999: 217) and the more the ‘observer [becomes] part of 
the picture’ and thus ‘can never be made of information alone’ (Hayles 1999: 246). 
Accordingly, Katherine Hayles proposes considering a Posthuman subjectivity where 
‘what binds the decoder to the system is not the stability of being a member of an 
interpretive community or the intense pleasure of physically possessing […] rather it is 
the decoder's construction as a cyborg [:] another flickering signifier’ (Hayles 1999: 47)  
where identity is ‘emergent’ and ‘distributed’ (Hayles 1999: 291). However, this 
uncertain multiplicity of being has given rise to negative and positive constructions of 
the subjectivity it presupposes. In its negative construction, the Posthuman subject is 
doomed to radical disconnection: ‘leaving the body behind [to be] anti-human [and] 
apocalyptic’ (Hayles 1999: 291). On the other hand, the positive construction revolves 
around a type of connection where it ‘is not a question of leaving the body behind but 
rather of extending embodied awareness’ (Hayles 1999: 291). By focusing on the body-
organism’s ability ‘to transform its interiority precisely by opening it to forces in the 
environment’, Posthuman theory formulates a subjectivity that ‘encompass[es] the body 
as a locus of such forces’ (Hansen 2002: 348). By repositioning being at a ‘level of 
sensation [that] would be the original locus of openness upon things, or contact with 
them” (Lingis 1986: 59), the Posthuman being displays a particular attention to and 
cultivation of the ‘fleshy, objective foundations of subjective consciousness as it 
engages and is transformed by and in the world’ (Sobchak 2004: 2).  
This positive, emergent and risky face of the Posthuman allows for 
‘apprehend[ing] the body as multiple, protean and capable, literally, of being made into 
many different expressive bodies’ (Foster in Crary & Kwinter 1992: 495), that is, 
‘leap[ing] outward into the new’ (Hayles 1999: 222) and ‘producing new kinds of 
subjectivities’ (Hayles 1999: 217). These are ‘pleasurably tight coupling[s] [and] 
erotically charged violations with potent new fusions [where] the cyborg becomes the 
stage on which are performed contestations about the body boundaries that have often 
marked class, ethnic and cultural differences’ (Haraway in Foster 1996: 221).  
147
 
 
 
This Posthuman conception of the cyborg refers to a relation between body and 
technology wherein being is socio-politically confounded, resisted and innovated as 
such. Through practical experiments to engage and interface my body with the black 
box via digital technologies, I had advanced some way towards demonstrating, and 
verifying, the possibility that an embodied subjectivity can mutate by way of 
suspending the behavioural and cognitive codification of its singular identity. For the 
fundamental, and unique, function of the lighting system I had developed was to further 
expose the black box’s intrinsic capacity to support moving forms whose shifting edges 
cannot confirm the delineation of a finite form. Posthuman theory thus allows us to 
understand the black box’s suggestion of a new and critical dimension in the being’s 
relation to the environment and others. As a container in which nothing can be 
phenomenally contained, as a form undoing its finitude and the finitude of all other 
forms within it,  
the black box [is] a depoliticizing space in the sense that no body politic 
can be placed on view [yet it remains] rooted in the human body 
[wherein] this body is made tantalizingly available through proximity and 
three-dimensionality (Wiles 2003: 257–8). 
 
Wiles’ concept of the black box as ‘depoliticizing space’ prompts us now to add 
another element to the way we politically conceive of the black box, and in doing so to 
deepen the discussion of it. To this end, the ‘presencing [of] a more embodied spatiality 
[allows] to re-see the black box, not for what it reveals but for what it conceals’: a 
‘void’, or ‘primordial gap’, where ‘formless matter’ constitutes a critical and ‘collective 
body’ (Hannah 2003: 32). Indeed, as the black box bestows a renewed understanding of 
the individual being, it necessarily also suggest a different kind of human collectivity. 
However, in Dorita Hannah’s position, which also draws from a Posthuman 
perspective, the ‘non-representational space’ (Hannah 2003: 23) of the black box, an 
‘uncommitted space’ of ‘darkness once constituted by a pinpoint of signification’ 
(Hannah 2003: 29), can be related to a gendered environment, which  she calls a 
‘cyborg-womb’ (Hannah 2003: 28). She pursues this Posthuman contradiction by 
finding a ‘surplus’ or ‘overwhelming excess of meaning’ (Hannah 2003: 27) in which 
she nonetheless specifies representational constructs: ‘abject interior’, the space of 
‘grief’, ‘night and nightmares’ and the ‘dark continent of femininity’ (Hannah 2003: 
29).  
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The conflicting proposition of a non-representational structure that is articulated 
by thematic metaphor does not seek to expose the depoliticized dimension of the black 
box as such. Instead it seeks to define it as a dangerous and feminine vessel where the 
analogy with the womb enables a liberation of the construction of femininity from its 
politicized subtexts of procreation, maternity, peacefulness, passivity etc… Rather than 
advocating the Posthuman potential to undo gender constructs, Hannah re-constructs 
femininity (and, with it, the black box) in representational terms whereby political 
structures for understanding bodies and subjectivities are not resisted but are 
subversively rewritten by adding to them the very terms from which they were 
traditionally distinguished (namely masculinity).  
But, if the black box provides a formlessness which is a slippery and risky ‘in-
between’ (Hannah 2003: 24), or ‘interval’ (Hannah 2003: 27), between dialectical 
constructions of the human being (between self and other, masculinity and femininity, 
etc...), then all of these should be suspended 
to reach a continuum of intensities where all forms come undone, as do all 
the significations, signifiers, and signifieds, to the benefit of an unformed 
matter of deterritorialized flux, of non-signifying signs (Deleuze and 
Guattari in Nechvatal 1999: 153–4). 
 
Similarly, since the black box locates visual phenomena between form and 
formlessness, light and darkness, then darkness alone can no longer be taken to 
predominate and thereby produce those negative and violent associations of grief, 
nightmares etc… Indeed, the argument that  the black box’s radical darkness is to be 
seen in terms of  a singularly depoliticizing force, as Hannah does, is  predicated on a 
flawed claim that darkness is the key innovation in the mid-twentieth-century 
scenographic developments of the black box. As I explained previously, the expansion 
of darkness and its control were a scenographic strategy in Richard Wagner’s music 
dramas. But the Wagnerian approach to darkness significantly differed from the 
twentieth-century experiments that led to the black box insofar as his use of the dark 
sought to delineate it from light, thereby requiring that the audience attend to light only. 
In inverse contrast, Hannah can be seen to accentuate and privilege darkness, thereby 
pushing light to the background. But both cases are similar in that a dialectically 
hierarchized and politicized ordering of light and dark is maintained, as opposed to an 
assertion of that which is unformed and in flux. 
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To comprehend the depoliticizing dimension of the black box in terms of 
darkness and formlessness, their differentiation from light and form needs to be revised. 
The model instead is that of a dissolve. Correlated with his haptic, quasi-non-visual, 
conception of a phenomenal light, Merleau-Ponty conceived of darkness by way of 
evacuating the conception of night from any theme and symbol. He stated that night is 
depth without foreground or background, without surface and without any 
distance separating it from me. All space for the reflecting mind is 
sustained by thinking which relates its part to each other, but in this case, 
the thinking starts from nowhere (Merleau-Ponty in Gunning 2009: 23). 
 
By associating the darkness of night with the cognitive void of ‘nowhere’, Merleau-
Ponty seeks to undermine the epistemological tradition by which cognition is framed by 
representation and thematization. However, ‘nowhere’ does not stand for an empty 
nothingness. Since ‘there is nothing neutral about blackness’ (Wiles 2003: 254) and  
thus the black box cannot be seen as an ‘inert container’ (Wiles 2003: 258), its darkness 
is rather to be understood, as Merleau-Ponty does, as an emergent mode of re-
conceptualizing the cognitive act of thinking itself:   
a room without either doors or windows [,] a useless room [–] a 
functionless space [that] would serve for nothing, relate to nothing [–] 
language itself, seemingly, proved unsuited to describing this nothing, this 
void, as if we could only speak of what is full, useful and functional [; yet] 
how does one think of nothing? How to think of nothing without 
automatically putting something round that nothing, so turning it into a 
hole, into which one will hasten to put something, an activity, a function, a 
destiny, a gaze, a need, a lack, a surplus …? (Perec 2008: 33–4). 
 
In the specific case of the black box, I have argued by two conjoined methods, 
both theoretically and through laboratory experiment, that it can induce a corporeal 
presence and kinesis which disrupt one’s customary physical habits, their associated 
cognitive subtexts and their individuating or singularizing  effects. And throughout the 
practice the absence of meaning in movements and gestures was constantly filled by 
thoughts about a ‘lack’ (the loss of prior habits) as well as a ‘surplus’ (the sensations of 
moving with another who is much heavier and bigger than me, thereby becoming part 
of me too). 
Thus practice has highlighted an epistemological and ontological domain which 
is highly embodied and relational insofar as it evolves an inter-corporeal and inter-
subjective domain of experience. However, the dialogic quality of co-presence does not 
provide any fixed and autonomous agency. Rather, in the gloom of the black box, the 
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cognitive experience can be re-apprehended as one that does not belong to the thinker, 
that is not singular and individuated, but emerges out of the unsettled overlapping of 
body and space. It ‘sketches a body letting go of proprietary expectation, or habit, in 
order to be questioned by change [and] whatever change is looks something like this – a 
leaning, a consciousness towards, a showing to’ (Robertson 2003: 164–5) the outside. 
This might be described as an ontological and epistemological departure and vertigo 
which, drawn from the effect of the black box, require us to engage with a philosophical 
journey into redefining a human condition where   
to know is to ‘break out’, to escape from moist gastric inwardness and fly 
out beyond oneself, toward what is not oneself, over by the tree and yet 
outside of it – for it eludes and resists me, and I can no more lose myself 
in it that it can be dissolved in me – outside it, and outside myself (Sartre 
1992: 389).  
 
In this epistemological state, an ontological shift occurs whereby  
[t]he reality of another for me [cannot be] a given fact, only a ‘possibility’, 
which I can never mimetically appropriate as my own. That imaginative, 
empathetic imitation which for earlier thinkers was the very foundation of 
human sociality is here abruptly dismissed (Eagleton 1990: 186). 
 
Here human relations and collectivity are not predicated on a reciprocal affirmation of 
singularities or singularity but on an ontological inversion where ‘to-be-in-the-world 
understand[s] this “being-in” as a movement’ – the ‘fleeting and puzzling image of 
breaking apart’ – allowing ‘consciousness to exist as the consciousness of something 
other than itself’ (Sartre 1992: 389):  
no longer a question of attaining a definite status as a thing, a permanent 
fixture, nor of clinging to, having an identity, but of moving, changing, 
being swept beyond one singular position into a multiplicity of flows […] 
to proliferate connections (Grosz 1995: 184). 
 
In this relational mode of being, the human collective may be reenvisioned in terms of a 
disparate multiplicity in which (power) relations can never be settled. Unlike the 
‘rationalisation of social or conceptual space’ (Bois & Krauss 1987: 245–6) that 
organizes a dialectical opposition between inside and outside, self and other, the space 
of the black box offers ‘an experience [that] dislocates us [,] its essence being to put us 
“besides ourselves”’ (Bataille 1987: 260) and suggest, accordingly, human relations and 
interactions thinkable without a relational order based on conceptual divisions between 
self and other. A new human collective or landscape may then be unfolded away from 
any authoritative injunction of individual singularity and reciprocity. 
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 Though less concerned with the political ordering of human relations and more 
interested in its spiritual and religious equivalent, Simone Weil can provide us with a 
theoretical starting point regarding a reenvisioning of the human collective  away from 
the ontological, dialectical and ‘imaginary’ ‘illusion […] that being carries the principle 
of its preservation within itself’ (Weil 2008: 7). Rather subversively, Weil conceives of 
an ontological stance, ‘light’, against the dialectical ordering of self and other she calls 
‘gravity’ (Weil 2008: 1). Gravity stands for the political grounding of an idealized 
‘base’ whereby ‘law generally puts force on the side of baseness’ (Weil 2008: 2). Thus, 
justice is ‘obedience to the force of gravity’ (Weil 2008: 3) inasmuch as it is a ‘search 
for equilibrium’: for the ‘analogous desires’ (Weil 2008: 7) of ‘wish[ing] to see others 
suffer exactly what we are suffering’ (Weil 2008: 6). In this model, human relations are 
based on a ‘desire for vengeance […] a desire for essential equilibrium’ (Weil 2008: 6). 
In contrast, light is a kind of food freed from gravity, like ‘chlorophyll’, wherein ‘to 
feed upon light’ (Weil 2008: 3) constitutes an ontological vertigo of the body-politic’s 
gravitational base: the ‘tearing out’ of a ‘dark night’, of a ‘void’ by means of a ‘grace 
[that is] the law of the descending movement’ (Weil 2008: 4). However, in this descent 
one ‘come[s] down by a movement in which gravity plays no part’: this is a ‘second 
degree of grace’ for one cannot elevate oneself through it but rather ‘lower[s] oneself’ 
(Weil 2008: 4), ‘seek[ing] equilibrium on another plane’ (Weil 2008: 6) to find that ‘I 
also am other than what I imagine myself to be’ (Weil 2008: 9).  
 Implicit in Weil’s elaboration of a being whose relations to others are not based 
on an affirmative and singular selfhood is the recognition of a fragile otherness in 
oneself and its unfolding as an ethical matter of the human collective. While she 
develops her analysis of such otherness with respect to external and desingularized 
forces of a spiritual kind (thereby forming a critical discourse on spiritualism), we may 
equally observe the outside’s ‘majestic potentials of the convulsive seizure’ (Walter in 
Iles 2001: 47) as a contender to ‘radically destabiliz[ing] the ontological foundations of 
what counts as human’ (Hayles 1999: 24). Either way, that which is external to being 
(material objects, technologies, environments, the world, the realm of the divine) must 
be seen as an unstable and vertiginous component of being which new equilibrium 
resides in how this otherness can become the hinge of being’s relations to the outside: 
not to see in the outside, as the others see it, the contours of a body one 
inhabits, but especially to be seen by the outside, to exist within it, to 
emigrate into it, to be seduced, captivated […] so that the seer and the 
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visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and 
which is seen (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 139). 
 
As a mode of reciprocal disorder, this ‘feeding upon light’ is not an easy experience but 
a vulnerable and risky endeavour: ‘whoever endures a moment of the void either 
receives the supernatural bread or falls. It is a terrible risk, but one that must be run’ 
(Weil 2008: 11).  
1. Faint light on stage littered with miscellaneous rubbish. Hold about five 
seconds. 
2. Faint brief cry and immediately inspiration and slow increase of light 
together reaching maximum together in about ten seconds. Silence and 
hold about five seconds. 
3. Expiration and slow decrease of light together reaching minimum 
together (light as in 1) in about ten seconds and immediately cry as before. 
Silence and hold about five seconds (Beckett 1971: 11). 
 
 
 Having experientially reached moments of relations between myself and the 
black box that produced phenomena, sensations and thoughts aligned with the key 
speculations underlying the practice (co-affective interaction, bodily/kinetic innovation, 
haptic perception and cognitive disturbances), the work has also enabled me to 
extrapolate further and broader implications to these speculations. In particular, the 
phase of practical experiments most recently described prompted the consideration of 
an ontological renovation. In this the embodied expansion of subjectivity is cognate 
with a collective domain of intersubjective and intercorporeal experience based on a 
desingularizing otherness. This would suggest that the point of development reached by 
the practice might allow for, and indeed require, the inclusion and confounding of other 
individuals as a mode of developing the work further. Thus, in the final stage of the 
practical research journey, I opened the work to other practitioners, including new 
digital developers, a performer and a sound composer. This stage will be discussed later 
on in the thesis, after having developed a more comprehensive understanding of the 
conceptual and philosophical ramifications of the concept I introduced above, 
ontological vertigo. 
To develop this understanding, the study will pursue the analysis of the gloom in 
architecture, visual arts and theatre from the emergence of the black box (mid-twentieth 
century). Having already described how all these fields have undertaken various aspects 
and qualities of the gloom from the early twentieth century, the tracing of their further 
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development will demonstrate a lineage that has relevance to understanding the 
contemporary state of the gloom. 
In particular, the following sections will analyze the historical precedents by 
which ‘kinetic and responsive structure, temporal event, and flickering screen’ attracted 
‘architecture’s return to the stage at the end of the twentieth century’ (Salter 2010: 80). 
The elaboration of what may be referred to as ‘soft architecture’ will provide more 
evidence regarding the ontological ‘drift’ of a ‘speculative cognition’ (Robertson 2003: 
77–9). Indeed, ‘the transitory performances of and within architecture [will, again,] 
help us pose complex questions straddling the territories of stillness and movement, 
façade and depth, stasis and morphogenesis, and permanence and evanescence’ (Salter 
2010: 85). These will provide an understanding of the relational changes and challenges 
at play between being and world, which will then be observed in performance arts and 
theatre where, again, the radicalism of the gloom has found even more potent 
conceptions and instantiations. 
 
 
2.4 Soft architectures  
In this section, I shall present summarily the practices and speculations that have 
progressively developed architecture’s own resistance to and departure from the 
politicization of spatial subtexts and orders which commonly participate in the 
autonomization and classification of subjects. The large scale on which architecture 
operates makes it a highly politicized domain: the size of its visual phenomena has 
traditionally been used for the purpose of reinforcing national and ideological identities. 
However, in the twentieth century architecture can be seen to shift away from such 
political subtexts. A return to experiments found at the Black Mountain College 
provides, through the work of Richard Buckminster Fuller, an initiation into such an 
architectural venture. Here again the model of Posthuman autopoiesis can make sense of 
the positioning of a space where inside is established as dependent upon and through the 
outside: architecture is thus conceived as an organism which interiority (including its 
inhabitants) is in constant (ex)change with respect to its exterior surroundings.  
 Already perceivable in his Dymaxion House (1929), Buckminster Fuller’s 
interest in spatial mobility and ‘ephemeralization’ (Fuller in Gorman 2005: 20) drew, as 
Antonio Gaudí did, from ‘nature’s own co-ordinate system’ (Fuller in Gorman 2005: 
115) – which he explored in Ernst Haeckel’s drawn observations of microscopic 
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organisms – to find ‘independence from “grids” – sewage, electricity, schools and 
water’ (Gorman 2005: 194). The same year that he participated in the Black Mountain 
College performance of the Ruse of Medusa, 1948, a student of his, Kenneth Snelson, 
produced the X-Piece: a simple structure based on an innovative structural principle, 
derived from the scaffold, that Buckminster Fuller took up, to expand it the following 
year by constructing his first geodesic dome, and to patent this in 1962 under the term 
Tensegrity (tension-integrity).  
 
 
76 Richard Buckminster Fuller, Geodesic Dome and tensegrity mast, 1959 
 
Tensegrity can be roughly summarized as ‘the use of isolated components in 
compression inside a net of continuous tension, in such a way that the compressed 
members (usually bars or struts) do not touch each other and the prestressed tensioned 
members (usually cables or tendons) delineate the system spatially’ (D’Estrée Sterk 
2003). In a tensegrity structure, weight is not conducted to the ground but distributed 
across all the nodal points and thus suspended. This allows structures to defy gravity 
and thus sometimes produce drastic antigravitational effects, as in Snelson’s Needle 
Tower (1968). Resulting in ‘lightweight architecture’ (Gorman 2005: 177), tensegrity is 
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particularly suitable for constructing ‘superstructures for embedded substructures’ 
(D’Estrée Sterk 2003) as well as architectural environments ‘extend[ing] in a modular 
way in all directions’ (Gorman 2005: 115): ‘portable and foldable […] low-
environmental-impact shells, temporary shelters, earthquake-resistant water sheds and 
sunscreens’ (Gómez Jáuregui 2004). There is therefore an adaptative, and bodied, 
quality to tensegrity structures exemplified in the way they ‘hous[e] a “central nervous 
system”’ and, like a body, have an ‘exoskeleton’ (Gorman 2005: 115). And indeed, 
since then, tensegrity has also been shown to be a principle of internal bodily structures, 
or bio-tensegrity: ‘the skeleton and the central nervous systems are not just framing 
supports for bones, tendons, muscles and neurons, but a set of compression components 
suspended within a continuous tension network’ (Gómez Jáuregui 2004). 
 
 
77 Richard Buckminster Fuller, Cloud Nine Cities, c1960 
 
Tensegrity can be seen as a development from the scaffold in terms of 
augmenting its responsive and adaptative intelligence (D’Estrée Sterk 2003). As a result 
of its extended lability, tensegrity creates a speculative threshold at the core of the 
architectural practice. It enables speculations as to impossible built structures evolved 
through a ‘radial view’ and ‘def[ying] the vertical axis’, the dominant ‘linear view’ 
(Gorman 2005: 115): see Buckminster Fuller’s Cloud Nine Cities (1960) shortly 
followed by the moving cities of Archigram (Walking City, 1965; Plug-In City, 1965; 
Instant City, 1968–9). Thus not only does tensegrity formulate the possibility of a 
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kinetic architecture responsive to its environmental surrounding and the human body 
but it also animates, in return, new potentials for dwelling, and therefore new modes of 
bodily behaviour and movement:   
The Gestalt psychologism that impregnates all conceptions of form at the 
origins of the architecture of the modern movement undertakes its 
displacement from the simply visual to the synesthetically complex 
precisely in the culture of the postwar period (De Solà-Morales 1999: 22). 
 
 
 
78 Archigram, Instant City, 1968-9 
 
 
79 Archigram, City of Towers, 1981 
157
 
 
 
Alongside the development of tensegrity, other architectural experiments can 
also be found to echo some of tensegrity’s key phenomenal impact. These include 
resistance to partitioning space, its allowance of inside/outside interpenetration, its 
ambiguous emphasis on volume rather than surfaces and its scaffolded tactility and 
interactivity: see experiments in inflatable architecture by architects such as Graham 
Stevens (an assistant of Buckminster Fuller), Ant Farm (50 X 50' Pillow, 1969), 
Archigram (Inflatable Suit Home, 1968) and Coop Himmelb(l)au (Restless Sphere, 
1971): ‘walls no longer exist. Our spaces are pulsating balloons. Our heartbeats become 
space’ (Coop Himmelb(l)au in Salter 2010: 81). 
 
       
      80 Archigram, Inflatable Suit Home, 1968                  81 Ant Farm, 50 X 50' Pillow, 1969 
 
Convoluted spatial phenomena occurring indoors were seen in events such as 
Dylaby – A Dynamic Labyrinth (1962) at Amsterdam’s Stedelijk Museum, where 
multiple rooms of the museum were turned into a labyrinth, part of which was plunged, 
by Daniel Spoerri, into complete darkness to guide viewers through the touch of walls 
and floors covered with textured, hot and cold, dry and wet materials. In parallel with 
this groups such as the Situationist International and GRAV disrupted architectural 
orders on an urban scale, to produce ‘the experience of urban space not as the result of a 
compositional order but as a dérive, an erratic accumulation of synesthetic experiences’ 
(De Solà-Morales 1999: 80). Importantly, these various experiments and speculations 
do not merely seek to empty the architectural container of any discursive reference but 
rather to produce a ‘condition of infinite interpretation and misinterpretation [because] 
vistas are endless, detail is endless’ (Cook 2003: 143). They propose a soft ‘topography’ 
– an architectural ‘form of representation that articulates rather than depicts’ (De Solà-
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Morales 1999: 6) –  as they are ‘particular, singular, and their description should not 
eradicate their individuality [but should] reject a topology [:] not a question of logos, of 
universal ideas, but of graphe, of writings [,] taking plurality not only as a starting point 
but as multiplicity within which to situate any segment of […] contemporary reality’ 
(De Solà-Morales 1999: 7). 
 
   
      82 Coop Himmelb(l)au, SoftSpace, 1970         83 Coop Himmelb(l)au, Restless Sphere, 1971 
 
Architecture can only shift from representing a singular ideology to articulating 
multiple ways of being and living by allowing and mobilizing the imbrication of facets 
and fragments of this multiplicity. For example, we can turn to the urban landscape of 
Copenhagen which, since 1947, adopted a new approach to urban planning, the ‘finger 
plan’, for the city’s future developments. Based on the shape of a hand, the plan shapes 
the city to grow outwardly into its natural surroundings through its five fingers and thus, 
simultaneously, retains ‘fingers’ of countryside reaching towards the city’s centre. 
Through the frictions between these two sets of natural and built fingers, ‘the 
architectural object no longer establishes a stable and hierarchical relationship between 
itself and its surrounding’ (De Solà-Morales 1999: 21). Rejecting any ‘rational totality’ 
(Juel-Christiansen 2002: 7) – the ‘kingdom of sameness; the region where the landscape 
is similar; the site where differences are put aside and expansive unities are established’ 
(Porphyrios in Velibeyoglu 1999) – the finger plan further enables the ‘city [to] 
delineate […] itself as a manifestation of a spatial community situated amidst a number 
159
 
 
 
of widely divergent social praxes [: an] interpositioning into a larger non-transparent 
space’ (Juel-Christiansen 2002: 19).  
 
 
84 Copenhagen, Finger Plan, 1947 
 
Traditionally, urban architecture had been framed by two conceptual models: 
‘Urban Identity’ and ‘Generic City’ (Juel-Christiansen 2002: 5) which are ‘causal [and] 
representational’ models (Grosz 1995: 107). In the urban identity model the ‘body or 
subjectivity’ is seen as the cause ‘and the city, the effect’ (Grosz 1995: 105). The 
Generic City, on the other hand, conceives of a representational ‘isomorphism between 
the body and the city’ which become ‘congruent counterparts’ (Grosz 1995: 105). In 
both models, the city forms a unified architectural domain as a ‘statist representation’ 
(Grosz 1995: 107) of the ‘averageness’ (Juel-Christiansen 2002: 14) of the ‘body-politic 
[,] an organized, cohesive, integrated body’ (Grosz 1995: 107):  
against any attempt to conceptualize the city-as-a-whole […] macro-
viewing the city […] with a modernist and masculinist hegemony of the 
visual, an authoritarian viewpoint that allegedly eradicates difference and 
heterogeneity, silences subaltern voices, obscures the immediacy and 
sensuality of urban life, and works only to reproduce its own academic 
and intellectual hegemony’ (Soja 1996: 313). 
 
By contrast, Copenhagen’s finger plan offers another conception, a ‘thirdspace’ 
or ‘thirding-as-othering’: an ‘intimate ethnography-geography’ (Soja 1996: 313) that is 
a ‘two-way linkage’ of ‘interrelations’, in which the body and the built space are 
‘mutually defining’ within a ‘fundamentally disunified series of systems, a series of 
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disparate flows, energies, events, or entities, bringing together or drawing apart their 
more or less temporary alignments’ (Grosz 1995: 108). Reflecting and accommodating 
the ‘flux and flex’ of a ‘transitoriness [that] effectively dissolves any other insistent 
perspective from the city’s space’ (Juel-Christiansen 2002: 14), urban architecture 
conceived around specifically bodily premises of ‘transit’ (Grosz 1995: 107) – 
‘allowing human beings to migrate like birds’ (Gorman 2005: 184) – articulates a 
‘deterritorializing energy’ (De Solà-Morales 1999: 11): ‘a form of itinerancy, a cruising 
that is not a territorializing or partitioning of space, but a folding of partitions’ (Ricco 
2003: 55). 
 
 
85 Friedensreich Hundertwasser, Waldspiral, 1998-2000 
 
Echoing scenography’s bodied spatiality, such a conception of urban 
architecture as a multiplicity of shifting layers that never form a whole has most often 
only found practical outputs in the form of speculative projects. Nonetheless, it informs 
various architectural practices concerned with buildings, smaller architectural units and 
the body in the second half of the twentieth century. One of the rare architects to have 
pursued many aspects of Gaudí’s work (Wade 2009), Friedensreich Hundertwasser, 
created the manifesto Speech in Nude for the Right to a Third Skin (1967) in which he 
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presented architecture as an interface between a network of five types of layers or skins 
extended from the body: the first three skins are the ‘natural epidermis […] clothes [and 
the] house’, the last two skins were the ‘social environment’ and the ‘planetary skin […] 
the air we breathe and the state of the earth’s crust (Restany 2001: 10–11). 
Hundertwasser favoured focusing on the friction of the first and the last skins, epidermis 
and planetary skins, as his Mould Manifesto against Rationalism in Architecture (1958), 
later renamed Sacred Shit Manifesto (1979), envisioned the birth of a ‘wildly 
proliferating architecture’ and ‘the material uninhabitability of the slums’ 
(Hundertwasser in Harries 1997: 240): ‘when mould forms on a wall, when moss grows 
in the corner of the room and rounds off the geometric angle […] we become witnesses 
of architectonic changes’ (Hundertwasser in Harries 1997: 241). 
Although Hundertwasser’s focus on mould, as ‘matter out of place’, could 
remain a mere ‘contravention’ of the ‘systematic ordering and classification of matter 
[– which always] involves rejecting inappropriate elements’, or ‘dirt’ (Douglas 2002: 
44) – his interest lies in the relation between the mould and the architectural surface, 
and specifically how the mould erases it, making it incomplete as part of architecture’s 
‘mediated […] condition [– a] relationship with its surrounding […] that is always 
adventitious, improper and extrinsic’ (De Solà-Morales 21). Thus he sought ways to 
erode surfaces through a painterly and mosaic-like approach that expels the 
rectangularity of borders and produces new layers and porosity. Importantly, the visual 
complexity and irregularity of his work are also an invitation to the inhabiting bodies to 
participate. Hundertwasser would leave certain surfaces blank for inhabitants to fill: 
such as the areas of the facades surrounding windows where each inhabitant could paint 
and repaint over to the extent of their arms’ lengths. 
If the space presented is complete, what’s left for the viewer is to relive 
the space – this is the domain of fiction, the impulse is preservation 
(conservative); if the space presented is not yet complete, what’s left for 
the viewer is to try out the space, attempt the space – this is the domain of 
essay, the impulse is change (radical) (Acconci 2001: 18). 
 
 To conceive of architecture as a structure of incompletion which then hosts 
participation from its inhabitants is to constitute a type of resistance to controlling the 
movement of dwellers and, in turn, to authorship on the part of the architect. When 
body and building enter into a ‘partner[ed]’ relation wherein ‘the manipulators and the 
manipulated become exchangeable’ (Howell in Giesekam 2007: 202) the body is 
impelled to interact and ‘maintain some equilibrium [sensory and cognitive] amidst the 
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disorder’ (Giesekam 2007: 202). A collaboration between architect Cedric Price, 
theatre director Joan Littlewood and cybernetician Gordon Pask on the Fun Palace 
(1963–74) specifically proposed an architectural environment ‘seeking [the] maximum 
flexibility’ and incompletion of the scaffold by means of a ‘skeletal frame in which 
multiple interchangeable module-like environments could be constructed, rearranged 
by a mass-scale moving gantry crane that ran the length of the structure’ (Salter 2010: 
310). Fun Palace would have been made of ‘inflatable structures and volumes, variable 
screens, pneumatically controlled floors [and other] moving structures’, ‘without 
divisions between spectator and performer’ since only ‘warm air currents, vapour and 
light curtains [would] serv[e] as walls’ to encourage an ‘ever-shifting […] social 
behavior [in] the participants’ (Salter 2010: 310). It would be a ‘university of the streets 
[and] laboratory of pleasure, providing room for many kinds of action’ (Price and 
Littlewood in Salter 2010: 310). 
 
 
86 Cedric Price, Fun Palace, c1964 
 
This building was unrealized, as with most of the aforementioned architectural 
examples. But the actual realization of performative and mobile scaffolded 
constructions in the street and indoor performances of the Living Theatre, 
contemporaneous with the Fun Palace, suggests that it was performance and its 
scenography that continued the work of producing more tangible architectural and 
bodily suggestions, where indeed ‘topography cathects with the desire to release 
identity and dissolve into material [to] wander […] among solidities’ (Robertson 2003: 
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165). Thus, if ‘the liberation of architecture in the twentieth century paralleled a similar 
trajectory to the liberation of stage scenography, not only in the transformation of static 
materials into things kinetic but also the dynamization of the perception of space itself’ 
(Salter 2010: 82), this has occurred by way of scenographic anticipations and 
propositions of an architectural ‘form in which space, technologized through materials 
and media could become expressive – almost performative’ (Salter 2010: 82).  
 Indeed, ‘captivated by the potential of the stage as a proving ground to research 
architectural issues [, to] open up and challenge common precepts of architectural 
discourse’ (Salter 2010: 79), some architects relocated their ‘architectural research 
laboratories [...] in the controlled safety of the theatre space’ (Salter 2010: 80). They 
sought to create a ‘dancing architecture’ (Goldberg in Salter 2010: 80), an ‘architecture 
in a state of becoming, revolving, pulsing’ (Salter 2010: 82) according to ‘the richness 
of erratic drifting, of mobility with no predefined goal’ (De Solà-Morales 1999: 127). 
This would be a ‘fragmentation [that] fractures projects into particles difficult to 
recompose [as] the unfinished, the partial, and the cumulative have become 
predominant’ (De Solà-Morales 1999: 23).  
 
 
87 Diller + Scofidio, The Rotary Notary, 1987 
 
Derived from scenographic innovation, architectural incompletion in the works 
of Elizabeth Diller and Ricardo Scofidio (Diller + Scofidio) is explored through 
collapsing visual clarity and creating in-between spaces or what they called an 
‘interscenium’ (Diller + Scofidio in Salter 2010: 80). This was the ‘updating of the 
proscenium [by ways of an] ocular-saturated stage’ (Salter 2010: 80) using rotating and 
foldable walls and mirrors, and inspired by Duchamp (American Mysteries, 1983; The 
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Rotary Notary, 1987). We see here that scenography’s own resistance to, disturbance 
and rejection of the framing device that is the proscenium arch (which led to the black 
box) were now becoming of interest to architects who sought to relinquish any 
architectural framing of the body. As a result, the ordering agency of such frames was 
critiqued and abandoned and the ‘terms “figure/object” and “ground” [which were] both 
determinant and all encompassing […] totalities [,] have come into question [and] are 
no longer thought to explain the true complexity of phenomena’ (Eisenman 1992: 424). 
The search to ‘animate form’ (Lynn in Salter 2010: 85) led architecture to being 
rethought as a ‘stage set’ (Tschumi in Salter 2010: 85), breaking through the organizing 
frontal interface, or fourth wall, of the proscenium arch. In doing this architects released 
much of the control their constructions had upon bodies’ behaviour and mobility. So 
too, in reconceiving architecture as ‘porous, projective, polymorphous’ (Kwinter in 
Acconci 2001: 53), architects posed important questions regarding their authorship of 
the architectural phenomena inasmuch as their inhabitants were also now questioned by 
the built in terms of finding ways to inhabit it. These problems of autonomy and 
dependency are well summarized by  
Eisenman’s conception of spacing [which] transforms the problematic of 
motivatedness from a restrictive into an enabling constraint […] as the 
means of liberating architecture from the task of discovering a figure in 
the ground (Hansen 2002: 13–14).  
 
 
88 Diller + Scofidio, Blur Building, 2001 
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Spacing as a confounding rather than a defining mode of dwelling may be best 
illustrated by Diller + Scofidio’s Blur Building (2002) where tensegrity and responsive 
intelligence coalesced most conspicuously to create an architectural haze-machine 
aimed at confounding the body’s perception of its presence in the environment. By 
these means it pushed bodies into intensely improvisational interactions with their 
surrounding. The architects initiated the conception of Blur with a script or what they 
call a  
Dramaturgy Of Seduction: seduction and tension to accentuate the power 
of the sense: being in close proximity; foreplay; having a loss of 
orientation; succumbing to desire; acting out passions to the point of 
exhaustion and seeking the next adventure (Diller + Scofidio 2002: 41). 
 
 
89 Diller + Scofidio, Sketch for Blur Building, 2001 
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The sensuality of seduction informs two main aspects of Blur. Firstly, the 
building’s relation to its environment is based on a constant friction: it is located above 
a lake from which it drains water and turns it into a cloud of fog wrapping around the 
building. This interaction is engineered by means of an intelligent system embedded 
into Blur which allows it to detect wind power above the lake in order to drain 
calculated amounts of water that forms a cloud that is neither smaller nor bigger than 
the building. In return, the building’s skeletal tensegrity enables the fog to become its 
semi-transparent walls through which the landscape is always partially visible (and 
certainly always felt due to the wind). Secondly, people’s relation to the building (and 
thus to its surrounding) is also relatable to a sensual and seductive domain of 
experience. Having to wear a particular parka (with embedded LED lights), their 
entrance into this hazy metallic labyrinth requires progressive adaptation to the 
reduction of visual information and the correlated need to engage in tactile perception.  
Bodies slow down and find, increasingly, the correct grasps and grips to ensure their 
mobility. We may thus talk of a vertiginous sensuality since it requires ‘rebalancing the 
senses’ (Diller + Scofidio 2002: 195). ‘The fog mass is primarily an experience of 
visual interference, thus the reliance on vision competes with Blur’s most notable 
characteristic, obscurity’ (Diller + Scofidio 2002: 195). It thereby creates an ‘immersive 
environment in which the world is put out of focus so that our visual dependency can be 
put into focus’ (Diller + Scofidio 2002: 195). 
 
 
90 Diller + Scofidio, Blur Building, 2001 
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Whereas architecture had traditionally provided static containers to protect its 
inhabitants from the shifting vicissitudes of the outside world, here in Blur such a 
tradition is turned on its head as the building enhances the problems posed by the 
natural world to human beings. To do so, Blur requires a static structure and so it may 
be said to intersect the static and the kinetic, the inside and the outside. Such an 
architectural paradox has found various conceptual discourses to support it. Among 
these, like many other architects (De Solà-Morales 1999: 9), Peter Eisenman’s theories 
draw from the conceptual terms of Gilles Deleuze, whose philosophy is not only much 
concerned with architecture but also contains ideas which are presented as images of a 
spatial kind. Eisenman’s conception of spacing as dis-positioning comes from his 
interest in Deleuze’s notions of the ‘fold/unfold […] of an object-event’ (Eisenman 
1992: 425) where the ‘object-event’ or ‘objectile [is an] other kind of event, one in 
which a displacement of the static environment is […] an interpretation in which the 
environment is problematized’ (Eisenman 1992: 424–5). It is a ‘disjunctive synthesis 
between a fluctuating field and a form that erupts in its midst’ (Frichot 2005: 72). 
This apparent conflict was integral to Deleuze’s ‘Baroque House’, in which 
space is two-fold:  
upstairs the voluminous space of the house is entirely dark, it has no 
windows to the outside, in fact, it is quite difficult to tell exactly how 
expansive it might be [because it is made of] drapery diversified by folds 
[while] downstairs there are windows, a door, and a rather formal set of 
steps that allows us to enter or exit (Frichot 2005: 65).  
 
In Deleuzean terms, half of the house is a striated space with walls, doors, windows: 
‘the plane of consistency (grid) […] the outside of all multiplicities’ (Deleuze in 
Lorraine 2005: 166). The other half of the house is a ‘smooth space’ (Colebrook 2005: 
198): ‘uncemented stones, where every element has a value in itself but also in relation 
to others: isolated and floating relations, islands and straits, immobile points and 
sinuous lines’ (Deleuze in Buchanan and Lambert 2005: 11). Not ‘concerned with 
framing space but, rather, with a temporal modulation that implies a continual variation 
of matter’ (Eisenman 1992: 425), this ‘formless field of attraction’ (Crary 2001: 366) 
‘articulates possible new relationships between vertical and horizontal, figure and 
ground’ (Eisenman 1992: 425). These are ‘multiplicities [...] defined by the outside […] 
by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they 
change in nature and connect with other multiplicities’ (Deleuze in Lorraine 2005: 166). 
Overall, then, the Baroque House is a construct that stands for the Deleuzean ‘event [:] 
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precisely what punctures (or is subtracted from the axioms governing) a situation: it has 
a “site” in a situation but this does not belong to the latter, it is supplementary to it’ 
(Burchill in Badiou 2000: viii). 
The smooth space is a ‘liquid groundless space’ (Crary 2001: 359) that is ‘a 
grounding without ground […] the need to build on air, to build in the void’ (De Solà-
Morales 1999: 59). As such, it is a space of conflictual sensory experiences: surfaces 
become depths, borders become membranes, vision is disorienting, etc. ... While the 
smooth space hints at ‘the realm of the five senses’ (Frichot 2005: 65–6), it only does so 
by means of creating sensory disturbances – a ‘seeing that can no longer interpret [, a] 
‘shortcircuiting of the role of vision’ (Hansen 2002: 369) – by ‘inventing laws of liquids 
and gases (Deleuze in Crary & Kwinter 1992: 293) that produce an ‘understanding of 
vision best conceptualised as a fluid or gas in motion’ (Haralambidou 2006: 6). Here 
images are ‘after-images, or effects of light that appear and disappear’ (Frichot 2005: 
71). Consequently, vision can no longer support either physical or cognitive certainty 
and the smooth space thus provides an ‘escape from figuration, illustration and 
representation’ (Frichot 2005: 71–3).   
In the case of Diller + Scofidio’s Blur, then, the dramaturgy of seduction is not 
represented visually but embodied in the people and the building. There is no static 
depiction of sensuality but a changing experience of it. Now, as I have previously 
argued, such sensuality is unsettling and vertiginous. Therefore Blur can be said to 
impel its inhabitants to consider new understandings of seduction and sensuality. In its 
project of confounding bodies, it simultaneously (and autopoietically) enables them to 
change their ways of interacting with others. The building makes it impossible for 
bodies to move as they normally would and they must now elaborate new ways of 
moving. By unsettling their physical and cognitive understanding of their surrounding, 
Blur requires its inhabitants to produce new physical and cognitive modes of 
experiencing without any settled understanding.  
In this sense, Blur may be said to fulfil a specific aspect of the Deleuzean 
smooth space, namely its virtuality where the ‘virtual [is] that which resists 
representation’ (Frichot 2005: 71). To take the argument about spatial effects a step 
further we need now to consider this virtuality.  It can be thought of in relation to the 
real ‘as a kind of presence not as a kind of non-presence’ (Noë 2004: 216):  
concepts of the virtual in itself are important only to the extent to which 
they contribute to a pragmatic understanding of emergence, to the extent 
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to which they enable triggerings of change (induce the new). It is the edge 
of virtual, where it leaks into actual, that counts (Massumi 1995).  
 
From here we can, in general terms, suggest that by ‘folding back to a function 
that projects beyond the hypothetical ground of things’ (De Solà-Morales 1999: 70), 
architecture undertakes a speculative and ‘dynamic threshold between the virtual and 
the actual’, between ‘flexibility’ and ‘inertia’, between ‘locality as the space in the real 
[and] disclosing the invisible [….] the virtual as that which might be’ (Juel-Christiansen 
2002: 11). Or, as Grosz says:  
The capacity of walls, boxes, windows, and corners to function in more 
than one way, to serve not only present functions but others as well, is 
already part of the ingenuity and innovation of the virtual in the real 
(Grosz 2001: 90).  
 
In this way, architecture can not only morph in ‘respon[se] to changing social, 
cultural and technological conditions’ (Kolarevic and Malkawi in Salter 2010: 88) but 
also provoke social, cultural and technological changes by enabling bodies and spaces 
to be ‘disjointedly connected to random others and objects through the spatio-temporal 
layout’ (Grosz 1995: 110). Virtuality as the ‘excess of that which has been actualised 
[…] effectively allow[s] an opening for future actualisations, or future built  forms’ 
(Frichot 2005: 67). And, as it critically also involves bodies, it thus allows an opening 
for future bodily and subjective forms too.  
 The virtuality of the body may be understood as what Deleuze called, drawing 
on Antonin Artaud, the ‘Body-without-Organs [or] BwO [which] is in constant 
metamorphosis’. This is ‘an intensive and unshaped matter’ (Colombat in Bensmaïa 
2005: 145) which follows the spatial exploration of ‘all the ways in which matter 
manners or articulates itself’ (Colebrook 2005: 200). The constant metamorphosis may 
be conceived as ‘the indeterminacy of the fold [: that] is neither figure nor ground but 
contains aspects of both’, ‘an in-between or third figure’ (Eisenman 1992: 426) that 
‘occup[ies] the in between space that allows intensities and desiring flows to circulate 
before actualizing themselves in different shapes of thought and in living organisms’ 
(Colombat in Bensmaïa 2005: 145). 
Cognitively unstable, the BwO is predicated on an ‘excess of meaning’ 
(Bensmaïa 2005: 145) ‘where concept continually moves in all directions and reinvents 
itself’ (Conley 2005: 217) thereby making ‘perceptible the process of [its] deformation’ 
(Frichot 2005: 70). Thus ‘the event should not be treated as something whose sense is 
170
 
 
 
to be sought and disentangled’ (Deleuze in Frichot 2005: 66). Rather it is to be 
observed in terms of the forces and matters it puts into friction, and in this way ‘spacing 
begins to suggest a possible figure/figure relationship’ (Deleuze in Hansen 2002: 13). 
To return from here to Blur ’it can be noted that its concern with a discrepant sensuality 
can be associated with the proposition of new human relations where it seeks to 
confound and renovate the most personal, relational and possessive confines of being. 
Before examining how such an interior dimension of being becomes precisely the 
ground upon which being can be radically reconfigured, we shall need first to describe 
the intercorporeal and intersubjective relations at play in the architectural gloom. For 
these are the catalysts of another form of being. 
To get there we can examine other architects like Diller + Scofidio who show a 
particular interest in proposing new types of human relations through their buildings. 
For instance, Vito Acconci’s architecture is similarly predicated upon encouraging 
‘bodies’ transit from here to there, like the rolling heat of sex itself seeking the 
exquisite maximal state between frenzy and control’ (Kwinter 2001: 48). Once again 
here the relation between the body and the architectural object is coterminous with the 
relations between bodies in that object. Acconci’s structures are thus often interactive 
and inclusive of multiple bodies. With Adjustable Wall Bra (1990) Acconci created an 
open and modulable container which somehow functions as two seats.  
 
 
91 Vito Acconci, Adjustable Wall Bra, 1990 
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Using a basic flying system, Bra evidently refers to specific body parts as well as to the 
membrane or skin that normally covers them. However, here nothing is covered, 
concealed or contained. The object rather ‘proposes a performance and practice of the 
hinge […] between inside and outside […] a total modulation of openness and 
closedness [...] activated, completed, turned on, only with human energy and effort [: a] 
promiscuous and articulated fold, a magically flexible erotic device that grows and 
contracts and slips and slides, assembling and disassembling in a perpetual act of play 
and tumescence, involution, connection, and humor’ (Kwinter 2001: 48).  
 
 
92 Vito Acconci, Island on the Mur, 2002 
 
Completed one year after Blur was dismantled, Acconci’s Island On the Mur 
(2002) is a permanent theatre-house, using tensegrity in order to be positioned on the 
water of the river Mur in Austria. Island comprises two imbricated large transparent 
domes that create two spaces (a theatre and a café) that are both indoor and outdoor.  
Acconci’s interest lies in the intersection of these two domes whereby each space 
always comes into being with the other, as they also do with respect to their natural 
environment: a ‘playground is formed by the collision and by the melting’ (Acconci 
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2001: 78). Multiple ways of inhabiting the building are offered just as multiple ways of 
seeing and seeing through the building are encouraged. All bodies present in the 
building can see and be seen by all other bodies. Just as Island On the Mur is made of a 
two-fold structure that is in constant dialogue perceptually, bodies are forced to 
undergo a highly intercorporeal and intersubjective domain of experience. It must be 
noted, furthermore, that the presence here of a theatre stage as part of the building is 
evidently no coincidence. As the cafe is located behind and partially overlapping with 
the stage, it can be seen as an extension of the stage that augments the way the stage 
always looks back at its audience (the cafe users become audiences who can observe 
both the stage and the auditorium of the theatre). The reciprocity of presences and 
gazes is thus intensified as part of the intercorporeal/intersubjective domain provided 
by the building. 
This then becomes key to understanding the gloom’s sensual critique of the fact 
that ‘in contemporary social space, if you’re not actually fucking, you’re probably 
getting fucked’ (Kwinter 2001: 53). By contrast the gloom suggests an ‘uninhibited 
polyphenomenality of display’ (Rabinow 1992: 249) as a way ‘to become part of the 
environment’ (Eisenman 1992: 423). Here the ‘body is deprived of its substance and 
appears to be on the verge of disappearing’ (Taylor in Manning 2007: 112) in an ‘orgy’ 
where all sensory and cognitive shackles have been released, for, indeed, ‘who brings a 
Walkman to an orgy?’ (Kwinter 2001: 53–4). 
Where ‘we have neither a determinate space to inhabit nor determinate 
principles of space to inhabit us’ (Flaxman 2005: 177), the reciprocal uncertainty of this 
relationship is exported onto and between bodies. Like many of his predecessors, 
Acconci has speculated on such an architectural and relational condition projected onto 
the scale of urbanism. In A City that Rides the Garbage Dump (1999), Acconci 
conceived of a mobile city based on the transit of its waste products. Following 
Hundertwasser’s obsession with the volatility and formlesness of dirt, A City that Rides 
the Garbage is made of floating balloons, architectural fragments that are constantly 
mobilized and travelling in order to manage a more exposed sewage system. This 
makes it an urban ‘garden [where] everything is interstitial: the bug, the worm, and 
certainly the mole have their role and there is interference at every turn’ (Cook 2003: 
143).  
Conceived thus, Acconci’s city is radically disenfranchised from any existing 
urban model in that the entirety of the urban landscape is made to modulate 
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unpredictably. In doing so, it refers to a type of human condition best described by the 
term ‘nomadism’, one that Deleuze associated with the smooth space and to which I 
shall return. For now we can note that to become nomadic in the way required by 
Acconci’s sort of architecture would first require a period of adaptation where being 
undergoes radical transformation. This flows from the fact that 
[t]he Incorporation of Random Play and a Margin of Underdetermined, 
Uncontrolled Investment are now seen to be necessary ingredients of any 
strategy aimed at Innovation [,] offer[ing] itself to inhabitation as an 
Aleatoric field, anticipating and actively prefacing its own detournement 
(Hadid and Schumacher 2002: 8). 
 
 
 
93 Vito Acconci, A City that Rides the Garbage Dump, 1999 
 
Given such a creative approach, unpredictability in the built must bestow a 
similar underdetermination and detournement upon the author who creates and the 
being who inhabits it. This in its turn gives rise to a new series of questions: what is the 
extent of this sort of dissolving subjective makeup and ‘impersonal ontology’ (Deleuze 
in Buchanan and Lambert 2005: 13)? What remains of subjectivities that ‘space the 
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void’ (Eisenman in Hansen 2002: 369), ‘giv[ing] to [their] being [the] inconsistency 
[of] the “void” [or] position[ing themselves] on “the edge of the void”’ (Burchill in 
Badiou 2000: viii)? How does the radical sensuousness, or ‘erotic hope’ (Slade in 
Robertson 2003 79), of such beings promote an understanding their new 
(inter)subjective conditions?  
 
 
2.5 Scenographic bodies 
The analysis of architecture’s particular investment in the gloom has highlighted its 
potential for forging new models of human relations and interactions. Rather than 
conceiving of the societal domain on the basis of a singular understanding of its agents, 
the gloom inaugurates a reversed conception, in which the human collective is 
understood in a particularly divergent and disparate way. This in turn informs a 
multiplicity of understanding of its agents. 
 This section will therefore inquire into this multiplicity of being as part of the 
gloom’s ontological innovation, with the aim of consolidating our understanding of its 
philosophical discourse. To this end, the narrative will return to visual and performance 
arts practices, where the term ‘performance arts’ is used to refer to performative 
practices that have emerged from within the development of installations in the visual 
arts of the second half of the twentieth century. From the mid-twentieth century, 
galleries increasingly hosted performances by visual artists who have frequently used 
their own body temporarily to occupy the white cubes. Like black boxes, white cubes 
have provided more flexible and intimate environments for exploring performative 
modes concerned with immersing and interacting with their audience. In making work 
in these spaces, performance artists have challenged both architectural and corporeal 
agencies in and out of galleries.  As a consequence their works and processes shed light 
on an issue with which we have already been principally concerned, namely subjective 
mutations. This chapter thus develops an ontological argument which starts from the 
study of such performance artists and thereafter moves on further before pursuing it 
further through theatre practices. 
 Offering ‘doubts […] about the ideological reality of the moment [and] about 
the relationship between individuals in the silence of their separate lives’ (Tronche 
1998: 41), Gina Pane’s performances have been seen to focus on a disturbing kind of 
intimacy which Anne Tronche attributes to what she calls the ‘scenographic body’: the 
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‘intimate recognition of the body and its urges [constitutes an] initiatory sensuality [that 
goes] beyond the limitations of the retina’ by organizing a ‘relationship between body, 
space and light [in terms of] how can one give voice to that which has no voice?’ 
(Tronche 1998: 41, 49). Working in galleries and outdoor environments, Pane 
presented performative events based on embodying the suffering of others 
contemporary with the artist. Yet these others were not presented or represented as 
singular identities. Rather, Pane aimed at undoing distinctions between self and other 
and found a shared otherness by ‘becoming conscious of the ghosts which are merely 
the reflection of myths created by Society [to unfold] the body (its expressiveness) 
[and] translate the indefinite search for the Other’ (Pane in Vescovo 1998: 73). The 
work may thus be said to reject the ‘tattoos that culture has incised for millennia’ (Dehò 
1998: 13) by searching and ‘mak[ing] us search our minds for the unexpressed and 
inarticulate’ (Gombrich 1993: 169) ‘into that area in which new languages are 
invented’ (Tronche 1998: 41). In doing so, Pane’s scenographic body drew its new 
language from intense and painful intersections between her body and the material 
world. 
 These intersections prompt a necessary consideration of a mode of intimacy that 
is very unlike any notion of a ‘protected intimacy’ (Bachelard 1958: 3) that might be a 
self-contained site of personal intelligibility and definition. Normatively, intimus 
connotes the interiority of personality, psychology, identity and the self as the secluded, 
and singularly owned, confines of character. In this model, the concept of home, as 
Gaston Bachelard argues, is a paradigmatic effect of how such ‘intimacy […] has 
magnifying properties’ (Bachelard 1958: 202). Here ‘dwelling becomes a kind of 
casing’ (Benjamin in Kosofsky Sedgwick 2003: 14) where the ‘essential experience of 
the home is the window [as an affirmation of its] enclosed privacy’ (Pallasmaa 1992): 
‘the world would get along better if pots and covers could always stay together’ 
(Bachelard 1958: 83). As a result, the intimacy of such homely self-containment and 
autonomy is a ‘privilege of autovalorization [:] deriv[ing] direct pleasure from its own 
being’ (Bachelard 1958: 6). The socializing and ‘inscribing practice’ of intimacy 
‘correct[s] and modulate[s] the performance’ of bodies (Hayles 1999: 200) by creating 
an ideological border or ‘tension between the home and the world’ which ‘represent[s 
an] authentic way of life’ (Pallasmaa 1992). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that such a normative conception of intimacy 
has been ‘raised everywhere and assiduously to a concept and an ideal’ (Kwinter 2001: 
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53), creating ‘a decadently rich private world, on one side, and an impoverished public 
one, on the other, with none but the most rigid and routinized connection between 
them’ (Kwinter 2001: 48). This ‘intimate vision of society’ (Sennett 2002: 5) is 
produced by ‘intimate tyrannies’ wherein the ‘governing of a multitude of habits and 
actions by the sovereign authority of a single source need not arise by brute coercion; it 
can equally arise by a seduction’ (Sennett 2002: 337). Intimacy thus constitutes ‘the 
arousing of a belief in one standard for measuring reality’ (Sennett 2002: 337–8). This 
amounts to ‘the measuring of society in psychological terms’ (Sennett 2002: 5), ‘the 
“psychologization” of social life’ (Žižek 2000: 32), ‘unspoken expectations’ regarding 
the clarity and meaningfulness of the ‘inner psychological concerns of each person’, the 
‘claustrophobia’ of ‘domestic routine’ and ‘the net of governmental surveillance’ 
(Sennett 2002: 337).  
Intimacy, as the product of making ‘the fact of being in private, alone with 
ourselves and with family [...] an end in itself’ (Sennett 2002: 4), conceals a rather 
public, and indeed deceptive, ideology of autonomy. For even ‘the ongoing sensations 
of the domestic scene cannot be tamed so easily as Bachelard suggests’ (Frichot 2005: 
62). Indeed he himself does not seem entirely satisfied with such an autonomous 
intimacy, in that he attempts to assimilate it with the hallucinatory experience of 
daydreaming. Like ‘trance or reverie’ (Crary 2001: 3), ‘the daydream is a domain of 
resistance internal to any system of routinization or coercion’ (Crary 2001: 77). 
Daydreaming was conceived by Freud as a psychological ‘tension’ or ‘commotion’ 
(Freud in Crary 2001: 363–5) falling under the notion of the uncanny: ‘involv[ing] 
feelings of uncertainty, in particular regarding the reality of who one is and what is 
being experienced’ (Royle 2003: 1). Remember, as we saw much earlier, ‘the 
autonomy, the privacy that Freud seems to be arrogating for himself […] (figured at the 
end of the letter by the insularity and sensory remove of his hotel room) is a futile 
evasion of the deindividuation which he experienced in the piazza’ (Crary 2001: 370). 
 In contrast to this model of intimacy and its attendant ideological operation, 
Pane explores an ‘intimacy perceived as violent because it disrupts the autonomy of the 
individual’ (Leach 2006: 200). This is an ‘incorporating practice[… that] perform[s] 
bodily content’ (Hayles 1999: 200) within material problems that decenter being. She 
makes use of individuating habits such as the domestic routine of facial make-up and 
the mundane ritual of birthday celebration but relocates them within a destabilizing 
material context. She uses blades as lipstick or presents a funereal image of herself 
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devoured by maggots juxtaposed against a birthday-cake celebration. By ‘making it 
possible to feel the texture of the various materials [, to] enter into the substance [and] 
the torments of matter’, this ‘wrenching from within’ (Tronche 1998: 49) produces an 
otherness that is no longer dialectically distinguished from, and consolidated against the 
self, but is instead a ‘passion for the Other expressed in terms of a global sense of 
solidarity, reflecting […] ethical beliefs’ (Tronche 1998: 41). This otherness may be 
described as the undecidable conflation of all that exists outside oneself but that is also 
at the same time part of oneself, whereby the self is always incomplete and ‘one can 
communicate only by means of [that] break’ (Vescovo 1998: 69, 73): 
‘[e]ngaging with a disappearing image has some results for the formation 
of subjectivity, or precisely, a subjectivity that acknowledges its own 
dispersion [:] an embracing of the self's relations with others and with all 
matter, which is, after all, in a state of constant dissolution’ (Marks 1997: 
109). 
 
 
                          94 Gina Pane, Azione Sentimentale, 1973 
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 In Azione Sentimentale (1973), Pane expanded her live presence through 
photography, film, drawing and writing presented throughout multiple rooms of the 
gallery. In this way, she constructed an iterative process of splitting, cutting and spacing 
oneself out. For instance, the content of photographic records colonizing and littering 
the clean white walls of a room is transposed in another room into an actual 
performance in which the body grafts itself onto the white environment (by dressing all 
in white) while breaking from it with red blood spilling out of Pane’s skin. As she takes 
the thorns off roses’ stems to perforate her forearms, these appear to become the roses’ 
stems, although the thorns are now reversed, planted in her skin, and the blood they 
draw out evidences Pane’s body opening to the material world. 
White cubes and gallery spaces are commonly differentiated from black boxes 
on the basis of common assumptions such as ‘the white wall brackets the body against 
its surface [whereas] the black-ness of theatre space threatens to devour the body it 
envelops’ (Hannah 2003: 30). By contrast, Pane’s work shows a body both embracing 
and extracting itself from this bracketing in a way similar to the black box experiments 
that plunge the body into and extract it from darkness. The (dis/)position of such a body 
echoes the architectural proposition of a ‘dis[/]connection between the built and what 
goes on around it’, of an ‘appearance ex abrupto’ (De Solà-Morales 1999: 21). In these 
circumstances embodied subjectivity is decentred from itself and others or in a state of 
dis/connection with itself and others: the ‘division of the subject, first split because 
constituted by its other to become in the long run its own other, and in the end multiple 
and elusive – polyphonic’ (Kristeva in McDonough 2009: 130). 
Pane’s mode of decentring subjectivity towards its polyphonic and irreducible 
otherness can be found in various performance artists of the time who sought to draw 
from the body an ‘indefinable space – at least indefinable in traditional terms [since 
there is] no central focus’ (Brus in Faber 2008: 8). In other words, the presence of the 
body which would normally provide a central focus in the work serves precisely the 
opposite function of decentring itself, its space and the other bodies involved in the 
encounter of the work. 
This effect can be shown from artists such as ORLAN. She and her 
commentators have emphasized the disclosure and development of a decentered 
subjectivity, with particular affiliation to Baroque aesthetics, the philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze and the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan. While both thinkers are 
contemporaneous with her work their theories rely, in part, upon their study of the 
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Baroque subject. Although effectively reaching very different outcomes, Deleuze and 
Lacan  drew similar insights from the Baroque with regard to its play with a break in 
subjectivity based on ‘permanent catastrophe and not straightforward progress, loss of 
any stable referent in history and not the subject as bearer of an already accomplished 
meaning’ (Buci-Glucksmann in Doy 2002: 143). Concentrating on her own body, 
ORLAN has appropriated multiple forms and images from various eras. Her Baroque 
approach is best contextualized by its influence on Deleuze’s notion of the fold: ‘the 
baroque trait twists and turns its folds […] fold over fold, one upon another. The 
baroque unfurls all the way to infinity’ (Deleuze in Doy 2002: 149). In turn, the fold 
informed Deleuze’s conception of the event: ‘matter as explosive […] overflowing its 
boundaries, and before which the frame eventually disappears’ (Eisenman 1992: 425). 
 
     
95 ORLAN, Assumption of Black and         96 ORLAN, The Reincarnation of St ORLAN, 1993 
White Virgin on Video Monitor Playing 
with Toy Guns, 1983 
 
Through a variety of media and technologies, ORLAN has transformed her body 
into a large array of other bodies and faces. These began with masks and prosthetic 
extensions but in the surgical creation of the alter-ego Saint-ORLAN she drew from 
Bernini’s famous Baroque sculpture of St Teresa. The cognitive dissonance of this 
statue, mixing ‘glory’ and ‘perdition’ (Buci-Glucksmann 2010: 1), populates all of 
ORLAN’s work from Body-Sculptures (1964) to the performative surgeries of The 
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Reincarnation of Saint ORLAN (1990–93) and more recent works. Progressively, 
ORLAN’s body has mutated and, like her endless identities, has come to exceed any 
aspect of its original form. She, like the Deleuzean ‘event [,] comes between sign and 
object’, producing a semiotically ‘out-of-focus condition’ (Eisenman 1992: 424). The 
effect may be described as ‘a non-equivalence or “inadequation” between signifier and 
signified [, a] “non-fit” [, an] “overspill”’ (Foster 2002: 86) where the signified, the 
object or the body, flickers away from its signifiers and discursive signifiability.  
To understand such slippage between materiality and discourse we may turn to 
Lacanian theory where ‘there is something of the signifier that exceeds meaning, 
something inadequate that is its very materiality’ (Belau 2002: 153). To Lacan this gap 
is constitutive of a being that can never fully circumvent its materiality in discourse. 
But the gap is always bridged by structures that create illusions of singularity. This is 
what Lacan called ‘suture’, where ‘suture names the relation of the subject to the chain 
of its discourse’ and thus ‘the general relation of lack to the structure – of which it is an 
element, inasmuch as it implies the position of a taking-the-place-of’ (Miller 1977: 26). 
As a result, Lacanian theory is primarily concerned with exploring notions that seek to 
render how the gap is filled up and suture hidden.  
On the other hand, where Lacan sees the split or sutured subject as a condition 
that cannot be lived, Deleuze suggests some viability to it. By repositioning the 
Lacanian perspective within a Deleuzean framework, commentators on ORLAN are 
able to propose that in using her ‘skin’ like the ‘shifting signifier’ of Baroque ‘drapery’, 
ORLAN’s practice precisely mobilizes ‘the exposure of a gap […] between skin and 
the body’  (Doy 2002: 160): ORLAN’s ‘body is itself the material of the fold’ as it 
explicitly makes a ‘break’ between signifier and signified, enacting a ‘practice of being 
cut’ according to ‘the Lacanian “line of suture” [that] is this line of fold which operates 
the undoing of boundaries’ (Buci-Glucksmann 2010: 8). 
ORLAN explores how the ‘baroque fold emblematizes the point of view in 
which the subject must give up its autonomy’ (Bal in Doy 2002: 141). As subject she 
offers a self that is constantly ‘reborn’ (Doy 2002: 179) in an otherness that is not 
entirely the identity of another but found in the gap that separates one from another, 
made explicit through non fusional overlapping. As an embodied subject she can be 
said to dissolve ‘distinctions between inside and outside’ (Doy 2002: 160) and 
undertake the Deleuzean relational mode of ‘becoming’ as ‘merging with one’s 
environment’ (Deleuze in Braidotti 1994: 260). Here ‘becoming fold’ (Buci-
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Glucksmann 2010: 6) is ‘co-exist[ing] with [the] environment in a “play of folds”’ 
(Doy 2002: 150), ‘paint[ing] oneself gray on gray’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 218): a 
‘camouflage [that is] not a question of harmonizing with the background but, against a 
mottled background, of becoming mottled’ (Lacan 1981: 99).  As Grosz explains: 
[C]amouflage, the capacity to imitate one’s habitat or surrounding, far 
from performing an adaptative function, witnesses the captivation of a 
creature by its representations of and as space, its displacement from the 
center, from a ‘consciousness’ of its place (in its body, located in space) to 
the perspective of another (Grosz 1995: 190). 
  
 
97 Francesca Woodman, House 3, 1975-6 
 
 
98 Francesca Woodman, Untitled from Some  
Disordered Interior Geometries, 1980-1 
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If ORLAN offers one example of dissolution in and by the embodied subject, a 
related set of experiments with the fractured body is offered by Francesca Woodman. 
‘Me and Francis Bacon and all those Baroques are all concerned with making 
something soft wiggle and snake around a hard architectural outline’ (Woodman in 
Dunhill 2008: 9). In Woodman’s photographic self-portraits, the shifting illegibility of 
facial and bodily features in motion is contrasted with the legibility of environmental 
features ‘pulsations’ where ‘there is no suggestion of permanence or a stable identity’ 
(Cayzer 1999: 109). Bacon similarly described his own work: ‘if the thing seems to 
come off at all, it comes off because of a kind of darkness which the otherness of shape 
which isn‘t known, as it were, conveys to it’ (Bacon in Boyne 1991: 290). In her book 
Some Disordered Interior Geometries (1980–81), Woodman utilized an Italian 
educational manual of geometry from the 1900s to initiate, produce and display 
photographic self-portraits in which she softens and fractures the rigidity of the 
axiomatic structures of the architectural environments she inhabits: as if ‘hang[ing] a 
geometry book from the balcony […] so that the wind would tear through its pages’ 
(Duchamp in Dunhill 2008: 11–12). Embodied subjectivity is spliced with the outside 
in such a way that the singular features of both are affected. However, the outside here 
is not merely the environment or background around the figures but also the outside 
material presence of the artwork itself. The blurring of bodily contours in Woodman’s, 
as in Bacon’s, work boldly reveals the photographic and painterly media in which they 
work. Rather than producing a seamless overlap of body, environment and medium, 
their works exacerbate gaps between them by drawing conflicting relations between 
each other. As a result, ‘the viewer not only watches in a variety of media-viewing 
positions but also sees the deconstructions and alterities of media performing each 
other’. This amounts to a ‘shift’ towards ‘a pluralistic, changing, interactive viewer’ 
(Klaver in Giesekam 2007: 22). 
This is what Deleuze had implied in his analysis of haptic perception in Bacon’s 
work. He finds that the work  
no longer tells a story and no longer represents anything but its own movement, 
and which makes these apparently arbitrary elements coagulate in a single 
continuous flow. Certainly there is still an organic representation, but even more 
profoundly, we witness the revelation of the body beneath the organism, which 
makes organisms and their elements crack or swell, imposes a spasm on them, 
and puts them into relation with forces (Deleuze 2003: 129). 
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 Thus far from simply romanticizing primitive faciality (West 2004: 218) or 
‘invit[ing] us to take refuge from the twenty-first century in the age of the baroque’ 
(Doy 2002: 175), the viewer of these bodies extending into, and camouflaging 
themselves with,  the media that make them visible, can no longer establish a discursive 
understanding of their corporeal and subjective singularity. In attempting to specify 
their presence, the viewer is invited into a relation wherein his own singularity must be 
put in jeopardy: a ‘voyeur [who] is not, therefore, in a position of pure manipulation of 
an object, albeit distant, but is always threatened by the potential exteriorisation of his 
own function’ (Rose 1986: 194). Bacon and Woodman’s works of portraiture ‘re-
establish contact with the spectator’ (Doy 2002: 149) by conveying ‘psychic security 
[…] in ruins’ (Doy 2002: 169). 
 
 
99 Francis Bacon, Self-Portrait, 1973 
 
By way of following further these experiments with corporeal singularity we 
can look next at later work by ORLAN.  Moving from the productions of ‘an internal 
discourse based on experience and actual practice but avoiding the purely 
autobiographical’ (De Solà-Morales 1999: 142) to the explorations of new encounters, 
in one of her most recent self-portraits, The Harlequin’s Coat (since 2007), the artist 
has created a large-scale (plexi-)glass work of a Baroque kind, a bio-reactor in which 
live skin cells that have been extracted from her body are co-cultured with skin cells 
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from other human bodies and animal species. Growing together since 2007, those 
invisible cells are placed in Petri dishes located in diamond-shaped Harlequin motifs, 
where they are nurtured to evolve and form a living and hybrid skin, or coat. Although 
the work takes the overall form of a wall within which a human body, larger than life, 
frontal and standing upright, has been delineated as a frame for the cells, these 
effectively cannot be directly seen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 ORLAN, The Harlequin’s Coat, 2009 
 
The installation thus also includes the projection of pre-recorded and microscopic video 
footages of the cells in action. These become visibly crucial to the carnivalesque motif 
of ‘Arlecchino [which, like] all carnivalesque commedia masks [seeks to] liberate […] 
the [subject] from the hierarchical, sexual, gravitational, ontological constraint of 
normal existence’ (Wiles 2004: 141).  
This sort of experiment may be said to result from a polyphonic process by 
which the subject’s division and incompletion allow its expansion. It implies a renewed 
mode of encounter with others. This can be seen in Dan Graham’s two 16mm film loops 
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Body Press (1970–72). In this work two naked bodies (male and female) are standing 
up, back to back, in a tight circular and mirrored room. Each body holds a camera and, 
as they slowly move in a circular motion, they film themselves and each other by 
angling the camera towards the distorting curvilinear mirror walls, or towards the other 
behind, or by passing the cameras to one another. The resulting work presents the 
footages from each camera on separate screens. Much of the footage is abstract but has 
clearer moments of filming which include images of body parts from each other, close 
ups on indeterminate skins and bodies’ distorted reflections in the mirror, which all 
seem to fuse into a new and grotesque body. Throughout it is impossible to identify the 
bodies individually or even to delineate one from another. The small size of the space 
makes it impossible for them to capture their entire bodies in the camera. Instead bodily 
fragments appear and disappear, and the encounter remains a material one without 
sense: the friction of bodies whose awareness of one another is intensified by material 
means but disengaged from any relational meaning. 
 In Body Press the spatial structure created by Graham is core to the kind of 
meaningless encounter described earlier. It informs the physicality of the bodies inside 
as well as the problems of vision experienced by them and captured on camera. Graham 
went on to apply these ideas on an architectural scale. In Cinema (1981) he conceived, 
but did not realize, a commonly cubic building whose lower floor is a cinema in which 
the projection screen is an actual wall of the building made of two-way mirrored glass. 
Audiences inside watch the film superimposed upon the everyday world that is 
unfolding behind it, and audiences outside watch the film superimposed upon the 
indoor space of the cinema and its inhabitants. As Graham wrote, Cinema’s ‘screen’ is 
‘an optical “skin”’ where ‘spectators on both sides observe both the opposing space and 
a reflection of their own look within their own space’ (Graham 1999: 94–5). Here again 
the materiality of the built environment prevails as ‘the psychological circuit of 
intersubjective looks and identifications is echoed in and is a product of the material 
properties of the architectural materials […] the properties of the two-way mirror glass’ 
(Graham 1999: 95).  
Graham’s Theater-Cinema (1986), another unrealized architectural piece, 
pursued the ‘two-way mirror power’ in conjunction with the traditional architecture of 
the Renaissance’s ‘pavilions’ (Graham 1999: 174) and the seventeenth-century ‘green 
theaters’ where the ‘Baroque garden [...] (where the play was being performed) would 
become part of the stage design’ (Graham 1999: 138). Graham refers to such garden as 
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a mise en abyme which is prone to decentering cognition: ‘the garden as a theater and 
the theater garden within the garden […] a sense of a representation within 
representation’ (Graham 1999: 138). In this project, Graham develops this cognitive 
complication through additional architectural elements as well as lighting and 
projection that transform the pavilion into a cinematic screen which reflects its 
environment and viewers. In this way, the work subverts the ‘Renaissance “picture-
window”’ and how it ‘creates a picture plane that places the world at a measured 
distance for the viewer on either side’, propelling ‘inequalities of power’ between 
bodies (Graham 1999: 54).  
 
 
101 Dan Graham, Model for Theater-Cinema, 1986 
 
To summarize our exploration thus far, we can observe that as the gloom 
precipitates subjectivities into networks of intersubjective and intercorporeal relations, 
the decentering of these encounters also involves the dehierarchization of power 
relations. This particular observation has also been made by Hal Foster in relation to 
artworks which ‘make a new medium out of the remnants of old forms, and […] hold 
together the different temporal markers in a single visual structure’ (Foster 2002: 137). 
These provide, he argues, a ‘mnemonic dimension of the outmoded that might still be 
mined today’ (Foster 2002: 139). So, if we look back to the works of Dan Graham just 
discussed, we can see that the media involved are tripartite: architecture, film and the 
body. Although these are fused visually in the work, conceptually they refer to different 
temporal contexts. While film certainly attests to the present context of the time, 
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architecture in Graham’s work always hints at other periods (early Modernism, 
Baroque, Renaissance, Primitivism, etc...). The body then interfaces with these media 
and eras and thereby suggests that aspects of the past can be critically brought back to 
the present. 
 
 
102 Gabriel Orozco, Island within an island, 1993 
 
 Alongside Graham’s work may also be placed artworks in which Hal Foster 
notes the ‘non-synchronous’ and ‘incongruent’ (Foster 2002: 137) critique. These 
include the photographic works of Gabriel Orozco. In Island within an island (1993), 
Orozco used the medium of photography to collide urbanism and primitive sculpture 
where the latter operates as a heterotopian reflection of the former. As a result of the 
materials employed and juxtaposed, the city’s form is critiqued in various ways: in 
terms of its limited accessibility and interactivity, its physical and conceptual rejection 
of architectural decay and detritus, and its objection to ephemerality. To put this another 
way, following Foster, we may say that the work laments how such architectural 
potentials used to be acceptable and celebrated. Island within an island presents a trace 
(sculptural) within a trace (photographic) thereby (and as the title suggests) it is a mise 
en abyme. Its critical power thus lies in how it stands rooted in the problem it critiques. 
Here Orozco is problematizing the isolation of the island as the cultural isolation of a 
nation – one that involves rejecting other cultures, other modes of dwelling and living. 
Here again we might invoke the concept of nomadism, for the kind of dwelling Orozco 
presents is volatile, uncertain of its own end. Dwelling is here conceived as passage 
which simply leaves an ephemeral trace in the material world. The activity of 
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mnemonic mining is done by replicating and downscaling the forms of our sedentary 
society with unstable and raw materials that suggest nomadism which is, at base, the 
primitive origin of dwelling itself. Here though it evokes a ‘melancholia that is, 
paradoxically, detached from its lost object’ (Foster 2002: 169) so as to be used for a 
critical re-examination of our contemporary world. Indeed, in this work we see 
primitive nomadism positioned as part of the dirty periphery of what it reflects, a 
derelict idea which has lost any currency and which cannot, as a result, be recalled in its 
integrity but is instead sacrificed to its unwelcoming present.  
In Foster’s analysis, the work is based on the admission that there are ‘too many 
lost objects to track, so many that it makes one vertiginous’ (Foster 2002: 169). It is 
‘enact[ing] this vertigo’ to ‘survive it’. This is the ‘vertigo of coming-after’ (Foster 
2002: 169). The mnemonic vulnerability of the individual human mind can be described 
as one where ‘all the time the mind […] is reduced to the state of a container 
overflowing with, burst by its contents – like a suitcase into which objects keep being 
put which stops being a suitcase in the end, since it ceases to enclose the objects 
entrusted to it’ (Bataille 1987: 260). This displays an aspect of how subjectivity is split 
or broken by the material world where recollection itself can never be fully preserved 
and owned. By as it were opening itself to its own incomplete memory, being can no 
longer operate through the singularizing self-ownership as seen in  ‘the vertigo of Faust, 
overwhelmed, at the top of the tower, by the endless expanse of territory offered up to 
boundless ambition’ (Morris 1998: 151). Being disenfranchises itself through, and with, 
the material world so as to collapse its singularity. With it collapses the singular and 
linear order of the spatial and temporal constructs which inhabited and framed 
subjectivity.  This amounts to a Deleuzean  
vertigo [of] great dimensions, depths and distances which the observer 
cannot dominate [and thus where] hierarchy [is] abolished [:] not only that 
regulating the divisions between the Origin and the first-, second-, third-
order copies determining authenticity [but] also the secular projection of 
that process in hierarchical myths of space (the top of the tower) and time 
(‘meta’-narrative) (Morris 1998: 151). 
 
We must note at this point, however, that the materiality by which subjectivity 
is refracted is not merely that which pre-exists the subject. It is instead its alteration by 
the subject’s own material presence and interaction with the world. In this way, being 
may be said to upset the ‘“material sincerity” of the external ideological ritual’ and 
disband the ‘locus of the fantasy of the ideological edifice’ from the ‘subject’s inner 
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convictions and desires’ (Žižek 1997: 6). Being finds otherness in its most internal 
confines and actualizes ‘sensations of vertigo and disorder as sources of pleasure’ 
(Virilio 1991: 12). This constitutes an intimacy from the outside where actions are 
exposed at, and thus undermine, pre-constructed experiences of the world. It is a 
‘pursuit of vertigo [as] consist[ing] of an attempt to momentarily destroy the stability of 
perception and inflict a kind of voluptuous panic […] spasm, seizure, or shock’ 
(Caillois 2001: 23). In this endeavour, the authors and their audiences are 
polyphonically ‘weighed down’ (Deleuze 2003: 129) or undertake a ‘view from below’ 
(Soja 1996: 313).  This can be described as: 
the vertigo of Plato, discovering ‘in the flash of an instant, as he leans over 
its abyss’ that the simulacrum, the ‘other’ that his philosophy strategically 
creates, can destroy his philosophy’s foundations. It is the vertigo of a 
critical distance, in which ‘the privileged point of view has no more 
existence than does the object held in common by all points of view’ 
(Morris 1998: 151). 
 
 Up to this point we have tracked experiments in the refraction of subjectivity 
and corporeality through mainly visual art forms. Here now we need to re-engage with 
theatrical practice. For in the work considered hitherto it is arguable that the dissolution 
of the author’s own subjective framework through creative practice is a more direct and 
obvious process whenever the author is also the sole subject and object of the work. In 
theatre practices by contrast the author is most often physically excluded from the 
work, and thus needs to find tactics to disseminate its dis/positioning to the many other 
individuals and subjectivities involved. As such, theatre practices present more complex 
methodologies and these, in their complexity, are also more difficult to penetrate. In 
order to address this difficulty, and by way of concluding this inquiry within the domain 
of theatre, I shall now focus on specific creative processes and productions undertaken 
by some contemporary theatre-makers. In these we shall place the undoing of their 
authorial and subjective control alongside analysis of the implicated spectator’s 
experience. This extension of the range of the argument will then complete the account 
of the ontological and epistemological transformations at play in the embodied and 
polyphonic subjectivity that is the domain of the gloom. In doing so we shall encounter 
‘the horizon latent in our experience and itself ever-present and anterior to every 
determining thought’ (Merleau-Ponty in Iles 2001: 40). 
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2.6 Praxis of the gloom 
This section is concerned with providing a comprehensive analysis of how the 
polyphonic arrangements of intercorporeality and intersubjectivity can unfold in theatre 
practices and experiences where the greater number of individuals involved (makers, 
performers and audiences) most often tends to produce, and be inhibited by, collective 
and hierarchical structures (at the top of which stands the director). It is most often the 
case that the collaborative levels at work in theatre-making complicate the processual 
possibility of undoing the singularity of authorial identity and control. At the same time, 
however, this very dimension of collective or shared making in theatre could lend itself 
particularly well to elaborating new ontological structures of group interaction 
(collaboration). These in turn might portray the societal potential of the gloom more 
potently than in solo and more individually-based formats of practice. In order to 
understand how the author can disrupt subjective control and transpose such disruption 
through performers and/or audiences, this section analyzes some distinct, though 
correlated, tactics of this kind which emerged in the late twentieth century. 
 
 
103 Frank Castorf and Bert Neumann, Der Idiot, 2006 
 
Bert Neumann’s scenographies for director Frank Castorf at the Volksbühne 
theatre in Berlin have been discussed in terms of ‘the disruption of the sovereign 
viewpoint’ based on ‘roaming vagabond viewpoints’ (Oberender 2004). This becomes 
‘a patchwork of selected views, never generalized as a totality’ but producing ‘a rather 
dissociative effect on the stage action [as] it specifically increases the heterogeneous 
motives in the action by enlarging its self-disruptive moments’ (Oberender 2004). 
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Erasing the architectural separation of auditorium and stage, and filling the entire 
volume of the theatre, vast networks of cameras, projectors and screens populate and 
complicate  further labyrinthine spatial structures made of intricate and disparate sets of 
low-tech, often scaffolded and foldable structures, to produce what Neumann calls 
neustadt, ‘new cities’. These bricolage-based and temporary environments are produced 
as prototypical models of urbanism inasmuch as they are immersive and permeated by 
media. Their departure from real-life urban landscapes lies in how impermanent and 
unfinished their built structures are, and how their mediatized dimension is drastically 
revealed as a layering that disrupts and deconstructs the space it is woven in (as opposed 
to participating in the rigorous structural order of space as they do in everyday life).  
Performing and viewing bodies are similarly immersed in, and disunified by, the 
disparity of the event’s scenographic layers. As a result, they have to learn to navigate 
‘the conflicts, ambiguities and tensions [of] media surfaces, real environments, 
electronic boards, glass walls and hidden spaces [brought] into one visual field’ (Van 
Den Berg 2006: 66). They become part of what Boris Groys has termed, in relation to 
Neumann’s neustadt, a ‘submediale space’: an environment presented as if it were 
‘behind an image or covered up under the image’ thereby ‘compelling audiences to 
examine the fault lines in their own fields of perception’ (Van Den Berg 2006: 66). In a 
‘theatre where all the means that make up theatre […] maintain their own forces but act 
together, and where one does not just rely on the conventional hierarchy of means’ 
(Goebbels in Lehmann 2006: 86), performers and audiences can no longer be 
determined by a single relationship but must engage in multiple relations with the 
various forces at play. Producing ‘distance’ and ‘tension’ between the scenic elements 
‘the stage […] has something to do with the buildings, with the architecture or 
construction of the stage and its particular laws, and which also finds resistance in 
these’ (Goebbels in Lehmann 2006: 86). 
These remarks on the multiplicity of theatrical elements are from Heiner 
Goebbels. In his own work he organizes submedial perceptions and relations 
particularly through sound and its relation to light and imagery. In the operatic 
performance Hashirigaki (2000), a large curved cyclorama accommodates the 
projections of wriggling lines partly dissolved by the inclusion of a light box that 
appears rather like a cloud of light. Neither light nor projections are aimed at live bodies 
and those become visually incomplete, making it difficult if not impossible to associate 
the singing voices with their respective bodies. The visual aspects of the stage create a 
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‘mask that “ghosts” the “character” and renders him/her a spoken “it” as opposed to a 
speaking “I”’ (Lehmann 2006: 10), ‘bringing to light that the word does not belong to 
the speaker […] does not organically reside in his/her body but remains a foreign body’ 
(Lehmann 2006: 147). Sonically, the voice(s) of the singer(s) seem to come from all the 
bodies on stage, from the entire environment and beyond. By ‘appropriat[ing] the body's 
vocal apparatus and us[ing] it for ends alien to the self’ (Hayles 1999: 211), sound and 
image are associated by way of a ‘divide line’ wherein ‘once someone’s vocalizations 
and body sounds are spliced into someone else’s [–] grotesquely becoming half one 
person and half another [–] the effects can [widen and] feed back into [other] bodies, 
setting off a riot of mutations […] cutting through bodies as well as through the 
programs that control and discipline them’ (Hayles 1999: 211). 
 
 
104 Heiner Goebbels, Hashirigaki, 2000 
 
Although in calling his work ‘musiktheater’ he was referring back to Wagner, 
Goebbels’ mode of disunified scenography precisely rejects at every level holistic 
fusion of a Wagnerian kind: ‘I want to keep the different quotes or cultures or languages 
which come into performance […] transparent [by] put[ting] something in opposition to 
them, but not in the way of making a melting pot’ (Goebbels in Tusa 2007: 136). In 
opposing the Gesamtkunstwerk’s ‘hypotactical way of connection that governs the 
super- and subordination of elements in order to avoid confusion and to produce 
harmony and comprehensibility’ (Lehmann 2006: 86), Goebbels undertakes ‘the 
abandonment of totality […] understood not as a deficit but instead as a liberating 
possibility of an ongoing (re-) writing, imagination and recombination, that refuses the 
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“rage of understanding”’ (Lehmann 2006: 88). He explores the ‘non-hierarchy’ of 
‘parataxis’ which creates ‘sequences and correspondences, nodal and condensation 
points of perception’ (Lehmann 2006: 94), or, as Goebbels describes it, ‘distances on 
stage that I as a spectator can then cross’ (Goebbels in Lehmann 2006: 86) by allowing 
them to ‘enter the body and break down its limits’ (Lehmann 2006: 120).  The effect is 
to make ‘the spectators […] experience themselves as living organisms involved in an 
exchange with their environments’ (Fischer-Lichte 2008: 119).  
Setting themselves against ‘the quest for an all-comprehending “signifying 
vision”’ (Soja 1996: 313), Goebbels and Neumann are concerned with ‘a space that 
formulates a movement and has a time’ (Goebbels in Lehmann 2006: 86). Being made 
distinct from everyday life, it consequently gives initial ‘attention to physical 
experiences’ (Lehmann 2006: 120) signalling a ‘space of vision [that] is not to be found 
in the visual representation of an object nor in the object itself but in the “traces” of 
perception, a reminder of the visceral, inevitable relationship between the images 
viewed and the viewer’ (Van Den Berg 2006: 57). To do so, such authors or 
performance-makers place themselves at an uncertain distance from the various 
components of their work as a way of anticipating the audience experience. They do not 
hold a higher understanding of the work that would then be unilaterally passed on to or 
concealed from the audience. They dwell on an ‘aesthetics of atmosphere as an 
antithesis to semiotic aesthetics’ (Lehmann 2006: 120). As Lehmann says, it is 
‘postpon[ing] the production of meaning’ and ‘contradict[ing] the established hierarchy, 
at the top of which we find language, diction […] gesture’ (Lehmann 2006: 86–7). 
This epistemological opposition to human cognition as we know it plays an even 
greater part in the work of the company Socìetas Raffaello Sanzio (from here on 
referred to as SRS) where bodies’ tensed relations with their material surroundings 
make them seemingly lose all ability to communicate. Like Goebbels and Neumann, 
SRS’s creative team, Romeo Castellucci, Claudia Castellucci and Chiara Guidi, have 
also rejected any fusional ‘style [or] synthesis’ (Castellucci 2001: 97; all translations 
from this are the author’s own). To do so, they have evolved a process they subversively 
call ‘theatrical hand’ (Castellucci 2001: 25), a formulation which operates as a dissident 
appropriation of the ‘military hand’ and the ‘artistic hand’ (Castellucci 2001: 25) which 
they consider the ‘prey of a cultural universe imbued with the military and religious 
coalition’ (Castellucci 2001: 30). The theatrical hand operates on the basis of a 
conception of complete images that are deemed beautiful (the artistic hand) which are 
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then purged and simplified by way of cancelling out the core of the images so that only 
their traces and residues remain. This is in effect a reversed use of the military hand 
which would normally simplify visual structures by way of deleting their minor and 
peripheral elements. As a result of SRS’s destruction of images and cultivation of the 
residues as the scenography, ‘conceptual signifieds are not only absent, their absence 
itself is […] signified’ (Counsell in McKinney 2009: 161) so as to articulate the 
‘negation of representation in representation’ (Castellucci 2001: 97). 
 
105 Socìetas Raffaello Sanzio, Genesi from the Museum of Sleep, 1999 
 
 In this way, Castellucci argues, the work makes ‘power’, ‘oxygen’, ‘joy’ and a 
‘sense of intimacy’ (Castellucci 2001: 28) ‘phenomenologically felt’ (Castellucci 2001: 
31) and critically revised. Indeed, similar to the views of a critical intimacy noted 
earlier, this ‘intimacy’ is ‘not the situation of our insertion into the world, but of the 
world’s insertion into us’ (Castellucci 2001: 32). Power, then, is the ability to ‘extract 
precisely from the real, that is always disappointing, the supremacy of experience’ 
(Castellucci 2001: 97), ‘catch[ing] experience in the act of [re]making the world 
available’ (Noë 2004: 176). By ‘grafting ourselves onto the world that surrounds us and 
opening this world within us’ (Cache in Harris in Buchanan & Lambert 2006: 42) gaps 
emerge within us and force a new relation to the world. In order to realize this in 
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practice, SRS create scenographies of visual traces and sonic vestiges of images, bodies 
and spaces that are all left lingering on stage like ‘something abandoned in a rush by an 
anonymous presence gone elsewhere’ (Castellucci 2001: 183–4; present author’s 
translation). These residual presences are created out of all sorts of transparent, 
translucent, reflective and opaque surfaces and objects that permeate the entire volume 
of the stage up to the bordering line of the proscenium arch where they tend to 
accumulate. As such, the space takes on a heavy and stifling density by which 
performers are devoured: the ‘REDUCTION of forms’ through ‘REMAINS, RELICS’ 
– turns space into ‘a LIVING ORGANISM [whose] MOVEMENT […] creates tensions 
of a much higher level of complexity than the actor’s movement’ (Kantor 1961: 213).  
 
 
106 Socìetas Raffaello Sanzio, Genesi from the Museum of Sleep, 1999 
 
The proscenium arch’s fourth wall, the usually invisible wall that interfaces 
stage with auditorium, is given a material substance that blurs the volume of the stage 
behind and thus works to augment the material presence of the stage, thickening its air 
and weighting its inhabitants. Further, the stage imagery becomes somehow two-fold as 
it is stretched between the two-dimensional plane of the proscenium arch’s fourth wall 
(now revealed) and the three-dimensionality of the stage (now obscured). As a result, 
tangible ambiguities and tactile titillations compete perceptually with visual 
discrepancies, and the audience is thrown ‘on the border of properties of touch and 
vision’ (Bora in Kosofsky Sedgwick 2003: 15). ‘Touch, which was already onstage, 
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enters the scene’ (Derrida 2005: 307), but it belongs to the stage’s spatial substance 
rather than to the bodies in it. Thus, since touch is a ‘prerequisite for movement and 
action’ (Noë 2004: 100) but also ‘acquires content through movement’ (Noë 2004: 97), 
the movement of space becomes emphasized at the cost of the bodies’ movement. It is a 
brutal attempt at inserting that hazy world into bodies, us. 
On SRS’s stage, ‘the frustration of the intangible becomes its temptation’ (Cook 
2003: 143) as touch itself becomes, in Derrida’s words, the articulation of how ‘to 
tamper with, to change, to displace, to call into question […] a setting in motion, a 
kinetic experience’ (Derrida 2005: 25) – ‘to touch is to break with immediacy, with the 
immediate given wrongly associated with self-presence’ (Derrida 2005: 293). No longer 
a discrete divide, the (now) tactile interface that is the proscenium arch recovers a 
‘touch [which] is a spacing out or interruption as the paradoxical and intervallic 
“medium” of con-tact’ (Derrida 2005: 223). What we have described as a 
representational paradox functions in such a way that we can come to conceive of an 
operation where ‘to inscribe presence is not to (re)present it or to signify it, but to let 
come to one and over one what merely presents itself at the limit where inscription itself 
withdraws’ (Nancy in Derrida 2005: 276). 
 
            
107 Socìetas Raffaello Sanzio, Tragedia Endogonidia, L#09, 2004 
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Shifting the proscenium arch’s function from a window of cognitive clarity to 
one of cognitive imprecision necessarily sets up a new kind of (cognitive) encounter and 
relation between stage and auditorium, a relation that could be said to be drawn from 
the black box. Indeed, if the proscenium arch can be said to draw a clear model of 
relationality at a distance, its occupation by SRS turns it into an interface of proximity. 
It is therefore not surprising that the work of SRS has also explicitly explored the use of 
black box environments. In Paradiso (2008), a black box is occupied by a large white 
cube containing a smaller black box wherein there is a ‘tension between the two rooms 
that evokes a state of unresolved conflict with the exclusion of any narrative 
development’ (Di Matteo 2009). 
 
 
108 Romeo Castellucci, Paradiso, 2008 
 
Upon entering the white cube, audiences found a ‘blinding white room’ inside 
of which ‘a black rose window, like a deep well, reveals itself to be a narrow 
passageway [that] leads the spectator into a darkened room without outlines’ (Di 
Matteo 2009). First only the ‘sound of gushing water can be heard [and then] suddenly 
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one’s sight is drawn to a small area of light, very dim, feeble’, disclosing liquids, ‘a 
pool that glimmers faintly with an opaque and ghostly quality’ and above which ‘a 
presence comes into view at the top of the room […] walled in from the waist down’ 
(Di Matteo 2009). This scenographic body is quite literally torn between darkness and 
light, but the division is unsettled and constantly oscillating. The half-bodied presence 
moves slowly, allowing a little water to flow out around the edges of its body, until it 
recedes entirely inside the wall, leaving an empty hole from which more water bursts 
out, pouring down like a waterfall. The body’s retreat into complete darkness echoes 
our own entrance into the space, blinded by darkness. Its return into the semi-dark 
space then further parallels the audience who have become habituated to the darkness, 
coping with it enough to perceive the edges of the body coming back through the hole 
(a circular hole similar to the entrance hole of the space). Aurally, the phenomenon of 
the bodily presence also becomes refined as one starts hearing alterations in the sounds 
of water produced by the movements, coming and going, of the performer mixed with 
the sounds produced by the audience’s presence. 
The parallelism of reciprocity that audiences are invited into goes even further. 
For the performing body is positioned in such a way that the head seems to be 
orientated and directed towards audiences in the space. But although ‘the spectator 
feels watched, as if caught in a trap’ (Di Matteo 2009), he or she can never be sure of 
being observed due to the imperceptibility of the performer’s face. The correspondence 
between ‘the struggling figure and the viewer’s visual effort’ (Di Matteo 2009) 
elaborates the relation of one to another by means of a shared domain of corporeal 
disorientation and visual imprecision. It is an encounter or relation based on becoming 
‘almost imperceptible’ (Di Matteo 2009), a ‘continuing “void”, which is elusive and 
breaks up the meaning of what can be said’ (Di Matteo 2009). As such it recalls another 
similar moment from a different time and a different place: 
[I]n the deepening gloom […] heading on foot for a particular point often 
she freezes on the way. Unable till long after to move on not knowing 
whither or for what purpose […] all is black. For an eye having no need of 
light to see. (Beckett 1981: 7–8) 
 
 The immersive detachment or distance that exists between audience and 
performer may be thought of as a condition and relation of non-intentional reciprocity in 
the moment of encounter. As the singularities of performer and audiences are countered 
by material and phenomenal conditions, Paradiso proposes an experience of human 
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encounter conditioned by the impossibility, perceptually, physically, psychologically or 
subjectively, of one being able to grasp an other. Encounter thus relies on the 
overlapping of that which does not constitute the singularity of the self from all agents 
involved in the encounter. Endlessly looped, Paradiso’s event can be understood as a 
pulse that seeks, through repetition, to produce new habits in oneself as in others. It is 
an attempt at consolidating a new relational domain of encounter which differs from, 
and opposes, the pressing everyday forces of identification and comprehension. 
 The reiteration of a reciprocal domain of becoming imperceptible as a matter of 
coming together may be said to implicate audiences in an ‘intima[cy] that is radically 
Other [and that] Lacan expresses with a single word “extimacy” [:] within the circle of 
the subject one discovers that what is the most intimate of its intimacy is the extimacy 
of the Other [, this] Other who, more intimate than my intimacy, stirs me’ (Rapaport 
1994: 257). While we needed in an earlier chapter to reconsider intimacy, here we now 
need to draw on Lacan to take further our thinking, by encountering ‘extimacy’. 
Extimacy is an ‘experience of rupture, between perception and consciousness, in that 
nontemporal locus [– that opens] another locality, another space, another scene’ (Lacan 
1981: 56) which, to Lacan, was part of the unviability of the split subject, always 
sutured. Like the ‘optical vertigo’ of an ‘ego [who] has lost control of the organ of 
sight’, which Lacanian theory refers to as ‘scotoma’ (Foster 2004: 293), the possibility 
of a decentered and incomplete subjectivity comprising of the unknowable presence of 
an outside otherness or ‘méconnaissance’ (Lacan in Fielding 1999: 197) was both the 
basis of subjective development and not an achievable state of subjectivity. Others have 
moved on from here, however, to re-model Lacanian theory so as to define and establish 
the conception of a viable ontology that repudiates ‘a psychism supposedly located in a 
bipartition between interior and exterior’ (Miller in Belau 2002: 153): 
[t]he remainder produced by subjectivation [...] is neither exterior nor 
interior, but not somewhere else either.  It is the point of exteriority in the 
very kernel of interiority, the point where the innermost touches the 
outermost, where materiality is the most intimate. It is around this intimate 
external kernel that subjectivity is constituted (Dolar in Belau 2002: 152). 
 
 While ‘suturing […] paradoxically elicits experiences of a decentered and 
detotalized consciousness’ (Rapaport 1994: 290), a ‘pleasure or jouissance that is alien 
to the subject’ and ‘utterly fails to define or circumscribe [any] subjecthood’ (Rapaport 
1994: 258) can be experienced and lived; and ‘extimacy [can formulate the livable] 
limits constituting beings as others, the limits of alterity within’ (Egginton 2006: 79). 
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By hybridizing Lacanian theory with a phenomenological ‘understanding of corporeal 
intersubjectivity’ (Fielding 1999: 196), the concept of extimacy becomes the 
springboard for deploying another model of subjectivity. In this model, ‘to “live” a 
thing is not to coincide with it, nor fully to embrace it in thought’ (Merleau-Ponty in 
Vasseleu 1998: 42): 
for if these experiences never exactly overlap, if there is always a ‘shift’, a 
‘spread’, between them, [this] is not an ontological void, a non-being [but 
the site of the] joints where the multiple entries of the world cross [, 
where] I hear myself both from within and from without (Merleau Ponty 
1968: 148). 
 
The shift from one model to another may be summarized thus: 
[W]hereas Lacan sees the original schism or alienation in our relations 
with others first generated by the mirror stage as impossible to overcome, 
Merleau-Ponty, while agreeing that the body is never fully united […] 
does not intuit this alienation to be insurmountable [, it] can be overcome 
through establishing relations with the other […] once the other’s gaze has 
fixed the subject as an object, robbed her of being, and she in turn has 
posited the other as object (Fielding 1999: 195). 
  
 As a ‘mutation in our most intimate relational system’ (Bersani & Phillips 2008: 
76), extimacy is ‘an intimacy with a process of becoming, not with a person’ (Bersani 
& Phillips 2008: 114): the 
singularity of [a] nomadic, floating subjectivity [that] rests on the spatio-
temporal coordinates that make it possible […] to coincide with nothing 
more than the degrees, levels, expansion and extension of the head-on rush 
of the ‘outside’ inwards (Braidotti 1994: 145). 
 
The embodied dimension of such subjectivity lies in an open-ended intentionality to 
intend nothing but the undoing of one’s individual self. It is a type of ‘self-divestiture 
[...] rethought in terms of a certain form of self-expansiveness’ (Bersani & Phillips 
2008: 56) through 
a mode of surface contact with things and substances, with a world, that 
engenders and induces transformations and intensifications [in terms of] 
labyrinthine maps of voluptuous pleasures and intensities [that] shake up 
the body’s forms and sensations (Grosz 1995: 204). 
 
The philosophical, and indeed specifically ethical, understanding of the 
extimate being, its relation to others and the human collective (or society) it signals can 
be taken one step further, and then concluded, by returning to an account of my own 
practice and its collaborative elaboration. In order to do so, however, I shall initially 
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conduct the conceptual argumentation by means of the observation and analysis of 
another’s work. Echoing my own practical and convoluted process of inquiry into the 
gloom, João Fiadeiro’s performances articulate exemplary enactments of a self-divested 
individual or ‘impersonal narcissism’ (Bersani & Phillips 2008: 56) that is a mode of 
‘contact that apprehends and holds onto nothing’ (Lingis 1994: 222). 
 
 
 
109 João Fiadeiro, I Am Here, 2003 
 
After his seminal Self(ish)-Portrait (1995) and I am sitting in a room different 
from where you are in now (1997), Fiadeiro’s third solo performance, I Am Here (2003) 
pursues his engagement with a domain of encounter that is founded on his physical 
presence being spliced within the phenomenon of the black-out. This is the mechanism 
for operating his and our deindividuation, conceived as a ‘sustainable model of an 
affective, depersonalized, highly receptive subject which quite simply is not one, not 
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there, not that (Braidotti 1994: 145). This example from Fiadeiro’s work will in its turn 
be used to model and support the development of a collaborative stage in my practice, a 
stage that constitutes its end point as a proto-processual inquiry. 
 Located in a black box, I Am Here unfolds through a syntactic and generative 
use of a cyclorama, projections, lighting and black-outs. The first half of the piece 
opens with four fluorescent tubes revealing a large cyclorama positioned diagonally 
across the stage, its two ends suspended vertically and its middle section laid against 
the floor, to suggest a soft enclosure, a room, another container. At the centre of the 
cyclorama, Fiadeiro stands up still, dressed in black, with his shadow cast upon the 
cycloramic floor. All are suddenly plunged in darkness and then the silence is broken: 
blinded, the audience hears energetic breathing and the textural sounds of something 
rubbing against a surface. Light goes up and reveals the same space, with Fiadeiro 
standing in the same location and position. Yet his shadow is now partly destroyed 
(dark matter has dispersed beyond the shadow’s outline), and the vertically suspended 
far end of the cyclorama is imprinted with a still and dark image of Fiadeiro’s body in 
movement. Fiadeiro breaks his stillness and walks to the image: takes a pen, draws the 
outline of his two-dimensional and oblique replica and walks back to his initial 
position. During this time, although Fiadeiro’s shadow followed him as one would 
expect, his dark shadow on the floor remains the same and we thus understand that it is 
made of a black powder which was deposited exactly according to Fiadeiro’s real 
shadow. (It must be noted that the visual illustrations presented here do not show actual 
moments of the work, but alterations made by Fiadeiro for the purpose of 
documentation. In other words, the artist has chosen deceptively to re-present the work 
by way of still images of new moments derived from the show. I shall return to this 
mis-re-presentation after describing the piece. For now it is important to mention this 
since the following textual description of the work will not entirely match the images 
alongside it.) 
Returned to the position from which the shadow is drawn, Fiadeiro stands still 
again. Another black-out occurs, and again we hear staccato breathing and surfaces 
being rubbed against. The light goes up and this time Fiadeiro is standing up, still, in a 
new location on the cycloramic floor. His broken shadow is still there, now even more 
dispersed. On the vertical section of the cyclorama where his double had appeared 
remains only the black outline of that double. Now another still image of Fiadeiro 
performing a different movement is projected partly over the outline. He walks again to 
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this image, takes a pen and draws the projection’s outline, thereby creating a second 
outline that overlaps and breaks the first one. We understand then that it is his 
movements, performed in darkness, which have broken the powdered shadow and been 
captured by an infrared camera connected to a projector that immediately casts a still 
moment onto the cycloramic screen. 
He walks back to his initial position. Another black-out occurs and the same 
routine continues. The artificial shadow on the floor progressively loses all form while 
the reiteration of projected still images of Fiadeiro moving accumulates more and more 
outlines on the vertical cyclorama, making it less and less possible to determine bodily 
shapes out of the chiasmus of lines. Because the most dynamic physicality takes place 
during each black-out, this section of the performance can be understood as a process 
of kinetic habituation to darkness. On the other hand, juxtaposed with these moments 
where the body’s mobility is affected by darkness, are moments where the body’s 
activity, under light, disperses the dark matter on the floor and thus affects darkness. 
Darkness may thus be seen to function as a point of reciprocal interaction and affect 
between the body and space. Indeed, even in the black-outs, space can be felt as the 
sounds that allow us to decipher the body’s dynamic movements also incorporate the 
sounds of the cyclorama’s texture on the floor. However, these sounds alone make it 
impossible to know what body parts are coming into contact with the floor and how. 
Thus, the embodiment of darkness constitutes an ‘opening […] out to possible 
encounters with the “outside”’ (Braidotti 1994: 145) which are predominantly tactile 
and uncertain – where ‘touching [then is] a way of actualizing or taking up a position 
without reference to any schema’ (Vasseleu 1998: 115) – thereby ‘necessarily 
[provoking] improvisational elements that are context-specific’ (Hayles 1999: 200). 
These uncertain encounters are paradoxically redoubled, both in the projected 
stills, seen as attempts to freeze and decipher, and in the disordering of the black 
powder. Whilst on one hand the absence of light and the dark powder evolve as a 
growing formlessness, Fiadeiro’s physical relation to the projected stills, on the other 
hand, is not dynamic but predicated instead upon writing and outlining forms. In this 
way the body can be said to be at the starting point of the polyphonic process, split 
between its normative agency and new bodily potentials lying outside of such agency. 
The body discovers its otherness not only in the material imprecision of darkness but 
also within its normative agency as the outlines are multiplied towards becoming 
formless. Having established the tactility and formlessness of frictions both with the 
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cyclorama and with the edges of a body – which multiply, overlap and undo that body – 
Fiadeiro then moves on to cut the cyclorama loose at its bottom end. He leaves behind 
its vertical section saturated with the outlines of the projections suspended in the air. 
Then he turns to the horizontal, floor, section of the cyclorama and lifts up its newly cut 
side, raising it up vertically to bring all the black powder down to its middle. He folds 
the vertical half over the horizontal half, reducing the cycloramic floor surface by half. 
He stands up, still, in the middle of this folded section and the environmental lighting 
reduces to illuminate only the folded cycloramic floor (and Fiadiero within it). He 
breaks out of stillness to fold the cycloramic floor delicately in two, halving its surface 
again, and stands upright and still in the middle of it. The light again slowly reduces to 
cover the newly reduced surface of the cycloramic floor (and Fiadiero within it). As he 
continues to fold the cyclorama in halves, he slowly drifts stage left while the lighting 
reduces further and further to contain the light only within the space determined by the 
cycloramic floor and inhabited by Fiadeiro.  
 
 
110 Joao Fiadeiro, I am Here, 2003 
 
 Again based on repetition, this section focuses on the cyclorama as a floor and a 
space. The surface it first demarcated becomes mobilized by way of its bodily 
inhabitation. It then reduces in size to the point where it solely demarcates the body. 
First constituting a mise en abyme, a space within a space, an interior within an interior, 
the cyclorama’s spatial interiority shrinks down to a bodily exteriority. Importantly, 
therefore, as Fiadeiro’s body moves in and out of the cycloramic floor, altering it every 
time, it is posited as a fold, or crease, of the unsettling relation between the brightness 
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of the cyclorama and the darkness of the black box. This tension of what could be 
regarded as losing ground culminates when the cycloramic floor has been folded to 
such a point that it can only accommodate Fiadeiro’s feet. The lighting here is reduced 
to a narrow vertical corridor of light that can no longer cover Fiadeiro’s entire body 
(since his peripheral bodily regions partly exceed the cycloramic surface). This 
cumulative process can be taken to refer to the unfolding of a polyphonic intentionality 
towards self-elusiveness. It becomes the embodiment of a  
disappeared aesthetics […] which cannot not visualize, and which 
persistently and defiantly approaches its potentiality to not visualize, to 
forget, to be rendered blind [as] an attenuation of the visual and, 
simultaneously, a persistence of the visual in the midst of imperceptibility 
[where] visuality is something other than merely the difference between the 
visible and the invisible […] turn[ing] away from everything visible and 
everything invisible, and […] in turning its back on the visible and the 
invisible [it organizes] a betrayal (Ricco 2002: 41) 
 
   
111 Joao Fiadeiro, I am Here, 2003 
 
To conclude with the polyphony of multiplicity, Fiadeiro unfolds the cyclorama 
entirely onto the floor. By this point, he has drifted to the stage left and light is diffused 
in that area. Once the cyclorama has been fully opened up, it becomes a bright 
rectangular island in the middle of darkness. At its centre is revealed the black powder, 
now piled-up. Fiadeiro sits down in the middle of the cyclorama and slowly spreads the 
black powder with his hands over its entire surface, rubbing its rectangular corners and 
frame. After covering the whole of the cyclorama with the black powder, Fiadeiro, still 
sitting in the centre of a now entirely dark floor, camouflages his body in darkness by 
covering his hands with black powder and bringing them to his face gently to blacken 
it. As he does so, he gazes for the first time at the audience, holding it until his face is 
completely black and only his eyes gazing at us are visible. He then closes his eyes as 
the lighting comes to a final black-out. 
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 This last section of the performance takes place downstage, nearest to the 
audience, so that the subtle sounds of his hands rubbing the cyclorama are heard and 
the proximity refers us back to the initial section’s black-outs. Fiadeiro thus moves 
from the isolation and remoteness of a cycloramic room through its dislocation and 
dissolution to a surface that is turned into the same dark periphery from which it 
originates, and thereby joins the audience’s own shaded space. Although it is a scenic 
device that can be used to contain, when mobilized by corporeality the cyclorama is 
effectively exposed as a ‘variable geometry, a Möbian skin with no inside or outside, 
on which it is impossible to assume a position’ (Crary 2001: 218–19) both spatially and 
temporally. It has an effect like the temporal state described by Lacan:  
What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it 
is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but 
the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of 
becoming (Lacan in Grosz 2001: 131). 
 
The subsequent documentary dissemination of the work remains inhabited by a 
loop phenomenon that is a Möbian structure of time. Each photographic record is an 
altered version of a moment from the performance. In these images, Fiadeiro has found 
new ways of occupying the cycloramic floor. Photographed from above, he sits or lies 
on the cyclorama, producing new bodily positions and perspectives drawn from a 
different medium. The documentation simultaneously brings us back to the piece, 
performs new moments in the present and projects us into the future of other hybrid 
forms. It seems to continue ‘diverg[ing and] proceed[ing] by way of division and 
disruption [to] forge […] new modes of actualization that will transform [the body] into 
others unforeseen by or contained within it’ (Grosz 2001: 130). Thus, 
[w]e can invent the other people that we are already or may become as 
singular beings only if our being and being-together are indeterminate – 
not identifiable, given, recognizable in space and time – in other words, if 
our future remains unknown and our past indeterminate (Foucault in Ricco 
2002: 5). 
 
Conceived as an act of portraiture, the singularities of the being (I), its time 
(Am) and the space (Here) are all diffracted by a corporeal investment in the material 
world, a ‘prosthetic pleasure-ground [of] fluent obliviousness’ (Robertson 2003: 41). 
By developing the ‘exposition [of the body as] a disruption of context’ (Vasseleu 1998: 
115) and of the ‘outside [as] an interference in and displacement of the body’ (Grosz 
1995: 197), Fiadeiro turns the outside into a ‘locus as a site [moving and moved] 
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beyond intentionality and identification [, towards] estrangement and 
deterritorialization’ (Braidotti 1994: 261–2). In this highly exteriorizing and ‘caressive 
mode’ (Segal 2009: 228), subjective consciousness unfolds ‘in excess of [any singular] 
design and intention’ (Grosz 2001: 130). It has to be seen instead to assume an intimate 
drive, or, more precisely, extimacy, that is a ‘voluptuous desire fragment[ing] and 
dissolv[ing] the unity and utility of the organic body and the stabilized body-image’ 
(Grosz 1995: 195).  
In general theoretical terms, then, it can be suggested that in works of 
polyphonic self-divestiture, even the body-‘organism [itself can] no [… longer be seen 
as] integrated sets of functions [but as an] anorganic body [: an] orgasmic body’ (Lingis 
in Boundas and Olkowski 1994: 290). The embodied dimension of being discloses its 
‘erotogenic’ drive. This is a desire that ‘no longer functions according to an “intentional 
arc”, according to the structures of signification, meaning, pattern or purpose’ (Grosz 
1995: 195). This ‘eroticism’ where ‘carnality’ is ‘radically unsignifiable’ (Vasseleu 
1998: 114) is ‘an erotics […] that dissolves considerations of content into those of 
form’ (Sontag in Shusterman 1998: 118) and – since form is dissolving – ‘all those in 
relationship with [it] may, according to the strength of their investments in a 
phantasmatic unity, be brought face to face with their own originary body “in bits and 
pieces”’ (Shildrick & Price 2002: 72). It is as if ‘appear[ing] to ourselves completely 
turned inside out under our own eyes’ (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 143)  
 Thus, theoretically expressed, in the scenographic relational domain of 
‘becoming-imperceptible’ (Braidotti 1994: 260), we find the state of ‘reciprocal self-
recognition in which the very opposition between sameness and difference becomes 
irrelevant as a structuring category of being’ (Bersani & Phillips 2008: 86). Instead 
‘intersubjective and intercorporeal relations’ are based on ‘the coming together in 
difference, and the overlapping without fusing’ (Fielding 1999: 196). Here ‘identity is 
nothing other than a remarking of interior alterity, of the extimacy of being […] in this 
redoubling a movement occurs, an affecting; a distinction emerges in which that which 
was redoubled is affected, or becomes affect’ (Egginton 2006: 81). And ‘in opposition 
to the sentimentality of emotions, linked to the preservation of one’s ego as a stable 
entity, the affect points to an impersonal, or rather, a transpersonal flow of intensities’ 
(Braidotti 1994: 181) which is ‘the principle of not-One’ (Braidotti 1994: 145). This 
scenographic relationality, this operation of the gloom, inaugurates a new and 
desingularized mode of being: 
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To have dismantled one’s self in order finally to be alone and meet the 
true double at the other end of the line. A clandestine passenger on a 
motionless voyage. To become like everybody else; but this, precisely, is a 
becoming only for one who knows how to be nobody, to no longer be 
anybody (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 218). 
 
While this scenographic potency can be theoretically invoked and described, it 
remains perhaps at some distance from material realization. It was to this that my 
practical research addressed itself. The last phase of the practical research with the 
gloom focused on the work of affect. It sought to test the practical validity and potential 
of affect in relation to the lighting system that had been developed through my physical 
and adaptive interaction with it. To do so, the work was opened to other bodies, 
collaborators whom I hoped would find it possible to engage with and respond to this 
light. In that engagement I hoped they might discover a physical and aesthetic language 
similar to the one I found but also possibly different. In its difference it might 
potentially take the work forward with the result that I could return to it in a different 
capacity, as a different agent yet still congruent with the work’s phenomenon and 
development. My own body was replaced by a dancer/performer (Laura Doehler), two 
new developers were invited (Daniel Felstead and Robin Beitra) and a sound designer 
(Donato Wharton), while I stepped out to observe by undertaking the video 
documentation and spatial provision (black boxes and white cubes) of these 
collaborations. 
Various experiments were conducted, starting from the immersion of the 
performer and her adaptation to moving according to the projected light. As the 
performer became fluent in this respect, the sound designer was invited to attend to her 
physical exploration of the light, to capture sounds from it (including her vocal 
reactions) and thereby to compose a soundscape. Throughout, the digital programmers 
remained present because the discoveries the performer was making were in turn 
suggesting to us some additional developments to the lighting software. 
From the onset, the performer instinctively used small gestures to discover the 
responsiveness of the light. As she started comprehending it she explored larger and 
more complex movements. Throughout, she would repeat the same gestures or 
movements incrementally to find an alignment with the lighting phenomena that was 
supportive enough to move on to other kinds of kinesis. As with my own experience of 
it, the performer came generally to slow down her motion and fragment her bodily 
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construction by way of isolating body parts in movement or stillness. Unsurprisingly, 
her ability to do so was much greater than mine and so more minute kinetic details were 
developed. These required, in turn, further diversification of the lighting phenomena 
and thus the software. For instance, the performer’s range of slow-motion pace was 
more extensive than mine, with the effect that we enabled the software to highlight very 
slow movements with white noise (parasite-like white particles of light) that would 
thicken and become a field of light as kinetic speed increased. Being able to observe 
this highly iterative process by which a progression was nonetheless achieved, the 
sound designer went on to compose a soundscape that is accumulative yet looped.  
 
 
Plate 6 Wearable Shadows, 2010 (also see DVD excerpt Wearable Shadows) 
 
All of this work has been incorporated in the short film Wearable Shadows 
(provided here for reference). Using one sequence of the looped soundscape, various 
moments of the experiments were selected from the video documentation and edited 
chronologically to present the performer’s journey from discovery to adaptation and, in 
response, the lighting’s mutations. Towards the end of the film, I have included a 
moment where my hand is seen rapidly waving in the air and temporarily bringing light 
upon the otherwise shaded (because still) body of the performer. In real space and on 
film, this moment was most confounding spatially. The distance between the body and 
my hand was thoroughly incomprehensible. As when casting one’s shadow on another 
could make this other seemingly shift in distance, the casting of the light here did not 
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help locate the body but somehow continued to dislocate it. Just as importantly, this 
moment revealed the potential of interaction between bodies under this light, a potential 
which may be said to be based on   
an exorbitance of proximity […] distinguished from a conjunction in 
cognition and intentionality in which subject and object enter [:] beyond 
the disclosure and exhibition of the known alternate, surprised and 
surprising, an enormous presence and the withdrawal of this presence. The 
withdrawal is not a negation of presence, nor its pure latency, recuperable 
in memory or actualization. It is alterity, without common measure with a 
present or a past assembling into a synthesis in the synchrony of the 
correlative. The relation of proximity is disparate (Levinas 1998: 90). 
 
 
Conceptually driven by such a confusing yet enticing domain of co-presence, 
Wearable Shadows encapsulates the findings made during the last and most 
collaborative phase of practice. It is also a springboard for further conceptual 
developments as well as actual applications. Indeed by the end of this stage, the 
software had grown to a point where multiple applications were conceivable, not only 
as a lighting system for performance, architecture and urbanism but also as an 
immersive installation for audiences (with or without performers). Each of these would 
require some minor adaptation of the software to the physical requirements of the 
context but, simultaneously, each could be predicated upon the software, thereby 
evolving a performance or a building out of this body-light interaction. In particular, 
the conception of a theatre house that would be profoundly reliant upon this lighting 
software suggested new forms for the black box (see Greenhouse as Black Box 
sketches). But these practical implications for theatre spaces are simply one outcome of 
the engagement with the gloom. Alongside them emerged the need to summon up a 
range of theoretical discourses in order to understand more fully the human potency of 
the scenographic gloom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12 Greenhouse as Black Box Series, 2007 
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Fig. 13 Greenhouse as Black Box detail, 2007 
  
 The final stages of the practice, both actual and speculative, which bring the 
research journey to its end are likewise principally concerned with the affective alterity 
of ‘the outside [becoming] the inside [and] the spacing of the dis-position of the world 
[…] our disposition and our co-appearance’ (Nancy in Egginton 2006: 79). The last 
chapter will therefore describe more fully, and in more depth, the conceptual 
ramifications, and possible impact, of the gloom. To do that we shall follow the shape 
of the experimental practice and allow a range of other voices to enter the text, staging, 
at the theoretical level, a collaborative invocation that, again, moves on from authorial 
singularity. 
To philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Nancy, corporeal and 
subjective porosities between inside and outside hint at an ethical domain of alterity. 
They conceive of human relations as ‘the-one-for-the-other [that is] outside of any 
correlation and any finality’ (Levinas 1998: 96–7) and which initiates the affect of a 
‘self-touching-you’ (Nancy in Derrida 2005: 291), ‘where the self is as indispensable as 
you’ (Derrida 2005: 291).  Seen thus ‘[t]o be in contact is neither to invest the other and 
annul his alterity, nor to suppress myself in the other’ (Levinas 1998: 86), but ‘being 
[is] primordially exterior to itself and hence always other than itself […] other for one 
another’ (Nancy in Egginton 2006: 78). As Levinas puts it, 
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[T]he self is on the hither side of rest […] on the hither side of the limits 
of identity [,] hold[ing] on to oneself while gnawing away at oneself [to] 
exist through the other and for the other […] emptied even of the quasi-
formal identity of being someone […] disturbed in oneself to the point of 
no longer having any intention, exposed over and beyond the act of 
exposing oneself, answering for this very exposedness […] without this 
being alienation (Levinas 1998: 92–114). 
 
Like ‘the tenderness of skin [that is] the very gap between approach and approached, a 
disparity, a non-intentionality’ (Levinas 1998: 90), alterity is a ‘caress [that] consists in 
seizing upon nothing, in soliciting what ceaselessly escapes its form (Levinas 1969: 
257), a ‘relation without relation’ (Levinas 1969: 79) ‘discover[ed as] a continuum 
formed by the contiguity of other extended bodies’ (Condillac in Bruno 2002: 252). 
The alterity of ‘becoming-rhizomatic’ (Braidotti 1994: 68) fractures borders between 
individuals and refocuses our attention on ever-changing ‘points of contact [:] how 
[they] indicate, demarcate, and circumvent our sense of the shifting extremities 
between and within things’ (Smith 2001). This constitutes the ethical injunction, noted 
above, which is at play in alterity. It is a call to take ‘responsibility for another’ 
(Levinas 1998: 43) according to an ‘understanding of the self’s others’ (Shusterman 
1998: 107) drawn from ‘the body’s vulnerability to the impingement of the world’ 
(Vasseleu 1998: 114–15). This is the ‘good violence’ of a vertiginous ‘exposure of 
being’ (Levinas 1998: 80) that is 
the ground zero of subject-formation [where] the recognition of alterity in 
the sense of incommensurable loss and an unpayable outstanding debt to 
others entails the awareness that one is the effect of irrepressible flows of 
encounters, interactions, affectivity and desire, which one is not in charge 
of (Braidotti 1994: 269). 
 
 Based on a ‘defecting or defeat of the ego’s identity’ (Levinas 1998: 15), 
alterity suggests a ‘body [that is] an image [reliant upon] other bodies, a whole corpus 
of images stretched from body to body’ (Nancy in Derrida 2005: 288–9) whereby 
‘proximity [,] as though it were an abyss [, is] the skin caressed […] not the protection 
of an organism [but] the divergency between the visible and the invisible […] the 
alternating of sense, the ambiguity of a phenomenon and its defect, poverty exposed in 
the formless, and withdrawn from this absolute exposure’ (Levinas 1998: 90).  In other 
words,  
neither ‘presence’ nor ‘truth’ […] rather a way of binding the world and 
attaching oneself to it […] nature communicating itself to man […] does 
not need to be interpreted […] it is beyond the dialectic element […] and 
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the given […] the logos […] a logic, a language, any kind of structure [,] it 
is […] emotive like an infant, before it is a fixed narrative [, an] 
incantation […] that gives rise to a world in the advent of a language [:] 
neither dialogue nor monologue [but] the unique speech of the many […] 
of nature as humanity and of humanity as nature (Nancy 1991: 49–50, 54). 
 
 ‘Nature’ here should not, however, be understood as a finite scheme. Rather, 
following the ‘huge vibratory currents swathing the earth’ (Robertson 2003: 164) 
‘nature’ is cognate with ‘the terrifying soul of our surroundings’ (Proust in Kosofsky 
Sedgwick 2003: 592) that ‘accommodates us in a shivering’ (Robertson 2003: 162). 
From this sort of basis, we can propose that the gloom allows us to recover an intrinsic 
relation to such a dominating natural environment because it makes us ‘fall […] out of 
step with the march of surrounding things [in order to find new] unison[s] with it[s]’ 
(Dewey in Johnson 2007: 153) ever-changing directions. In this way, the affective 
alterity of relations and interactions -which is so crucial to the gloom – ‘prepare[s] us to 
act upon, to sense as best we can, the solidity and non-solidity of indeterminate 
boundaries on earth itself’ (Harris in Mercer 2006: 26). Here the embodied subject is  
neither ‘signifier’ nor ‘signified’ [but] exposing/exposed [, an] extension 
of the break that is existence [: a] mobile extension, spacing [made of the] 
drifts, sutures and fractures […] of the immemorial tectonic plates stirring 
up under our feet (Nancy 2006: 24–5). 
 
Now, since any enactment of the gloom would necessarily be located within 
societal constructs (social, cultural and political contexts) where the autonomy of self-
presence is heavily emphasized, we may think of the gloom as a partial eclipse of these 
very constructs. As such the gloom reminds us that ‘via the aesthetics of our bodily 
senses, the environment enters into the very shape of our thought, sculpting our most 
abstract reasoning out of our embodied interactions with the world’ (Johnson 2007: 
154). It allows us, crucially, to apprehend a ‘culture not only flow[ing] from the 
environment into the body but also emanat[ing] from the body into the environment’ 
(Hayles 1999: 200). Society is thus reconceived through the ‘full body of the Earth’ 
(Lambert 2005: 229). 
In the ‘pleasurable torment’ (Lingis in Grosz 1995: 195) of such ‘intercourse 
with the world’ through which ‘non-interpretational experiences’ constitute its very 
‘intelligen[ce] and meaningful[ness] (Shusterman 1998: 117), being’s every ‘gesture 
[is] prolonging its incompletion’ (Vasseleu 1998: 114). The scenographic gloom 
bestows a mode of being in the world – ‘habituation’ – as an ‘operation which we must 
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always start afresh’ (Proust in Kosofsky Sedgwick 2003: 592). In this way, it does not 
merely require the reconstruction of our understanding of the human but also, at the 
same time, bestows the human being with multiple, disparate and ever-changing forms 
and conceptions. It enables us to restore and evolve, in co-presence, ways to be 
constructively ‘imperfect, mechanical, in relations of dependence, originarily disabled 
or incomplete’ (Wills in Smith 2001). It is this which formulates the productive vertigo 
that characterizes any praxis of the gloom. Such a praxis, it now has to be 
acknowledged, is not merely aesthetic but also, importantly and inevitably, ethical. As 
such, like 
any alternative ethic of relationality, of mutuality, that did not rely on the 
strictly autonomous agency of the singular, detached self would go at least 
some way towards forestalling the anxiety, and even hostility, evoked by 
proximity. It means taking seriously the notion of becoming-in-the-world-
with-others (Shildrick & Price 2002: 72). 
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Conclusion 
Or: how to give non-human form to that which has human form? 
 
 
 
Desert. Dazzling Light. The man is flung backwards from right wing. He 
falls (Beckett 1971: 25). 
 
 
I am in a no man’s land, in the wandering and inaccurate condition of 
someone in search of something of which, in reality, one knows nothing: 
neither the name nor the entity, but only (if one is very lucky) the 
enchanting light of its form (Castellucci 2001: 183; present author’s 
translation).  
 
 
Narcissism would then find in the granite of things but a surface that 
would refer to men the echoes and reflections of their humanity (Levinas 
1998: 81). 
 
 
[T]he generative vitality of non- or pre-human or animal life (Braidotti 
1994: 37). 
 
 
 
To bring to its end this account of the mode and operations of the scenographic gloom, 
we shall stage a conclusion which will both present a summative ending to the research 
and yet disrupt itself as a finite terminus by way of departing from it. It is a conclusion 
but not a closure: a kind of Envoi. Furthermore, as part of the formal protocol of 
synthesizing implied by the act of concluding, the previous and sporadic management 
of the present author’s partial obscuring, off-staging, and becoming multiple will here 
find its climax. In this conclusion which does not conclude, a discursive patchwork of 
voices will suggest a radical and ethical departure of the author from the text and the 
reader.  
The research journey described here was initiated by asking the question as to 
what the scenographic production of visual imprecision and disturbances – the gloom – 
might reveal about the graphic domain of the practice. The particular issue has to do 
with the fact that the scenographic writing of space is historically ramified within an 
architectural tradition that monologically (in the form of linear perspective) insisted on 
and enhanced the clarity of spatial delineation and cognitive understanding. In 
exploring, by contrast, visual disturbance, the abjuration of clarity, this research sought 
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to uncover and comprehend the historical, practical and theoretical convergences and 
divergences between scenography and its tradition. These divergences were found to 
relate to and increasingly cultivate the paradigm of a speculative threshold, or void, in 
perception and cognition which was consolidated in the invention of the 
multiperspectival and haptic space of the black box. 
 In locating and describing the breaks that occurred within scenography’s own 
codes, broader schisms and correspondences were revealed between scenographic 
practice and other aesthetic domains of spatial construction such as architecture and the 
visual arts. Historical analysis showed, however, that by the time the scenographic 
gloom came to evolve into the black box, visual arts and architecture had formulated 
their own approaches to the speculative threshold of the visual field and its discursive 
legibility. Indeed the cycloramic dissolution of linear perspective, the deregulation of 
surface/volume and figure/ground agencies, and the substitution of the visual field for a 
haptic one can all be detected in the development both of tensegrity in architecture and 
of installation and live arts in galleries and museums.  
Researching the gloom in various spatial arts disclosed a conceptual thread 
between them. This pertained to the alignment and activation of spatial phenomena 
with corporeal phenomena. This spatio-corporeal domain is caused by an 
intensification of material frictions through which ‘space [is re-] oriented in terms of a 
body that exists […] as its originating site, its zero point’ (Garner 1994: 4). In 
phenomenological terms it is a ‘space […] starting from me as the zero point or degree 
zero of spatiality. I do not see it according to its exterior envelope; I live it from the 
inside; I am immersed in it’ (Merleau-Ponty in Iles 2001: 72). Critically, this ‘bodily 
space [–] the product of the double investment of the body by space […] and the 
investment of space by the body’ (Gil in Hansen 2002: 9) – is prompted by an approach 
to phenomena that is uncertain, interrogative and destabilizing. Thus, at the very core of 
the spatio-corporeal gloom lies what I have called vertigo. The operation of this is to 
question what the body and the built can be through speculating about – disorienting – 
their positionality.  
Spatio-corporeal positions and relations that have not yet been fixed can be 
inscribed neither in representation and language nor in intentionality. Relations 
between one’s body and the outside (a building or other bodies) are subverted in such a 
way that one’s contact with the outside cannot be solely pre-determined by one’s self or 
by any other external agency. Instead they are predicated upon one’s attempts to 
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relinquish agency through environmental phenomena and engage with the consequent 
venture into the alterity of an othered, affective and, as such, ever-changing 
subjectivity. This is simultaneously exacted and enacted by how the bodily or  
wearable space [discloses] the body’s infralinguistic capacity to convert 
force into affect [thereby] explain[ing] how spacing can be understood as 
a dynamic operation of framing that manages to avoid grounding: an on-
going embodied framing of space not as given in this or that form, but as 
processural (Hansen 2002: 368).  
 
 
            
 
            112 Socìetas Raffaello Sandio, Hey Girl!, 2007 
 
 
The movement away from that which is spatially fixed has led to the 
remodelling of ontological and epistemological assumptions about cognitive and 
perceptual experiences: 
Our primary concern was to destroy what existed, not due to a need for an 
empty space, but to satisfy the need to break the representation of the world 
that was handed on to us. We needed to start something else from zero 
(Castellucci 2001: 23; present author’s translation). 
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The best we can do in designing and lighting a set turns out to be: nothing at 
all … It’s not a process of building, but of destroying obstacles that stand in 
the way of the latent form (Brook in Baugh 2005: 197).  
 
A world is perceived and unfolded without the assumption or presupposition 
of perception in general. One has not troubled oneself or given man the 
responsibility for the genesis of space from his own time; one has not yet 
seen each perceiver as the effect or sign of a perception in general 
(Colebrook 2005: 201). 
                                                                                  
Since the sceno-graphic here constitutes a practice of writing that seeks to counter 
(visual) legibility, it may be described as a praxis of scribbling: an ‘undoing of writing 
in writing […] in turn undone by the touch of the Outside’ (Ricco 2002: 58).  
Thus if, as ‘Lecoq insists [,] the actor writes with his body […] just as the 
author writes with black lines on paper’ (Bradby 2006: xiii), then the scenographer’s 
writing is one of generating spatial phenomena that disrupt the actor’s body from its 
work of inscribing the author’s writing. This produces material pressures on models of 
representation, cognition, intelligibility and language. These epistemological models, 
and what they promise, are not eradicated, however, but are instead pushed to the 
periphery, up to ‘the moment before the[ir] fall’ (Decroux 1985: 23). So in the case of 
the black box, its own internal visual crisis  remains wrapped in and surrounded by 
architectural legibility. As a consequence the architectural mise en abyme that is the 
scenographic space becomes a mise en abyss where ‘two edges [are collided:] an 
obedient, conformist, plagiarizing edge […] and another edge, mobile, blank, ready to 
assume any contours […] the place where the death of language is glimpsed (Barthes in 
Brooks 2007: 45).  
 By positing ‘architecture with its flaw, the rule with its transgression, the 
discourse with its slips of the tongue, the function with its dysfunction … and the fabric 
with its rend’ (Didi-Huberman in Brooks 2007: 45), the scenographic space seems to 
take on ‘the deceptive semblance of a theatre of representation’ (Crary 2001: 220). Yet 
the act of focusing on the transgressive flaw upon which it is reliant allows us to discern 
a ‘concept of experience surpassing the experience of meaning’ (Vasseleu 1998: 93). 
This suggests a spatiality and a corporeality ‘devoid of reference to any locatable 
origin’ (Vasseleu 1998: 115): ‘where things have not taken their places but remain 
possible’ (Irigaray in Vasseleu 1998: 114). The situational (architectural) paradox of the 
scenographic space formulates a ‘non-place where the “no longer” and the “not yet” 
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reverse into each other [to] mark his or her assent to the loss of identity’ (Braidotti 
1994: 262): 
a ‘REVERSED’ space [that] evokes a world, objects […] not in their 
‘positive aspect’  […] but similarly to a pocket or a glove turned inside out 
with exposed stitches, threads and shreds (Kantor 1961: 213). 
 
 
       
113 Tadeusz Kantor, Electric Bulb (From the           114 Günter Brus, Selbstbemalung, 1964 
series Impossible Architecture Projects), 1970 
 
When applied to being, this reversed space promotes ‘dismembering’ and ‘juggling 
with’ corporeality and subjectivity (Kantor in Giesekam 2007: 118): 
the slowing of pace, loss of rhythm, repetition, elimination through noise, 
stupidity, clichés, automatic action, terror; by disinformation, withholding 
of information, […] acting poorly, acting ‘on the sly’, acting ‘non-acting’ 
(Kantor in Giesekam 2007: 118). 
 
The scenographic gloom is the ‘site of a loss, the seam, the cut, the deflation, 
the dissolve which seizes the subject’ (Barthes in Brooks 2007: 45). It forces us to 
remain suspended in the live thing, in the gap of the non-representable, 
rather than falling back into the production of dead, representable, and 
materialized action […] because the minute that anything is concretized, 
and is given a form, it becomes part of the fallen world (Foreman 1992: 
316). 
 
Desert. Dazzling Light. The man is flung backwards from right wing. He 
falls […] Whistle from right wing. He reflects, goes out right. Immediately 
flung back on stage he falls […] A little tree descends from flies, lands 
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[…] Whistle from above. He does not move. The tree is pulled up and 
disappears in flies (Beckett 1971: 25, 29). 
 
 
 
115 Ilya and Emilia Kabakov, The man who flew 
 into space from his apartment, 1988  
 
 
 Though the gloom has been coded with discursive qualities of a negative kind, 
ones often threatening the very existence of human life, in this research it has been 
linked to the ‘generative powers of doubt and uncertainty’ (Phelan 1993: 171): a 
productive and ‘lively […] vertigo’ (Robertson 2003: 163). Not the absence of visual 
content but its attenuation, the gloom requires us to reconsider ‘disappearance’, and 
especially the disappearance of a subject, not as ‘a disaster or death’ but as a ‘sudden 
topological change’ (Bey 2003: 130), a ‘movement […] stak[ing] out the path of escape 
in all its positivity’ (Deleuze and Guattari in Nechvatal 1999: 153–4) towards an 
irreducibly ‘complex positionality’ (Garner 1994: 4). It is ‘a non-dialectical double 
refusal [of] “no-longer-being” and “not-yet-being” at once’ (Ricco 2002: 41). 
 A praxis of the gloom, then, is a ‘think[ing of] space or life in general […] 
beyond its human territory […] in its infinite divergence’ (Colebrook in Buchanan & 
Lambert 2005: 204) which becomes a procedure of ‘reconstitut[ion of] our very way of 
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being human’ (Foreman 1992: 31). By postulating that which is not yet human – 
‘strik[ing] a new relationship to the non-human’ (Braidotti 1994: 37) – the gloom 
encourages  
a process that, while bringing forth a new humanity, does not yet know 
what humanity it is going to produce and, likewise, cannot possibly know 
exactly what humanity ‘does’ that producing (Carlson 2008: 137). 
 
We thus  
find our being less in the category of the human […] and more in the on 
going process that [Michel] Serres calls ‘hominescence’ [where the 
subject is] always under construction […] fundamentally relational, 
interactive, and evolving […] irreducibly inceptive [while enacting] its 
continual departure from any fixed place [and thus] the resistance of the 
human to placement or belonging [, to] any belonging that defines 
property and place, and any property or place that depends on belonging 
(Carlson 2008: 137). 
 
Desert. Dazzling Light. The man is flung backwards from right wing. He 
falls […] Whistle from right wing. He reflects, goes out right. Immediately 
flung back on stage he falls […] A little tree descends from flies, lands 
[…] Whistle from above. He turns, sees tree, reflects, goes to it, sit down 
in its shadow, looks at his hands […] the shadow returns. Whistle from 
above. He does not move. The tree is pulled up and disappears in flies. He 
looks at his hands (Beckett 1971: 25, 29). 
 
 This thesis has argued that the relational domain disclosed in the gloom can be 
understood according to an innovative reciprocity between the body and the 
environment.  This has ethical implications in that the relational domain of the gloom 
has been underpinned by intersubjective and intercorporeal propositions. Within these 
the agency of an author-figure becomes intersubjective and fades from view. For the 
propositions shift human relations away from fixed hierarchical structures and towards 
unfixed and affective interpenetrations. These formulate what the thesis has called 
alterity, a notion that 
requires us to see the emergence of a world, and of a humanity in and 
through that world, that can no longer be (if it ever was) understood 
adequately according to the old divisions of subject and object, activity 
and passivity, or, correlatively, according to the character and conditions 
of solely human intelligence and agency – all of whose localities and 
delimitations may once have served a project of mastery and possession 
that now grows untenable (Carlson 2008: 136). 
 
Since ‘we shall never return to the mythic humanity of the primal scene, no 
more than we shall ever recover what was signified by the word “humanity” before the 
fire of the Aryan myth’ (Nancy 1991: 46), the hominescent dissolve of the ontological 
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foundations of the human – of ‘origination’ (Nancy in Carlson 2008: 135) itself – 
requires an engagement with the ‘interruption of myth [, of] the stage upon which we 
represent everything to ourselves [:] the passing of time […] a consciousness, a people, 
a narrative’ (Nancy 1991: 44–5). ‘[T]o think our world in terms of [a mythological] 
“lack”’ (Nancy 1991: 47) would lead to a ‘touch[ing]’ of the ‘ghosts’ of the ‘myths’ of 
‘Man’ (Serres in Carlson 2008: 136) as a resistance to any ‘new metanarrative based on 
the story of the universe [, any new] mythic […] world view’ (Jencks in Nechvatal 
1999: 123). The aim is to dislodge any certainty from selves, even dissolving them, 
turning them into partial beings made of, and hungry for, ‘the unmarked, unspoken and 
unseen’ (Phelan 1993: 7).  
The scenographic gloom’s rendition and exploration of how to give non-human 
form to that which has human form present the productive possibility of ‘human 
incompletion and indetermination as both ground and consequence of the human 
capacity for technological creation that is also inevitably self-creation’ (Carlson 2008: 
136). It is to turn the determinant notion of being on its head by refusing to know what 
will be: 
[E]ntering the body [by] turn[ing] into matter […] to act [by] renouncing 
the fruits of action […] effort without finality […] finality without an end 
(Weil 2008: 180–81). 
 
[T]urning to life in the gesture of giving way (Vasseleu 1998: 128). 
 
We leave, and give leave to our productions; we produce, and we produce 
ourselves, through this incessant movement of leaving (Serres in Carlson 
2008: 137). 
 
[A]n insistent reminder of a mystery as familiar as it is unexplained, of a 
light which, illuminating the rest, remains at its source in obscurity 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968: 130) 
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